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ABSTRACT
MAKING MARKETS: THE POLITICAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE
EDUCATION IN INDIA
Emmerich Davies
Devesh Kapur
The two questions motivating this project are, first, why did India see such a rapid growth in private
education since 1980? And, second, what are the effects of this growth on citizen-state relations? Ap-
proximately 35 percent of students attended a private school in 2012, nearly a doubling in private school
enrollment since 2003. In 1987, Indian households spent an average of |10 (approximately 17 cents) out of
pocket on education per year. That figure stood at |2,700 (approximately $45) per year in 2014.
To answer the first question, I rely on a variety of methods, including historical and archival methods of
official government and international financial institution policy documents, parliamentary debates, and
secondary data sources. I argue that initial choices made in the expansion of government-provided education
in the 1980s and 90s created conditions that allowed for private providers to later thrive.
At the same time, interactions with government services serve as an important site of political socializa-
tion. What then happens when governments are no longer the primary providers of services? To answer
the second question, I rely on an original household survey with households that were entered into a pri-
vate school voucher lottery in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Here I find that access to private education does
not change a household’s engagement with the Indian state, but it does change their political preferences.
Household’s with access to private services express stronger preferences for private services and value gov-
ernment services less. I suggest that governments are fundamental in “making markets” and, in a process of
policy feedback, can then create constituents that are later hostile to the expansion of government provided
services.
vii
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
ABSTRACT vii
LIST OF TABLES xii
LIST OF FIGURES xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xv
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND TERMINOLOGY xvi
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Two Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.1 The Growth of Private Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.2 The Effects of Private Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 The Argument in Brief: A Theory of Policy Feedback in Flailing States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Overview of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 SOME STYLIZED FACTS ON PRIVATE EDUCATION IN INDIA 24
2.1 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.1 Supply Side Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.2 Demand Side Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 POLICY DRIFT & LAYERING IN INDIAN EDUCATION POLICY: FROM UNIVER-
SALIZATION TO PRIVATIZATION 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Policy Drift in Indian Education Policy from 1986-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 A Renewed Commitment to Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Creating Facts on the Ground: The Legacies of the National Policy on Education . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Reacting to Facts on the Ground: The Judiciary and Codifying Spaces for Private Schools . 55
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4 FRIENDS OF THE STATE? STATE CAPACITY AND PRIVATE SCHOOL GROWTH IN
INDIA 61
4.1 Context: The District Primary Education Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 Data & Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.1 District Information System for Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.2 Economic Census . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.3 Population Census and Village Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.4 Annual Status of Education Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.5 Operationalization of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.6 Difference-in-Difference Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.7 Regression Discontinuity Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.8 Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
viii
4.4.1 State Territoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.2 Reach of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.3 Size of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.4 State Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4.5 Private School Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.6 Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5.1 Data Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5 THE LESSONS PRIVATE SCHOOLS TEACH: USING A FIELD EXPERIMENT TO UN-
DERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 99
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Theoretical Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Setting the Context: Private Services in India and the Andhra Pradesh School Choice Ex-
periment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4.1 Operationalizing the Key Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.1 Political Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5.2 Economic Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.6 How do Preferences Change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6.1 Evaluations of Front-Line Functionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6.2 Claim-Making Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6.3 Private Sector Permanence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.7 Alternative Explanations: English Language Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6 CONCLUSION 131
6.1 Scope Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.1 Flailing States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.2 Experience Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.1 Privatization and Experience Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.2 Political Responses to Education for All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.3 Private Schools and Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2.4 School-Level Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3.1 Causal Inference and Policy Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3.2 The Role of Non-State Providers in Service Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 142
A.1 Mincerian Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
ix
B APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4 143
B.1 Difference-in-Difference Parallel Trends Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.2 Regression Discontinuity Design Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.2.1 Pre-Treatment Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B.2.2 Robustness to Bandwidth Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.2.3 Robustness to Cutoff Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.2.4 First Stage in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.3 Using National Sample Survey Household Level Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.3.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B.4 Exploring Alternative Explanations Using the National Sample Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.4.1 Triple Differences in Private School Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.4.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.5 Data Consistency Between the Economic Census and the District Information System for
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.6 District Bifurcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
B.7 District Primary Education Programme District Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5 181
C.1 Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
C.2 Selection & Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
C.3 First-Stage Estimator for Instrumental Variable Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
C.4 The Andhra Pradesh School Choice Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
C.5 Downstream Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
C.6 Full Results Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
C.6.1 Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
C.6.2 Associational Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C.6.3 Intention to Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.6.4 Comfort with Private Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
C.6.5 Willingness to Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
C.6.6 State Claim Making Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
C.6.7 Non-State Claim Making Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
C.6.8 Teachers Non-Teaching Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
C.6.9 Teacher Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
C.7 First-Stage Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
D SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR CHAPTER 5 232
BIBLIOGRAPHY 272
x
List of Tables
3.1 State-Level Education Programs 1984-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 Summary Statistics: Economic Census Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Summary Statistics: DISE Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Summary Statistics: Population Census Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Difference in Government Schools Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5 Difference in Private Schools Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6 Difference in Literacy Rates Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.7 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Villages with Government Schools . . . . . 82
4.8 Difference-in-Difference: Government Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.9 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Government School Growth . . . . . . . . . 85
4.10 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Test Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.11 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.12 Reggresion Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Percent of Villages with Private Schools . 89
4.13 Reggresion Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.14 Difference-in-Difference: Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.15 Time-Series-Cross-Sectional: Private School Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Balance Tests Between Treatment and Control Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3 Compliance Rate: Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.1 Mincerian Regression of Returns to Education on Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.1 Regression Discontinuity Pre-Treatment Discontinuity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.2 Regression Discontinuity Bandwidth Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.3 Regression Discontinuity Cutoff Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.4 First Stage RD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B.5 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.6 Triple-Differences: Private School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.7 Triple-Differences: Any Private School (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B.8 Triple-Differences: Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.9 Triple-Differences: Private School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.10 Triple-Differences: Any Private School (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
B.11 Triple-Differences: Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.12 DPEP District Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
C.1 Compliance Rate: Downstream Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
C.2 First-Stage Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
C.3 Comparison of Sample Socieconomic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
C.4 Political Participation Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
C.5 Member of a Political Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
C.6 Attended a Political Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
C.7 Canvassed for a Political Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
C.8 Distributed Leaflets for a Political Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
C.9 Associational Membership Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C.10 Member of a Caste Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
xi
C.11 Member of a Cooperative or Labor Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C.12 Member of a Self-Help Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.13 Electoral Participation Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.14 Intend to Vote: Lok Sabha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
C.15 Intend to Vote: Vidhan Sabha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
C.16 Voted: Panchayat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
C.17 Private Services Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
C.18 Preference for Private Sector Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
C.19 Basic Services should be Provided Privately . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
C.20 Basic Services should be Financed Privately . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
C.21 Voucher Child Continued in Private School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
C.22 No. Children in HH in Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
C.23 Choice of Private Health Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
C.24 Willingness to Pay Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
C.25 Willingness to Pay: School Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
C.26 Willingness to Pay: PDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
C.27 State Claim Making Networks Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
C.28 State Channel: Access to Government School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
C.29 State Channel: Access to BPL Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
C.30 State Channel: Access to Government Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
C.31 State Channel: NREGA Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
C.32 State Channel: Dealing with Police or Land Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
C.33 Non-State Claim Making Networks Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
C.34 Non-State Channel: Access to Government School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
C.35 Non-State Channel: Access to BPL Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
C.36 Non-State Channel: Access to Government Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
C.37 Non-State Channel: NREGA Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
C.38 Non-State Channel: Dealing with Police or Land Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
C.39 Government Teachers Serve as Election Monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
C.40 Government Teachers Serve as Census Enumerators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
C.41 Government Teachers Care about the Well-Being of Their Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
C.42 Government Teachers Treat All Students Equally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
C.43 First-Stage Regression for Accepted Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
C.44 First-Stage Regression for Enrolled in Private School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
C.45 First-Stage Regression for English Medium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Public and Private School Growth since 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 Government School Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 Private School Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Government School Growth by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Private School Growth by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 NSDP and Private Schools per 10,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 State-Level GDP and Private Schools as Percentage of All Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Distribution of District Level Average Returns to Primary Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.8 The Return to Education and Number of Private School. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.9 Caste Fractionalization and Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Private Schools as a Percentage of All Schools in 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Growth in Private Schools 1986-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 DPEP Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Education Policy Timeline and Data Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Difference-in-Difference: Government Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Difference-in-Difference: Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 Villages with Government Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8 Government Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Test Scores Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.10 Changes in Literacy Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.11 Villages with Private Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.12 Private Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1 Growth of Private Education in India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Survey Districts in Andhra Pradesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3 ITT: Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 ITT: Associational Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 ITT: Intention to Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.6 ITT: Preference for Private Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.7 ITT: Valuation of Public Serives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.8 ITT: Local Level Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.9 ITT: Front-Line Functionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.10 ITT: State Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.11 ITT: Non-State Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.12 ITT: English Language Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.1 Placebo Test: Difference-in-Difference Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.2 Placebo Test: Difference-in-Difference Private Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B.3 McCrary (2008) Sorting Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.4 Probability of Falling on Either Side of DPEP Literacy Cutoff by DPEP Districts . . . . . . 146
B.5 Regression Discontinuity Pre-Treatment Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.6 Regression Discontinuity Varying Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B.7 Discontinuity Plots Using National Sample Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.8 Out of Pocket Expenditure on Education by Consumption Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B.9 Out of Pocket Expenditure on Education by Caste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
xiii
B.10 Government Schools: 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.11 Government Schools: 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.12 Government Schools: 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
B.13 Private Schools: 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
B.14 Private Schools: 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B.15 Private Schools: 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
xiv
List of Abbreviations
APPEP Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Project
ASER Annual Survey of Education Report
BJP Bharitiya Janata Party
CSS Centrally Sponsored Scheme
DFID Department for International Development
DIET District Institutes of Education Training
DISE District Information System for Education
DPEP District Primary Education Programme
IDA International Development Association
IHDS Indian Human Development Survey
IIM Indian Institute of Management
IIT Indian Institute of Technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
MTA Mother Teacher Associations
NEDA Netherlands Development Assistance
NPE National Policy on Education
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NSP Non-State Provider
NUEPA National University of Education Planning and Management
ODA Overseas Development Administration
PIL Public Interest Litigation
RTE Right to Education
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSA Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
VEC Village Education Committee
xv
A Note on Spelling and Terminology
Throughout this dissertation I sometimes quote policy makers, politicians, and official Indian government
documents. These are written using British English spelling and I leave the spelling and grammar as is
in the original. When referring to the national level government in power in Delhi, I refer to it as the
“Central” or “Centre” government and remain consistent with British spelling. When referring to state-
level governments as a collective, I use the capitalized “States”. The Central Government in India is what
would be considered the Federal Government in the United States
In Great Britain and former British colonies, “public schools” are used to refer to schools that are pri-
vately managed and financed but are otherwise open to the public. To avoid confusion, I use the term
“government schools” when I am writing about schools that are managed and financed by the Indian gov-
ernment.
I also often refer to schools run by mosques and other Muslim religious groups as “madrassas”. Although
I recognize that this terminology is currently fraught with negative associations and has the potential to be
orientalizing, I continue to use this name to describe Islamic religious schools as that is the common phrase
used to describe them in South Asia.
Through this dissertation project, I use the number of schools per 10,000 school-aged children instead of
the number of schools per capita. I do this for ease of interpretation rather than following any convention
as this allows for whole numbers instead of decimal places.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades the Indian government has rapidly expanded government school provision.
Public expenditure on primary education has tripled since 1990 (Chakrabarti and Mistree, 2013; Goyal,
2009, 327), and since the implementation of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (or Education for All) in 2002 India has
built an average of 200 new government schools per district, or about 30 schools per district per year (Figure
1.1). As a result, India has achieved near universal enrollment in education (ASER, 2015a), previously a pox
on India’s social development record (Weiner, 1990). At the same time, Indian households are increasingly
turning to private and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for education. Approximately 35 percent
of students attended a private school in 2012, nearly a doubling in private school enrollment since 2003
(Figure 1.1). In 1987, Indian households spent an average of |10 (approximately 17 cents) out of pocket
on education per year. That figure stood at |2,700 (approximately $45) per year in 2014 (National Sample
Survey Office 1987, 2014).1
What is most striking about this move away from public education is that while it was previously an
upper and middle class phenomenon, India’s poor have also begun to abandon government education. In
a survey of Patna, a large city in East India, Rangaraju, Tooley and Dixon (2012) found that there were
between 10 and 100 private schools for every government school in the city. Most of these schools were
low-fee private schools catering to the city’s poor. Citizens are choosing to “exit” state provided education
and turn to government schools for education (Hirschman, 1970).
There are at least three reasons we should be concerned about the growth of private education in India.
First, not only does public education represent a redistribution of income in the present by transferring
financial resources from the wealthy to the poor, it also holds the promise of reducing intergenerational
transmission of poverty by increasing human capital of low-income individuals and increasing future earn-
ing power (Angrist and Krueger, 1992). If private schools were providing higher quality education, exit to
private school would be one way to reduce intergenerational inequality. The best evidence we have of the
quality of private schools, however, suggests that they are no better, and may be worse than government
schools (ASER, 2015a; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015; Singh, 2013). The poor are then paying
out-of-pocket for poor quality education, representing a net welfare loss.
Second, education has the ability to socialize individuals into the political system. Experiences inside
1Both figures are quoted in 2010 prices. The nominal amounts were |50 in 1987 and |2,300 in 2014.
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Figure 1.1: Public and Private School Growth since 2005.
The solid line measures the percentage change in government primary schools. The dotted line measures the percentage change in
private primary schools.
Source: District Information System for Education (DISE) 2005-2012.
2
schools can shape experiences of citizenship and provide common experiences around which polities are
constructed. Early experiences provide long-standing lessons on the value a nation places on its citizens
(Marshall, 1964). If the state no longer provides education, it loses a level of control of this socialization
process as well as the ability to provide a common experience for all its citizens (Bowles and Gintis, 2011;
Freire, 2000; Marshall, 1964; Pritchett, 2002; Weber, 1976).2 It also has spillovers to other elements of
citizenship such as political participation and social capital (Mettler, 2005). These features are particularly
salient in India where government school teachers are often the most educated members of a village (Béteille,
2015), and serve a number of other roles important to citizen interactions with the state such as census
enumerators and poll-booth monitors. Access to private services in other contexts have been shown to
change citizens’ relationship with the state (Di Tella, Galiani and Chargrodsky, 2007; Jeffery and Jeffery,
2008; Lerman, 2013) — does education still retain these positive externalities if it is provided privately?
Finally, teachers and education bureaucrats are also often the “front-line functionaries” of the state and
structure interactions between citizens and the state (Béteille, 2009). Especially in low-income countries,
government teachers are of the only constant state presence in some rural areas. Interactions with these
functionaries provide lessons on how the state views its citizens and how they can expect to be treated by
the larger state apparatus (Lipsky, 2010; Soss, 1999). Exit from the state breaks these relationship, whether
negative or positive, and reduces contact with the state.
This dissertation is motivated by questions raised by this third concern but also speaks to concerns of the
first two. Why, after the Government of India has effectively saturated the education market, do private
schools still thrive? And, what effect is this having on citizen’s engagement with the Indian state? The
expansion of the private sector in education in India belies easy explanation. Although there are numerous
discontents with the government education system in India, few provide convincing explanations for the
mass exodus from government education.
Exit is not an elite phenomenon. Although India has grown at about eight percent per year since the
early 2000s, exit to the private sector has not been the result of increased incomes for rural populations.
Many schools charge no more than |100 per month (approximately $2 USD per month) and are located in
poor urban and rural areas (The PROBE Team, 1999; Tooley and Dixon, 2003; Tooley, 2009; Rangaraju,
2The state can also outsource the provision of education to private providers and heavily regulate the content, but has often
preferred the direct provision over regulation as a result of incomplete contracting between the state and the private sector (Pritchett,
2002). For an example of this preference for direct control over contracting occurring in India contemporaneously, see The Wire
(2016).
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Tooley and Dixon, 2012). Priced at that level, they are accessible to large numbers of the population.
Private schools also do not provide better quality education. What research there has been on the dif-
ferences in quality between the private and government sector suggest that the private sector is marginally
better at best (Some of the most recent works, inter alia ASER (2015a); Chudgar and Quin (2012); Goyal
and Pandey (2012); Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015); Singh (2013)). Indeed, the quality of education
has been falling across both the government and private sectors (ASER, 2015b).
Teacher absenteeism has also often been offered as an explanation for disaffection with the government
school system. Indian government teachers are often missing, and, when present, not teaching (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2006; Kremer et al., 2005; Muralidharan et al., 2016). Much of this work assumes that the problem
lies in the lack of incentives regular government teachers face and that private contracting will align teacher
incentives to student outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether carefully designed incentives to motivate
government and private school teachers will work either. Various forms of teacher incentives have been
shown to work in the short-term (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011a,b), but ignore the long-term
costs (Robinson and Gauri, 2011; Béteille and Ramachandran, 2016). On the private side, private school
teachers confessed that their ultimate career aspirations were to become regularized government school
teachers because of the higher pay and job security (Anonymous interview, Medak District, October 2013).
Social aspirations have also been increasing with rapid economic growth and urbanization and have
been offered as an explanation for demands for private and, more importantly, English language education
(Genicot and Ray, 2015; Fernandes, 2006; Kapur, 2010a; Kapur and Witsoe, 2011; Kapur, 2010a). Citizens
are moving to urban areas in large numbers (Auerbach, 2015; Fernandes, 2006; Kapur and Witsoe, 2011)
and economic opportunities in urban areas are changing demands for education. But there is no reason to
expect that, ex ante, rising aspirations should increase demand for private education instead of improved
government education. When asked directly why households that sent their children to private schools
chose the private option, only ten percent explicitly cited English language education as their motivation
(National Sample Survey Office, 2014). Why have changing aspirations led to the exercise of exit over voice?
1.1 Two Questions
This dissertation poses two questions. First, why, despite the rapid growth in financing and provision of
government provided primary education, do we see an exit to the private sector? Second, what happens
to political attitudes and behaviors when citizens exit from government education? I discuss these two
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questions more formally below and then expand on the existing literature that attempts to address them.
1.1.1 The Growth of Private Education
This first question is concerned with the timing and form the growth of private education took in India. The
fastest growth of private schools occurred in the late 1990s and 2000s, well after market-oriented reforms.
Most of this growth was in private un-aided schools, schools that receive no financial support from the
Indian government. As I show in Chapters 2 and 4, there have always been some states in India, particularly
Kerala in the South, that have had high levels of private investment and management of education. However,
this pattern has changed in recent years. While Kerala continues to have high levels of private management
of education, most other states in India have now caught up to Keralan rates.
The geographic location of private institutions has also changed dramatically. While most private
schools were previously located solely in urban areas (Deva, 1985, 1648), this is no longer the case (The
PROBE Team, 1999). During field work, not one village I visited was lacking a private school, some having
up to four within walking distance. Private schools are now a rural as well as urban phenomenon. How
can we explain these outcomes?
Answers to the growth of public and private education have largely fallen into three strands. First, schol-
ars have suggested that a country’s relative levels of private investment in education are a result of bargains
during a nation-states early development. Second, democratization, and the new political voices intro-
duced during democratization, are believed to influence investments in education. Finally, market-oriented
reforms and integration into the global economy was supposed to sound the death knell for government
provided services, education among them, and private providers were expected to pick up the slack.
State-Formation and Education
The canonical model in economics suggests that governments should provide public goods such as public
health and education as this will be under-provided by the market (Sen, 2000). Certain market failures,
such as the inability to internalize the positive externalities provided by health and education, result in an
under-provision by the private market and the call from economic theory to provide this good publicly.3
Bargains made during early state-formation have been seen as important in explaining the relative in-
3This call, it should be noted, is not for the government to necessarily operate public services and can take many forms such
as financing (in the form of school vouchers and health insurance) and regulation (in the form of medical accreditation boards for
example).
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vestment in government versus private education. Private education was seen as a way to contain religious
conflict by giving large religious groups control over their education. Ansell and Lindvall (2013) suggest
that countries with large Catholic populations will see greater private investment in education as a way
to solve religious conflict. This explanation carries weight in India where Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and states
in the North-East, with a large early presence of private schools, have the highest proportion of private
schools. Singh (2010) argues that allegiance to a common sub-national identity (in her case a Malayali na-
tional identity in Kerala) facilitates investments in public goods such as education through private channels
as minorities were given freedom in running their own schools..
In Chile, Soifer (2010, 2015) finds that local-level institutions were crucially important in implementing
central state directives. Local-level state officials played two roles in the expansion of Chilean schooling
in the early 19th Century: properly implementing state policies on education, and second refining these
policies independently to adjust to local level conditions. The role of local-level institutions and the “front-
line functionaries” of the state is an aspect of the implementation of education policy I return to later.
Akshay Mangla (2015a) also finds a large role for education bureaucrats. He argues that organizational
culture and bureaucratic norms are critical for the proper implementation of education program in India.
It is the “unwritten rules that guide the behavior of public officials and structure their relationships with
civic actors outside of the state [that] influence how officials enact their roles and responsibilities as they
carry out the tasks of policy implementation” (Mangla, 2015a, 884).
In new nation-states, and new states within India, committed education bureaucrats have been found
to be important in the establishment in a broad-based government provided education system. Himachal
Pradesh (in the case of Mangla (2015a)), and Chile (in the case of Soifer (2010)), are two cases that, until
recently have seen relatively higher levels of government investment in education.
Explanations rooted in initial nation-building bargains, however, do not help us understand changing
dynamics. While Kerala and other states with large religious minority populations had high initial levels of
private education, they saw much slower growth in private education in later periods as I show in Chapter
2. Initial bureaucratic cultures have also been found to be strong predictors of robust government education
systems. But for bureaucratic culture to help us explain the rapid growth in private education, we would
have to see a rapid deterioration in bureaucratic culture in India. What is more likely is that bureaucratic
culture has always been poor with some notable exceptions such as Himachal Pradesh as Mangla (2015a)
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finds.
Democratization and Education
The third wave of democratization and the increased focus on the causes and consequences of democracy
in non-OECD countries has led to an interest of the effects of democracy and democratization on social
spending in general and education in particular. Modernization theory argued that democracy and edu-
cation would move together, although the causal direction was left unclear (Lipset, 1959). Expanding on
mechanisms, later arguments have suggested that with the inclusion of previously excluded groups and
widening of the “selectorate”, democracies should lead to greater redistribution (Lake and Baum, 2001;
Przeworski et al., 2000).
Lake and Baum (2001) suggest that democracy has an “invisible hand” that leads to greater spending on
human capital investments such as health and education. Their argument rests on the inability of demo-
cratic leaders to fully extract monopoly rents as autocratic leaders can. Brown and Hunter (2004) also find
that democracies are likely to spend more on primary education than autocracies. Ansell (2010) gives agency
to mass organization and their ability to organize around demands for greater redistribution to primary,
as opposed to tertiary, education. In a similar vein Kosack (2009, 2012, 2014) argues that “political will”
is an important determinant of whether democratic governments will invest in education. Political will
emerges when there is a “vital constituency” (Kosack, 2009, 502), that resembles the “selectorate” in Lake
and Baum’s (2001) conception, or Stasavage (2005b) class-based political coalitions. In a subnational study
of government expenditure on education in Mexico, Doug Hecock (2006) shows that electoral competition
has led to higher levels of spending on education, suggesting that higher “quality” democracy leads to higher
levels of investment in education.
David Stasavage (2005b) argues that Uganda’s transition to multi-party democracy increased spending
on primary education as education became a salient political issue in post-democratization elections. He
also cautions against generalizing from Uganda on the basic relationship between democracy and education
because the winning coalition for Yoweri Museveni across Uganda was constructed on class, not regional or
ethnic, lines. He suggests that places where ethnic cleavages are more salient than class cleavages, it might be
difficult to construct coalitions in favor of broad-based education, suggesting an important role for ethnic
cleavages in the provision, or lack of, of education. In support of this story, Kramon and Posner (2016)
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suggest that, even under democracies, leaders favor members of their own ethnic groups in the provision of
public goods, providing evidence that even if the salient cleavage is ethnic, democracies might still provide
high levels of education, but in a particularistic way.
In a cross-country study of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, however, Stasavage (2005a) finds
that African governments have spent more on primary education after democratization, downplaying the
effects of ethnic cleavages. In another cross-country study of the effects of democracies on investment in
education, David Brown (1999) finds support for the idea that democracies invest more in education as a
result of electoral pressures. Providing greater nuance to these results, Harding and Stasavage (2014) find
that democracies have higher rates of school enrollment and lower school-user fees that non-democracies
across sub-Saharan Africa. There is little difference in school inputs, however. They suggest this is because
democratically elected politicians are more likely to exert effort in highly-visible goods like school-fees,
and reduce efforts for less visible goods like school inputs, a finding supported by evidence from India
(Mani and Mukand, 2007). Moving beyond simply measuring education expenditures, Michael Ross (2006)
suggests that democracy might not actually lead to useful educational redistribution. He finds that although
democracy does result in higher levels of public investment in education, this does not translate to higher-
levels of welfare for the poor.
Although none of the works above deal directly with the role the private sector and non-state providers
(NSPs) play in service provision regimes and education, except as the inverse of public provision, this lacuna
has begun to be addressed in more recent years. As democracy is believed to be good for public investment
in education, it is also believed to enable NSPs. Scholars have found that, particularly in formerly authori-
tarian countries, NSPs can now form, operate and grow and not necessarily be viewed as threatening to the
incumbent party or regime (Brass, 2010, 2012, 2014).
Separately from the ability to operate in more open political environments, the expansion of govern-
ment provided education under democracies has also been found to directly impact the demand for private
education. For example, in Kenya, the implementation of education for all resulted in the entrance of
large number of poorer students to formerly exclusive government schools, resulting in middle-class exit
to private schools (Bold et al., 2015; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). With democratization and the political imper-
atives to provide broad-based education, the Kenyan government launched an education-for-all campaign
and eliminated user fees in primary education. Bold et al. (2015) and Lucas and Mbiti (2012) find that this
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allowed previously excluded groups to access government education, but pushed wealthier households to
private schools. Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2013) also find that private schools in Pakistan are uniquely
dependent on the prior expansion of government education. They argue that private schools depend on
a large cadre of publicly educated and unemployed women. Without the expansion of public schools, the
female teachers that private schools employ would not have otherwise received an education.
Market-Oriented Reforms, Global Integration, and Education
Market-oriented reforms, market liberalization, and integration into the global economy have also led to
changes in service provision regimes. Early scholarship on market-oriented reforms and increasing integra-
tion into global markets suggested that integration would constrain the ability of domestic govearnments to
make policy (Cerny, 1995; Garrett, 1998). This contradicted foundational work on the introduction of mar-
kets in Western Europe that suggested that with the rise of markets there would be a “double movement”
to protect society from the vagaries of the market (Polanyi, 1944). Others, such as John Ruggie (1982),
suggested that the new wave of market-integration would break the “embedded liberalism” compromise of
post-World War II global market integration. Early empirical work from OECD nations complicated this
picture. Countries with larger initial welfare states were more likely to be open to international trade as
welfare states were more likely to compensate the losers from international integration (Rodrik, 1998).
Moving outside of the OECD has led to indeterminate empirical findings. Erik Wibbels (2006) argues
that developing countries peripheral position and late integration into the global economy spells doom for
the welfare state. Wibbels and Arce (2003) also argue that global integration has shrunk the welfare state,
while Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) show that although social security spending has decreased in
Latin America after international integration, spending on health and education has increased. Thomas
Gift (2014) argues that integration into the global economy will increase demand for education as citizens
look to increase their human capital to better match available jobs. Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) find
that increasing market integration has not had the dire consequences predicted by globalization skeptics and
in an analysis of Latin American countries during economic crises, Brown and Hunter (1999) also find that
democracies are more likely than autocracies to compensate voters during economic crises. Chakrabarti
and Mistree (2013) find that state governments across India have dramatically increased their spending on
education but not on health. They argue this is because the rhetoric after market-oriented reforms in India
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emphasized human capital accumulation in the form of greater education, but not in greater investments in
healthcare. All the authors suggest this is because as countries integrate into the global economy, there are
increased demands for human capital investments from national governments. In a more nuanced take on
the effects of market integration for the poor, Nita Rudra (2008) argues that welfare states in the developing
world have never traditionally served the poor, so while welfare states might be receding, those most harmed
by this retrenchment are the middle classes.
Studies of NSPs have also argued that their growth is a response to market failures. Africa in particular
has been said to be in a state of “permanent crisis” and has under-provided public services as a result (van de
Walle, 2001). They suggest that non-state providers emerged as a result of market failures to provide forms
of insurance and risk management for citizens across the developing world (Dercon, 2002; MacLean, 2002;
The World Bank, 2003). Lauren MacLean (2010, 2011) suggests that after state retrenchment and market-
oriented reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, citizens have turned to private providers and informal networks
for social protection.
Reforming governments in the United States and Western Europe have also looked for private actors
to serve as a “shadow state” when the state can no longer provide public goods (Wolch, 1990; Gottschalk,
2000). As a result, NSPs, particularly NGOs, already provide a myriad of welfare services in countries
such as Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Gingrich, 2011). In a study of the introduction of markets
into public services across OECD economics, Jane Gingrich (2011) seeks to explain the variation in the
types of markets introduced in advanced capitalist countries. She argues that the structure of markets will
vary depending on existing partisan constraints, with left-wing parties introducing markets as a way to
incentivize producers to control costs (as the example of the Affordable Care Act in the United States most
recently exemplifies). Right-wing parties on the other hand will use markets to give power to new private
producers and limit the role of the state. As they are limited by prior constraints, however, they can only
do so for marginal producers.
On the surface, these explanation certainly carry weight in India where the bulk of NSPs in education
outside of religious education has emerged after India liberalized its economy (see Chapter 2). It is therefore
important to understand the role that market-oriented reforms and international integration has played
in the growth of private education. The explanation is insufficient, however, as I argue that most of the
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growth of government schools has also occurred after market-oriented reform.4 While market-oriented
reforms often led to cuts in public investment and state retrenchment in Africa and Latin America, the
reality was vastly different in India. The Indian state has increased its investments in social programs and
the number of responsibilities it takes on since it integrated into the global economy (Kapur, 2010b; Saxena,
2005b). While some have argued that global integration will lead to demands for greater social investment
(Gift, 2014; Rodrik, 1998), there is little evidence that the increase in public investment investment was
demand or society driven. I argue that the channel in India has not been through conditionality that has
decreased state budgets for the provision of basic services, or ideology that has liberalized regulation around
the provision of private services, but through greater spending that has allowed the Government of India
and state-level governments to rapidly increase the amount of government schooling it provides.
Most importantly, these three variables — state capacity, democratization, and market-oriented reforms
— all assume that the educational systems are largely static and only undergo changes from some external
shock. None help us understand how educational systems gradually evolve to change their relative mix of
public and private, like India and other developing countries have. Any explanation that helps us under-
stand how countries change their relative mix of public and private investment in India must answer how
these changes are also gradual instead of responding to large external shocks.
1.1.2 The Effects of Private Education
The second question turns the dependent variable around and asks what effects the growth of private edu-
cation has had on political behavior and attitudes. This question is in essence one that asks when do “effects
become causes” (Pierson, 1993)? Education, and exit to the private sector, can influence political behavior
and attitudes in two ways. First, there can be direct effects within the school. The content of education,
social capital constructed within school, and educational attainment can all change an individual’s political
orientation. Second, education can have indirect effects through the role that teachers and the education
bureaucracy play in the wider community. Teachers are an important source of socialization as both the
most educated members of communities as well as physical representatives of the state apparatus, while
decisions made by government bureaucrats provide examples of state priorities.
Thinking about policy change, Paul Pierson (1993) argued that there were two potential avenues through
4NB: Throughout this dissertation I use government schools to refer to publicly provided government schools, rather than the
more common term “public school”. This is to avoid confusion with the British and Indian definition of public school used to denote
a school that is privately owned but open to the public. Where I am quoting someone directly that uses the term “public school” I
will note whether they are using American or British English vernacular.
11
which feedback from a policy to mass behavior could operate: resources and interpretive effects. By re-
source effects, Pierson argued that policies “create powerful packages of resources and incentives that influ-
ence the positions of . . . individual social actors in politically consequential ways,” (1993, 610). Alternatively,
Pierson suggested that new policies can influence “the manner in which social actors make sense of their
environment,” (1993, 610-1). Interactions with representatives of the state provide citizens with examples
of how the state views its citizens (Soss, 1999). Government programs and agencies are often the first point
of contact citizens have with the state and provide “lessons about how citizens and governments relate, and
these lessons have political consequences beyond the domain of welfare agencies” (Soss, 1999, 364). Initial
experiences with these representatives of the state can powerfully shape perceptions and future engagement
with government. I consider both the material and cognitive effects that education can have in direct and
indirect forms below.
Citizenship, Socialization, and Education
T.H. Marshall (1964, 81) claimed that when states provide broad-based education, they had “the require-
ments and the nature of citizenship definitely in mind”. Eugene (Weber, 1976) saw a more coercive role for
education in creating a singular French identity and argued that the growth of universal public education
as helped create this identity along France’s periphery. Generalizing from Marshall (1964) and Weber’s
(1976), Pritchett (2002) argues that most countries retain high levels of control over education as a means
of instruction in national beliefs. In two Marxist takes on education, Paulo Freire (2000) and Bowles and
Gintis (2011) argued that education were used as forms of social control and reproduction where dominant
elites used the educational system to create hegemonic systems of control.
A large body of literature has attempted to better illustrate how education can create strong attachments
of citizenship. Suzanne Mettler (2005) argued that the passage of the G.I. Bill allowed returning servicemen
the opportunity to attend university. This in turn led to a high level of civic and political activism among
beneficiaries, although it is not clear if this was a result of the content of education they received or a sense
of citizenship and reciprocity engendered from the generosity of the G.I. Bill. Education can also change
partisan beliefs. John Marshall (2016) found that an education reform that increased the school leaving age
in Great Britain led to greater support for the Conservative party. He argues that the channel is an indirect
one - with higher levels of education, individuals had higher lifetime earnings and wealthier individuals are
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more likely to vote conservative. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) argue that college education provides an
exposure to economic ideas and information that leads to higher support for free trade, a finding corrobo-
rated by Mansfield and Mutz (2009). Croke et al. (2016) argue that in non-democratic contexts, higher levels
of education can lead to “deliberate disengagement” as more educated citizens are more cynical of politics
in authoritarian contexts.
The more general case of the impact that education has on political orientations is to consider interac-
tions with the entire welfare state as a site for potential political socialization. Joe Soss (1999) argued that
different experiences with two welfare programs provided recipients with different lessons of the value the
U.S. welfare system and, by extension, the U.S. government placed on its citizens. In a program that gave
recipients little autonomy and case workers little discretion, recipients formed negative impressions of the
state and the importance the state gave to them. By contrast a different program that gave recipients con-
siderably more autonomy and case workers the authority to respond to client demands, recipients formed
far more positive impressions of government.
Another example comes from the criminal justice system in the United States (Weaver and Lerman,
2010). Here Weaver and Lerman find that interactions with the criminal justice system serve to depoliticize
citizens as “punitive encounters with the state foster mistrust of political institutions and a weakened attach-
ment to the political process” (2010, 818). Relying on public opinion data from Sweden, Staffan Kumlin
(2004) finds that the degree of spillover from welfare state experiences to evaluations of the political system
at large depends on the type of welfare state institution encountered. If the welfare state institution is one
that provides greater levels of empowerment for the end user and they have a positive experience with the
service, they are likely to evaluate the political system more favorably.
In a two-step process from education to greater civicness, Jamie Bleck (2015) advances the idea of “lin-
guistic brokers” in households that help the rest of the household engage in the political process. In post-
colonial developing states where not all citizens speak the official language, such as Mali, Bleck (2015) argues
that educated members of the household that speak French, the official language of Mali, help other mem-
bers of the household navigate the demands of citizenship. Having these linguistic brokers allows them to
more fully engage in the democratic process.
Many of these arguments can also be extended to other contexts. Kumlin (2004) argues that welfare
state experiences matter because “European welfare state arrangements are typically more pervasive than
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the American ones, reaching far into the personal realm of life. . .most citizens are regularly in personal
contact with the results of politics,” (2004, 9). This echoes claims made by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990)
who said that “the welfare state is becoming deeply embedded in the everyday experience of virtually every
citizen” (1990, 141).
While we may be wary of porting the findings of policy feedback, that have largely been tested in in-
dustrialized economies, to less developed countries, these findings might still be relevant in countries like
India. Although, as Lauren MacLean (2010, 241) suggests, developing countries might provide a stronger
test of policy feedback as a result of their weaker state capacity, the state is often equally prevalent in devel-
oping countries, but in a different form than in industrialized countries. Although it does not approach the
Weberian ideal-type found in advanced industrialized democracies, as Weaver and Lerman (2010) show, our
analysis should not be restricted to simply positive experiences with the state. As I argue in the next section,
the front-line functionaries of the Indian state play an important role in conveying information about the
Indian state, and also acting as intermediaries between state and society. While much of the work reviewed
in this section is concerned with the effects of education on the individual, this project is concerned more
broadly with the effects of exits on households and society at large. It is a review of those works I turn to
in the next section.
Front-Line Functionaries of the Education Bureaucracy
Much of the impact of the welfare state and experiences with the state are mediated by what have vari-
ously been called the “front-line functionaries” of the state or “street-level bureaucrats” (Handler, 1996;
Lipsky, 2010). Michael Lipsky (2010) argued that these street-level bureaucrats, through the discretion they
exercised at the individual level, had tremendous amount of power to influence the way that individuals
experienced the state. The greater discretion individual bureaucrats have over a client, the more that deci-
sions are left “open to the influence of prejudice, stereotype, and ignorance as a basis for determinations”
(Lipsky, 2010, 69).
Much of the impact that front-line functionaries have is left implicit in the policy feedback literature
(for some notable exceptions, see Soss (1999) and Weaver and Lerman (2010)), but as Kumlin (2004) notes,
their ability to condition the lessons citizens take from welfare state experiences are crucial to understand-
ing the effects of welfare policies. The levels of discretion bureaucrats have over education is broad and
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affects a number of ways that households experience services. Although teachers do not have discretion
over first-order issues such as admissions, they can influence deeper experiences with education such as how
students and parents are treated once in school. The entire range of concerns over education I encoun-
tered during my interview research concerned some form of bureaucratic discretion. From how a parent’s
child was treated in school (Anonymous Interview, Visakhapatnam Distric, November 2013), to whether
a village sarpanch (president) spent local funds on a boundary wall or to buy books for the school (Anony-
mous Interview, Medak District, October 2013), each respondent was reacting to the discretion teachers or
politicians exercised over some element of their child’s education.
In India, much access to the state is mediated through intermediaries. Teacher in particular play a large
role in this as they are often the most educated representatives of the state at the village level and both their
role as agents of the state, and relationship with higher levels of the state likely influence perceptions of
ordinary citizens (Béteille, 2015, 947, 967). Teachers are also called on for two important state functions:
the conducting of the decennial population census and the manning of poll-booths for elections (Béteille,
2015, 949).5 This role for teachers is not unique to India — Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin (2016) also
find that teachers are used as poll booth monitors and to mobilize voters in Mexico, too.
Education provision has also been used for partisan purposes. In India, Tariq Thachil (2011, 2014a,b)
finds that volunteer service provision from the Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP) a right-wing party with a strong
social service wing, was a deliberative strategy to attract poor voters. Through the establishment of schools
and health centers in poor and indigenous villages, party service workers were able to embed themselves in
communities and slowly convince voters to vote for the party. Here we see the front-line functionaries of
an NSP, in this case a political party, serving a crucial role in service provision and spillovers to political
attitudes. in this case, there is a deliberate attempt by the political party to convince voters of a particular
choice.
Cammett and Issar (2010) find that in Lebanon, when religious organizations prioritize electoral goals,
they will target out-group members to win electoral support. Again, service provision by non-state providers
is used as a strategy to win over potential voters. This is not always the strategy however. The Future Move-
ment, that does not prioritize electoral goals, does not target out-group members and has no electoral payoff
from their service provision strategies.
5In my own fieldwork, I found that 85 percent of government teachers served one of these two roles in my sample villages.
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Therefore, when thinking about the impact that education, in private and public forms, might have on
political attitudes and behaviors, the role teachers and education bureaucrats play is central to any effects
we might find. Teachers and education bureaucrats both structure relationships with the state, and in the
private sector have been found to deliberately attempt to influence partisan beliefs.
Finally, politicians have used various features of the Indian education system to reward and punish bu-
reaucrats, teachers, and voters. This has been done through the provision of public infrastructure (Wilkin-
son, 2006), rationing of teaching positions (Béteille, 2009), and school construction (Vaishnav and Sircar,
2013).
Although low on the levels of particularism, education has been used to reward supporters and sway
swing voters. Steven Wilkinson (2006) argues that politicians will use infrastructural spending to entice
swing voters. Looking at spending on education specifically, Vaishnav and Sircar (2013) find that politi-
cians in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu target swing voters in close elections, but otherwise reward
core voters with greater levels of school buildings. Fagernäs and Pelkonen (2014) find that spending on dis-
cretionary education items, such as school books, increase in the year before a local election. This squares
with the idea that politicians are likely to spend effort on highly visible inputs, such as school books and
school buildings, and shirk on outputs that do not have immediately realized benefits such as quality (Mani
and Mukand, 2007). Tara Béteille (2009, 2015) argues that teaching positions are not immune to the larger
patronage mechanism of the Indian state (Wade, 1985). As desirable teaching locations are in short sup-
ply, politicians use teacher transfers as a form of control over teachers, by rationing and distributing cushy
positions to the highest or best connected bidder.
Government schools and education infrastructure are used by politicians as a way to reward voters,
teachers are used to monitor voters at the local level, and teaching positions are used to reward teachers.
Citizens’ interactions with the state are often mediated through teachers, and teachers otherwise provide
examples of how to approach the state when they resort to intermediaries to demand particularistic benefits.
Exit to the private sector, where teachers are not a part of these politicized networks, has the potential
to alter or sever these relationships entirely. In the next section, I turn to formulating a theory on the
relationship between the growth of private education, exit from government education, and downstream
political effects.
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1.2 The Argument in Brief: A Theory of Policy Feedback in Flailing States
In this section, I propose a theory that unites the two questions I posed in Section 1.1 and helps us under-
stand the growth and subsequent effects of private education. Any theory that seeks to explain the growth
of private services in general, and private education specifically, must be able to account for three facts.
First, we cannot assume that the growth of private services are a response to state failures. Early literature
on the growth of the private sector in the developing world suggested that private services emerged where
the state was weak or private services were seen as the inverse of government services — where the public
did not exist, the private would emerge in its place (Dercon, 2002; The World Bank, 2003).
This assumption is a non-starter in India (and other contexts) where the private sector emerged at the
same time as the government was rapidly expanding its own offering (for an example from Kenya, see Brass
(2014)). The literature on market-oriented reform has done a poor job of explaining variation in India and
developing countries as a whole. While the opening to the market was expected to erode state capacity
(Avelino, Brown and Hunter, 2005; Wibbels and Arce, 2003; Wibbels, 2006), the Indian state has actually
increased its reach in the reform period - even enacting a number of large-scale poverty relief programs that
have left few corners of the country untouched. Any explanation that accounts for the rise of the private
sector must not simply embrace “a pluralist view of social welfare in which government, private [providers],
charitable organizations, and families are simply alternative loci of social provisions” (Hacker, 1998, 130).
Second, any theory must account for an endogenous process of change. There is substantial sub-national
variation in the provision of education in India that cannot be explained by exogenous shocks such as inter-
national integration (that affected the entire country equally) or democratization (which is a non-starter in
India as the country has arguably been a democracy for its entire history), or the quality of bureaucracies,
as we need to account for variations in their quality across the country.
Finally, theory must account for the changing nature of private providers. As has been noted elsewhere,
there is tremendous variation in the form that private providers take, from religious organizations, small
local entrepreneurs, and larger for-profit enterprises and they are also different from previous private service
providers (Kushner, 2015). India has moved from a context where private education was either provided for
wealthy elites or by religious groups, to a context where a broad range of private providers provide private
education for high and low-income groups.
My argument, in brief, is that initial political choices made in the early 1980s allowed for the growth
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of private education in the late 1990s and 2000s. I argue for a process of endogenous institutional change
in which early choices led to policy drift and layering where formal rules remained largely unchanged, but
in interactions with other parts of India’s political economy, including moves to decentralize policy imple-
mentation and international integration, resulted in outcomes far different from those envisioned by the
original policymakers (Hacker, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010a). Laws were either interpreted differ-
ently in the period between 1986 and 2000 (such as readings of the constitution on the responsibility of
the state to provide education), or government efforts to provide public education had unintended conse-
quences such as decreasing the costs of education labor that allowed low-cost private schools to emerge.
Specifically, I argue that the National Policy on Education, drafted in 1984 and introduced in 1986,
encouraged greater expenditure on education, particularly from the Central Government, while also de-
centralizing education management. These two events interacted with India’s integration into the inter-
national economy to allow for the rapid expansion but poor implementation of early education policy
designed to universalize education in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the Indian case, decentralization and
market-oriented reforms have created what O’Donnell (1993) identified as the expansion of state territori-
ality, without a similar expansion of state functionality.
In other words, the Indian state has both expanded geographically into areas it had a weak presence
prior to market-oriented reforms, and devolved government decision making to be closer to the average
citizen. This has led to a situation where the Indian government now has a real physical presence for most
people, but also a weak presence.6 This has caused a number of problems that are well documented in the
development literature. The front-line functionaries of the Indian state are often missing (Kremer et al.,
2005; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006), and when present are doing a poor job (Das and Hammer, 2007). With
decentralization has also come the extension of political patronage to the local level (Béteille, 2009, 2015)
and charges of elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).
These new opportunities resulted in a number of large education programs at the state and central level.
These programs quickly increased the funding available for education infrastructure and labor available
at the local level. To meet the rapid demand for new teachers, local-level governments were encouraged
to hire contract, or temporary, teachers to meet these demands. With the increasing number of contract
6I am sensitive to critiques that political scientists often reify and anthromorphize the idea of the “state” (Nordlinger, 1987), but
with that come real encounters with the state by real citizens that structure relationships of power and evaluations of the “state”
(Oldenburg, 2005).
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teachers, state governments faced increasing numbers of legal challenges from contract teachers challenging
their working conditions. In departures from precedent, High Courts and the Supreme Court increasingly
ruled in favor of state governments, normalizing the use of contract teachers. The realities on the ground
forced various High Courts and the Supreme Court of India to tacitly acknowledge the use of contract
teachers and sanction their use for government and private schools.
The Central Government mimicked these state-level programs at the national level through the intro-
duction of the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), explicitly
encouraging the greater use of contract teachers by local governments to quickly fill the demands of educa-
tion. This process first created pressures to recognize contract teachers, then normalized their use through
the expansion of government programs.
At the same time, India’s activist Supreme Court expanded the ambit of education providers, by rec-
ognizing the importance of private schools in the universalization of education. In a series of court cases
regarding the responsibilities of the Government of India to provide education, the Supreme Court of India
argued that private providers were also an important part of India’s education provision regime.
I argue that in middle-income democracies that have states bureaucracies that can provide basic state
functions such as security, when providing citizen facing services such as health, education, and internal
security, the state will be able to fully provide the inputs to these services, but will be unable to provide
high quality outputs for these services. This is because the front-line functionaries of the state - teachers,
doctors, and policemen - have incentives to shirk responsibilities and engage in activities other than their
core competencies. This will lead to two outcomes. First, this shirking will result in poor public services.
Second, it will also lead to citizen exit from the public sector to the private sector.
To understand the effects of the growth of the private sector, we must be cognizant of how the private
sector emerged. As I have argued, the private sector did not emerge independently of the government and
therefore the effects the private sector has on citizenship is not independent of the government sector. As
(Hacker, 1998, 59) argues, we must “broaden [our] inquires to consider the constraints that the development
of private market institutions create. . . for public policy making.” Work on policy feedback from advanced
democracies assumes the ability of the state to properly implement policy. That argument does not hold in
India where the state has been described as “flailing” (Pritchett, 2009), and government programs are often
imperfectly implemented (Kapur, 2010b).
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Therefore, any behavioral effects of private schools will take place in a larger context of imperfect gov-
ernment expansion. While the infrastructure of government provision — schools and teachers — will be
competing with private schools, the experiences of government provision — interactions with government
functionaries and bureaucrats — will be different than those citizens experience with private services. Be-
cause of this, I expect we should see much stronger behavioral effects in perceptions and attitudes towards
service provision and relative preferences for private and government service provision, and weaker effects
for political participation.
Methodological Considerations
The first question of this project — why do we see such a large growth in private education despite a parallel
growth in government education? — is explicitly an institutional question, while the second question —
what are the effects of the growth of private education for citizenship? — is explicitly a behavioral question.
This project seeks to combine these two approaches, the institutional and behavioral, to advance a larger
argument. As Sven (Steinmo, 2015, 1) argued “human beings come to the institutions they inhabit with
prior expectations and cognitive biases that affect how they will work within these institutions and adapt
them to their local circumstances.”
As the second question is explicitly behavioral, experimental methods are particularly well suited to
answering this question. They provide us with clean causal estimates of a treatment, in my case the intro-
duction of private education, on political behavior. To fully make sense of the results, however, we must
understand the context in which this treatment emerges. Work in historical-institutionalism, particularly
work on endogenous institutional change can help us make sense of the context by exploring the long-run
emergence of policies and the potential range of their effects. For this, I rely on theories of policy drift
and layering to explore the context in which private education, particularly low-cost private education,
emerged in India. This combination will hopefully allow us to better understand when parts of our theory
and findings can port to other contexts and which behavioral findings are context specific.
1.3 Overview of the Project
As I showed in 1.1, there are a number of competing explanations for the growth of private education. In
Chapter 2, I divide these explanations into supply and demand side explanations for the growth of private
schools. Under the supply side explanations, I argue we find rising incomes after economic growth and
market-oriented reforms. On the demand side, we find the increasing returns to education and rising as-
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pirations, as well as caste inequality. I argue that none of these are fully satisfactory for explaining either
the timing or the location of private school growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the case of rising
incomes, I find there has been a weak relationship between income growth and private schools, suggesting
that private schools do not necessarily grow in wealthier areas. With respect to market-oriented reforms,
although the largest growth of private education occurred after market-oriented reforms, I argue that the
relationship is more complicated than that provided in the literature so far. While private schools certainly
benefited from market liberalization, the mechanisms run through a deterioration in the quality of govern-
ment schools as well as the loosening of labor regulations to meet increased demand for teachers. Finally,
the idea that rising aspirations and increasing returns to education are important in the growth of private
education do not help us explain why we only see an increase in demand for private education, and not all
forms of education. While the returns to education have changed dramatically, they have changed across
the entire country and not necessarily in locations that have seen quicker growth in private schools. More
likely is that the pressures on better education have been channeled to whichever is the more responsive
education system, whether that be private or government provided. Finally, ethnic inequality helps us un-
derstand the initial stock of private education, particularly in the South. Ethnic inequality has remained
largely invariant over time, however, and does not help us understand the change in private education.
These four alternative explanations either help us understand the initial stock of private education, or the
larger overall demand for private education, but not the specific location and timing in which it happened.
In Chapter 3, I advance an argument that takes endogenous changes seriously.
This process also created large gaps between the reach of the Indian state, or what Guillermo O’Donnell
(1993) called state “territoriality” - that increased tremendously in the late 1990s and early 2000s - and the
ability of the Indian state to implement its education policies, or what I call state “functionality”. This
gap between reach and function allowed for the growth of private providers to “fill the gaps” (Helmke and
Levitsky, 2004). In Chapter 4, I leverage assignment rules from one of the largest education programs in
the world, and one of the programs implemented with foreign and domestic funding, the District Primary
Education Programme (DPEP), to show that where there were gaps between state reach and state imple-
mentation, we see a greater growth in private schools. I construct a dataset of private school growth from
1986 using the Economic Census of India, the National Sample Survey (NSS), and the District Information
System for Education (DISE) School Report Cards data. I find that in districts that implemented DPEP and
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rapidly constructed schools and hired teachers, or districts where state territoriality was rapidly expanded
and devolved to the local level, had no better educational outcomes, but also higher levels of private school
growth. I use DPEP only as an illustrative program in that it allows for clean identification of its effects
through clear assignment rules. Earlier state-level and subsequent national-level programs, such as the Shik-
sha Karmi Project (SKP) in Rajasthan, and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan at the national-level, had similar goals as
DPEP but do not allow for clean identification of effects. My theory suggests we would see similar effects
after programs like the Shiksha Karmi Project Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan as we did after DPEP. I argue that
together, this helps us better understand the supply side drivers of exit.
I am not the first to find evidence of co-location in India (Rangaraju, Tooley and Dixon, 2012), or abroad
(Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2013; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012), but I am the first to argue that it is directly a result
of the increase in state capacity, not other structural explanations such as inequality underlying exit. This is
not to say that inequality is not important in understanding when and where people exit, but an exclusive
focus on inequality, I argue, is incomplete in fully understanding exit in India.
Turning to the effects of the growth of private schools, I argue that the increased territoriality of the
state conditioned the effects that state exit could have. If exit had occurred in a larger political vacuum, we
would expect to see changes in political behavior. However, government teachers play various roles at the
village level, including an important monitoring function of political subjects. With the increased reach of
the state through the presence of schools and teachers in most villages across the country, citizens can little
afford to exit in visible ways such as withdrawals from the political process. Attitudes, however, can and do
change.
In Chapter 5, I leverage a field experiment that randomly distributed private school vouchers through
a lottery process. Households that won the voucher lottery could send their children to private school
for for four years with all expenses paid. Here, I find that private school vouchers have what the policy
feedback literature calls “interpretive” effects, but do not have any “material” effects. I find that voucher
winning households were more likely to hold pro-market beliefs that voucher losing households. Political
participation, however, remained unchanged between treatment and control groups. Citizens’ attitudes
can and have been changed by state exit in ways favorable to the greater provision of private services in the
future.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide what I believe are the scope conditions to my findings and contributions
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to the larger literature on service provision in the developing world and the role of the private sector in
service provision.
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CHAPTER 2: SOME STYLIZED FACTS ON PRIVATE EDUCATION IN INDIA
In this chapter I present stylized facts on the growth of private education in India as well as contend with
alternative explanations for the growth of private education derived from the literate on non-state providers
and education investment. I divide alternative explanations into two forms: supply and demand side expla-
nations. Under supply side explanations, I show that neither market-oriented reforms or economic growth
do a good job of explaining the growth and distribution of private schools across India over the past thirty
years. Under demand side explanations, although I find support for the idea that both inequality, measured
here as caste inequality, and increasing returns to education are related to demand for private education, I
argue that this does not explain the more recent growth, only a constant demand over the third year period
I analyze.
I turn now to looking at broad trends in the growth of government and private schools across India over
the last thirty years. As I argue that in Chapters 3 and 4 that the growth of private schools is closely related
to the growth of government schools, it is instructive to trace the growth of government schools in India
since independence.
I rely on school construction data from the District Information System for Education (DISE) school
report cards. Each school across India is required to self-report a small number of questions on school
infrastructure and staff. Most importantly for my purposes, the data contains the year the school was
constructed. I take the modal answer to this question from ten years of school report cards from 2005 to
2014. This ensures that I have the most consistent answers for the entire survey period.
I plot the distribution of government school construction in Figure 2.1. The dotted lines in both Figures
2.1 and 2.2 represent the years that the National Policy on Education (NPE), District Primary Education
Programme (DPEP) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan were introduced in 1986, 1994, and 2002 respectively. There
appear to be two distinct periods of government school construction: in the early post-Independence period
between 1955 and 1965, and then in a later post-liberalization period after 1996 that has tapered off in more
recent years but had its peak between 1996 and 2006. As has been much noted (Weiner, 1990), there was
little activity in government school construction between 1965 and 1994.
Turning to private school growth, Figure 2.2 presents the same plot as Figure 2.1 with private school
construction figures. There was little growth in private schools until the beginning of the 1980s when
private schools begin to increase their numbers, culminating with a rapid increase in growth in the early
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Figure 2.1: Government School Growth
The dotted lines represent the three major policy changes in Indian Government education policy. The National Policy on Education
(NPE) was released in 1986, the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) was implemented in 1994, and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
(SSA) was implemented in 2002.
2000s. This then begins to taper around 2005.
Next, I turn to the distribution of growth of government and private schools across states. In Figure 2.3,
I plot the number of government schools per 10,000 residents by state since independence.7. The number
of government schools increases monotonically in every state with the exception of Kerala and, to a lesser
extent, Tamil Nadu, two cases that warrants further discussion. As is to be expected, we see a discontinuous
jump in the number of schools per capita in states that received DPEP in 1994.8
With respect to Kerala, and to a lesser extent Tamil Nadu, both states have been characterized by a strong
presence of locally controlled private schools, with Tamil Nadu also having a large number of religious,
particularly, Christian schools (Mathew, 2016). These were early bargains made between large religious
minority groups and state governments to allow for a degree of autonomy for religious groups in their
management of schools and is similar to countries such as The Netherlands and Belgium that allowed for
the management of subnational diversity by granting educational autonomy for minority religious groups
7In the rest of the project I use the number of schools per 10,000 school-aged children. However, I do not have school-aged children
population data going back to 1947, so instead I use the total state level population as a proxy
8For a full list of states and districts that received DPEP, see Appendix B.
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Figure 2.2: Private School Growth
The dotted lines represent the three major policy changes in Indian Government education policy. The National Policy on Education
(NPE) was released in 1986, the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) was implemented in 1994, and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
(SSA) was implemented in 2002.
(Ansell and Lindvall, 2013).
Next, in Figure 2.4 I plot the same data for the number of private schools per 10,000. Again, we see a
similar pattern to that in Figure 2.2 in which most states saw an increase in private schools beginning in
the 1980s. However, a number of states and territories, namely Goa, Kerala, and Pondicherry have had
consistently higher percentage of privately run schools relative to other schools. There are two potential
explanations for this. First, as I mentioned previously, Kerala has always granted local control to schools and
most of these schools are privately managed but receive most of their funding from the state government
(Aggarwal, 1999; Mathew, 2016).9 Kerala at least confirms, at the subnational level, Ansell and Lindvall’s
(2013) findings that countries with high levels of religious diversity also decentralize control of schools to
private religiously affiliated groups at the local level. The second explanation is similar to the first in that the
four states with large numbers of private schools are also states with a strong Catholic missionary presence
and Christian religious minorities. Although the data does not allow me to disaggregate what religious
group private schools are run by, it is likely that many of the private schools in these states are run by
9In India, these schools are known as “private aided” schools and are akin to charter schools in the United States.
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Figure 2.3: Government School Growth by State
Each panel presents the number of government schools per capita between 1947 and 2014. The plot exclude all union territories as
well as Meghalaya for lack of data.
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Figure 2.4: Private School Growth by State
Each panel presents the number of private schools per capita between 1947 and 2014. The plot exclude all union territories as well as
Meghalaya for lack of data.
Christian religious organizations.
There are also states, such as Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal in the East that have seen little
growth in private education. These states are in general poorer than the average, and in the case of West
Bengal, have also been very hostile to the establishment of private schools for ideological reasons (Aggarwal,
1998). Indeed, for a brief period in the 1970s and 80s, it was illegal to establish new private schools in West
Bengal (Aggarwal, 1998).
Given the government and private school landscape across India presented above, I now turn to four
alternative explanations for the growth of privately run schools across India — economic growth, global
market integration, increasing returns to primary education, and caste inequality — and suggest that the
supply side explanations are incapable of explaining exit to the private sector, while the demand side expla-
nations help us explain some of the initial demand for private education, but does not explain the increase
we see over time.
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2.1 Alternative Explanations
From the literature review in Chapter 1, there are a four alternative explanations to contend with: the cater-
ing to newly wealthy citizens after rapid economic growth, the retrenchment of the state following market-
oriented reforms, increasing demand for private schools as a response to increasing returns to education in
a rapidly growing economy, and the growth of private schools as a response to societal inequalities. I deal
with each explanation in turn and assess its potential for explaining the temporal and geographic growth
in private schools across India. I divide the explanations into supply and demand side explanations, with
supply side explanations coming from government or private sector attempts to change the level of educa-
tion provision in the country, either explicitly through greater investment or lobbying, or unintentionally
through state-retrenchment. Demand side explanations are society centered and result from individual level
demands for greater or different forms of education.
2.1.1 Supply Side Explanations
Economic Growth
The most obvious alternative explanation for the growth of private education across India are the growth
of private schools as a response to the rising incomes since India liberalized its economy. The country
has grown at a rate of about nine percent between 2003 and 2007 and at a slower but still impressive rate
prior to that. With these rising incomes, some have suggested that the new elite have different aspirations
(Kapur, 2010a), and some of these aspirations are manifested through demands for private and English
language education (Mathew, 2016). Additionally, with India’s integration into the global economy, some
have argued that those most harmed by this integration, the middle classes, were those that most benefited
from India’s limited welfare state (Rudra, 2008). In turn, they would also have the financial means to exit
the state once public services worsened. There are two related, but slightly distinct, ways to view the effect
on private education that comes from rising incomes. The first is a supply side response that comes from
private providers attempting to capitalize on the newly wealthy middle and upper classes. The second
is greater demand for private education as a result of greater returns to education. I separate these two
explanations into demand and supply side explanations given the different source they emerge from. I deal
with the supply side explanation here before looking at the demand side explanation in Section 2.1.2.
As a first cut at this explanation, I plot the relationship between state-level GPD per capita (Net State
Domestic Product per capita or NSDP per capita) and the aggregate number of private schools per 10,000
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residents in Figure 2.5 and NSDP per capita and the percentage of private schools relative to the total number
of private schools in a state in Figure 2.6. Each panel in the plots presents a cross-section of every year for
which data is available from 1978 to 2012. The solid gray line represents the line of best fit of a univariate
regression between NSDP per capita and private schools per capita.
While it is certainly true that rising incomes have empowered new social classes and are likely changing
social and economic aspirations, the relationship between wealth and demand for private education has al-
ways consistently been strong. The wealthy have always resorted to private education. This, however, does
not show up in aggregate level indicators. While there is a positive relationship between Net State Domes-
tic Product (NSDP - a state-level measure equivalent to national GDP figures for individual states within
India) and the number of private schools, at least for the number of schools per capita, this relationship is
not always positive. There is a stronger relationship between the percentage of total schools that are private
and NSDP per capita in Figure 2.6, but much of this is driven by the state of Kerala that appears as one
outlying point hovering at around 60 percent private schools in all years.
Although there is sometimes a relationship in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, the figures might also hide more than
they reveal at the individual level. As Rajiv Gandhi stated in 1986, “good education [is] available to those
people who have not just adequate resources but plenty of resources. If you are lacking that, if you cannot
afford seven thousand or ten thousand rupees a year [85,600 to 122,000 USD in 1986 dollars] to educate
your child from the primary to secondary level,” (World Bank, 1997, 16). This astronomical figure was
often only available to the wealthiest citizens prior to market-oriented reforms. As late as 1997, the official
rhetoric on primary education in India still suggested that private education was largely the purview of the
urban wealthy.
This also does not square with accounts that exit to the private sector is now occurring at all socio-
economic levels (Mathew, 2016; Tooley, 2009; Rangaraju, Tooley and Dixon, 2012). The new class of pri-
vate schools that have emerged are deliberately targeting lower income households at price points that are
affordable to all but the poorest. There is no good reason why the rich as opposed to the poor should exit
from the state as is sometimes assumed (Kumar, Priyam and Saxena, 2001). With the evolution of education
policy came the decentralization of power and control of education to the local level. In other contexts,
this has led to capture of local-level institutions by local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Reinikka
and Svensson, 2004).
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Figure 2.5: NSDP and Private Schools per 10,000
Each point represents the relationship between the number of private schools per capita and the Net State Domestic Product per capita
(NSDP per capita) at the state level. The solid gray line represents the line of best fit for a univariate regression of NSDP per capita
on the number of private schools per capita. Each panel represents a separate year for which data is available from 1978-2012.
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Figure 2.6: State-Level GDP and Private Schools as Percentage of All Schools
Each point represents the relationship between the percent of private schools relative to the total number of private schools the Net
State Domestic Product per capita (NSDP per capita) at the state level. The solid gray line represents the line of best fit for a univariate
regression of NSDP per capita on the number of private schools per capita. Each panel represents a separate year for which data is
available from 1978-2012.
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It is surprising that there is a weak relationship between economic growth and the number of private
schools at the state-level in India. Unfortunately, the data available does not allow me to disaggregate this any
further, but it is unlikely that this relationship is subject to an ecological inference problem as other studies
have merely confirmed the relationship I see at the state-level (Mathew, 2016; Tooley, 2009; Rangaraju,
Tooley and Dixon, 2012). India’s rapid economic growth over the past twenty years does not help us explain
any of India’s growth in private schools over the past thirty years.
Market-Oriented Reform, Global Market Integration, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Indian State
A second alternative supply-side explanation for the growth of private provision of education surrounds
global market integration. With greater integration into global markets, national governments will have
less “room to move” in domestic policy making (Mosley, 2000),10 and also allow for foreign investment
in private education. International market integration represents a trade-off between pleasing international
capital markets and domestic budgetary concerns, of which government education expenditure is one. This
problem is accentuated by late integration into the global economy that has long been suggested to be even
more constraining for late-comers (Wibbels, 2006). Furthermore, with increasing global market integration
has seen the entrance of international private actors such as Pearson Schools in the financing and adminis-
tration of low-cost private schools in urban areas (Dixon, 2013; Tooley and Dixon, 2003).
There was also a common wisdom within Indian academic and policy circles that education spending
had decreased since structural adjustment programs began (Jha et al., 2008; Shariff and Ghosh, 2000).
This argument does not hold much weight in India for a number of reasons. First, global market inte-
gration in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with an increase in public goods investment, particularly
in education and health care (see Figure 2.1 and Chakrabarti and Mistree (2013)). This squares with the com-
pensatory mechanism to global market integration proposed by Polanyi (1944) and Rodrik (1998). There
are two ways that this might have functioned in India. First, with the disruptions caused by global mar-
ket integration, groups that stood to lose from this integration are likely to demand greater redistribution
from their government to compensate them for their material losses. Second, with increasing integration,
national and state governments might have seen an increasing need for providing human capital. It is likely
that the second mechanism is driving investments in India - rhetoric beginning from the National Policy
10Manmohan Singh, Finance Minister at the time, declared that India’s “room for maneuver, to live on borrowed money or time,
does not exist any more” (Singh, 1991).
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on Education in 1986, as well as separate work by Chakrabarti and Mistree (2013) suggests that this is the
case.
Second, global market integration provided India with new opportunities to finance human capital pro-
vision. Although structural adjustment programs were believed to reduce the size of the public sector, and
indeed did so in Africa, East Asia, and Latin America (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; MacLean, 2011;
Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007), in India, access to international financial institutions al-
lowed for greater means to finance social investments. The District Primary Education Programme (DPEP)
between several state-level governments and the World Bank allowed for increased state-level financing of
education. This pattern has continued with Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan that has been financed in large part by
the World Bank.
Third, the rhetoric around human capital provision and global market integration has turned to one
of providing workers for the global economy. While in other cases, either business groups (Ansell, 2010;
Kosack, 2009, 2012, 2014), or labor groups (Gift, 2014) have been seen as an important interest groups lob-
bying for education, it is not clear where the pressures came from in India. This helps explain some of
the increase demand for education in the East Asian tigers and some sub-Saharan countries post-global in-
tegration (Thachil, 2009). Moreover, the nature of education provision in India — high-skilled education
embodied in the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) and Indian Institutes of Management (IIM) — was
present long before India integrated into the international economy (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972). This,
again, was the type of education best poised to take advantage of India’s comparative advantage of oppor-
tunities in the international economy: labor scarce, capital rich high-skilled service sector jobs.
Globalization and market-oriented reforms certainly had a role to play in private education provision
in India, but not in a way typically recognized by existing scholarship. Global market integration allowed
India, and in particular state-level governments, to increase the financing and provision of education. By
opening to foreign markets and borrowing from international financial institutions, India was able to in-
crease the total money dedicated to education. Global market integration also compelled domestic leaders
to increase human capital provision to be able to “derive the maximum benefit from the assets already
created” (Government of India, 1986).
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2.1.2 Demand Side Explanations
Increasing Returns to Education
The most important demand side explanation for the increase in private education over the past 30 years is
simply the increasing returns to education across India.11 Using National Sample Survey Data, Vatta and
Sato (2012) estimate a series of Mincerian wage functions from 1983 to 2010 and show that the returns to
education, particularly for female workers, has been increasing since market liberalization.12
To see if the increasing returns to education might be driving the demand for private education, I proceed
in a couple of steps. First, I calculate the average district level return to primary education in each year for
which I have Economic Census data (1990, 1998, and 2005) using unit-level data from the National Sample
Survey. Individual level estimates are presented in Table A.1 in Appendix A. I plot distributions of the
average returns to primary education for each year in Figure 2.7. There are two points to note from Figure
2.7. First, the returns to education have been increasing since 1990. Second, the returns have also been
compressing, suggesting decreasing inequality for those with a primary school education.
I now turn to the relationship between returns to education and demand for private schools. In Figure
2.8, I plot the relationship between the return to primary education and the number of private primary
schools at the district level in 1990, 1998, and 2005. As is to be expected, there is a strong positive relationship
between the returns to education and the number of private primary schools in a district. This bivariate
relationship is positive and significant in every year in the sample and, if we remove districts in Kerala that
have large number of private schools but lower returns to education, this relationship is only strengthened.
There is one important point to note with this relationship, however. There has always been a positive
relationship between returns to education and demand for education. Although Figure 2.7 shows that the
returns to education have been increasingly quite dramatically over the last 30 years, it has been increasing
across all of India, and inequalities in returns have been decreasing over time. While the returns to education
certainly explain demand for private schooling in the cross-section, it cannot help us explain the relationship
11There is also credible evidence that increasing employment opportunities might also decrease demand for education, as Atkin
(2016) has found in Mexico as a result of the growth of manufacturing jobs, and Shah and Steinberg (2015) and Steinberg (2015) have
found as a result of the introduction of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) in India.
12I calculate Mincerian wage functions for the National Sample Survey unit-level rounds that coincide with the three rounds of the
Economic Census data in 1990, 1998, and 2005. I present the results of these in Appendix A. As the rounds that correspond to these
years does not have wage data, I use consumption data instead. Although I do not divide these wage functions by gender and urbanity,
I find similar results to Vatta and Sato (2012), where the premium on higher levels of education is increasing. Indeed, in 2005, there is
no premium on anything below a primary education.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of District Level Average Returns to Primary Education.
Panel 1 presents the district level returns to primary education in 1990. Panel 2 presents the district level returns to education in 1998.
Panel 3 presents the district level returns to education in 2005. All data uses unit-level data from the National Sample Survey. The
data uses consumption data instead of earnings data as those three rounds of NSS data did not include earnings data. The individual
level regressions which this data is plotting is presented in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.8: The Return to Education and Number of Private School.
Panel 1 presents the relationship between the return to primary education and private primary schools in 1990. Panel 2 presents
the same information for 1998. Panel 3 presents the same information for 2005. Returns to primary education are calculated using
unit-level data from the National Sample Survey in the respective years. The data uses consumption data instead of earnings data as
those three rounds of NSS data did not include earnings data. The individual level regressions which this data is plotting is presented
in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The number of private schools are taken from the District Information System for Education school
report cards data.
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we see in Figures 2.2 and 2.4. I now turn to another popular explanation for demands for private education:
caste inequality.
Caste Inequality
The idea that inequalities would drive exit to private schools is prevalent in both the popular and scholarly
literatures. Speaking in Parliament in 1985, Dharam Pal Singh Malik, the parliamentarian from Sonepat
constituency in Haryana suggested that “[Different castes] go on building their assets and they run [private
schools] in the name of their castes such as a Jat school, Gaur Brahmin school or a Vaish school,” (Motion
Re: Challenge of Education — A Policy Perspective, 1985, pg. 352). Speaking immediately after Dharam
Pal Singh Malik, Girdhari Lal Vyas argued that “we see that the children of the big people in society study
in the public [private] schools,” (Motion Re: Challenge of Education — A Policy Perspective, 1985, pg.
365).
These popular sentiments have also found empirical support in India pre-liberalization (Weiner, 1990),
and contexts as diverse as Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012), and Pakistan (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2008).
Myron Weiner (1990) suggests as early as the late 1980s that the upper and middle classes have exited to
private schools. Indeed, one of the strongest critiques of the second National Policy on Education in 1986
was its heavy emphasis on Navodaya Vidyalas or “Model Schools” that were government run elite schools
believed to cater to the middle classes (Resolution Re: National policy on Education, 1986). In Kenya,
Lucas and Mbiti (2012) find that in districts with high levels of economic inequality, the elimination of
government school fees led to a general exit of wealthier students to private schools. Suggesting a different
mechanism, Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2008) suggest that it is actually the poor that exit to private schools
as government schools have been captured by elites to serve their own interests.
While I cannot directly test the relationship between private school prevalence and income inequality as
there is no good representative dataset on income inequality, I can test a similar relationship for the Indian
context on caste inequality. Below, in Figure 2.9, I plot the relationship between caste fractionalization and
the number of private schools in a district.13 Figure 2.9 suggests that the relationship between caste frac-
13I calculate caste fractionalization using a Herfindahl-Hirshcmann index that uses the following formula:
Caste Fractionalization=
N∑
i=1
s2i
where si is the share of the total population belonging to caste i . I first calculate the village level caste fractionalization index using
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tionalization and private schools has been growing stronger with greater levels of fractionalization leading
to greater number of private schools.
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Figure 2.9: Caste Fractionalization and Private Schools
Panel 1 presents the relationship between caste fractionalization and the number of private schools per school-age children in 1991.
The correlation coefficient for Panel 1 is .156 . Panel 2 presents the relationship between caste fractionalization and the number of
private schools per school-age children in 2001. The correlation coefficient for Panel 2 is .097 . Panel 3 presents the relationship
between caste fractionalization and the number of private schools per school-age children in 2011. The correlation coefficient for
Panel 3 is .085 . The solid gray line represents the line of best fit of a regression of caste fractionalization on the number of private
schools per 10,000 school-aged children in a district in each year.
This suggests that private schools locate in districts that have greater levels of caste homogeneity and the
relationship is only growing over time. The results contradict the conjectures of Members of Parliament
as well as the academic work on private schools such as Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2008); Lucas and Mbiti
(2012) and (Weiner, 1990). The relationship holds for the entire period for which I have caste fractionaliza-
tion data and appears to be getting stronger. it does not, however, necessarily explain the growth of private
schools - there has always been a negative relationship between caste fractionalization. The relationship
between caste fractionalization cannot be dismissed out of hand and in subsequent chapters I will test this
census counts on the total number of schedule castes, scheduled tribes and other castes. I then take the district level mean of the village
level caste fractionalization. A value of 1 on the index suggests that everyone in a village is from the same caste, and a value of 0 suggests
that everyone in the village is from a difference caste.
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along with my preferred explanation of a growth of state territoriality.
One major problem with this explanation as applied to India is that caste fractionalization is largely
invariant over time and the largest growth in private education over the past thirty years has been over time
as opposed to across space. While caste fractionalization does a good job of explaining early private school
penetration in states such as Kerala, where local private control of schools was used as a way of maintaining
religious harmony, it does not help explain later growth.14
Religious Diversity
A subset of the argument that we should see greater private financing of education in locations with greater
levels of inequality is a similar argument by Ansell and Lindvall (2013) that countries with high levels of
religious diversity will see a large amount of local and private control of education. As I have suggested
earlier, this is certainly true for states such as Kerala that have high levels of religious diversity. Many
schools in Kerala are privately managed and this is likely a concession to religious, particularly Christian,
groups. This phenomenon, however, appears to only be a Christian one, as other states with high levels of
religious diversity such as Punjab, West Bengal, and Bihar do not have high levels of private investment in
education. While there is evidence that other religious groups, such as Hindu service organization (Thachil,
2011, 2014a), rely heavily on private schools, too, this relationship does not manifest itself in the data, likely
because they are often the religious majority and are not threatened as a religious minority.
2.2 Conclusions
In this chapter I have presented some stylized facts on the changes in Indian education since Independence
and presented four plausible counterarguments that could potentially explain the growth of private educa-
tion in India. Although all the explanations certainly have validity in the cross-section - i.e. they can help
us understand why some districts have more private schools than others in one time period - none can help
us explain the growth in private schools over the last thirty years.
The explanation that rests on economic growth, while likely true, does not explain the increasing
growth in private education over the last thirty years, nor does it account for the type of private education
that is increasingly catering to low-income populations. The explanation that argues that global market in-
tegration results in less “room to move” and a race to the bottom in public investment does not hold in the
14And this is despite some arguments that Kerala’s primary identity is not caste or religious based, but rather around a central
national identity (Singh, 2010).
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Indian case. India has seen greater investment in education since international integration and liberaliza-
tion, and this has often been a direct result of this integration as it allowed state-level governments to borrow
from international financial institutions and development agencies. While returns to education have been
increasing over the past thirty years, they have been increasing everywhere, and have been increasing most
dramatically in the poorest districts. The final alternative explanation that argues that greater inequality
leads to more exit is certainly a plausible explanation, and the effects of inequality have been growing in
the post-market reform period. I will argue that this is not sufficient, however, to explain all the exit to the
private sector and my preferred explanation on the growth of state territoriality without a growth in state
functionality does a better job explaining the growth we do see.
In the next chapter, I trace the evolution of Indian education policy since 1986 that I argued is a critical
juncture in Indian education policy. The newly elected Rajiv Gandhi government introduced a second
National Policy on Education that redefined Indian education policy over the next thirty years. I argue that
it is here that we should look for the beginning of the officially sanctioned growth in private education.
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CHAPTER 3: POLICY DRIFT & LAYERING IN INDIAN EDUCATION
POLICY: FROM UNIVERSALIZATION TO PRIVATIZATION
3.1 Introduction
As I showed in Chapter 2, there were few private schools in India in the early 1980s. What private schools
existed were either targeted at the elite or private-aided schools in the South that emerged out of bargains
between religious minorities and state governments looking to maintain communal harmony. By the early
2000s, the situation had changed dramatically, with a huge growth in private schools across the country.
On top of this, most private schools are now private unaided schools that cater to low-income households.
How can we explain this change? Over the next two chapters I provide two explanations, one long-run (in
this chapter) and one short-run (in Chapter 4), that help us understand the rapid growth in private schools
in the 1990s and 2000s.
Here I argue that part of the growth of private schools in India can be explained by “policy drift” that
both reduced the quality of the government offering and opened the space for low-cost private schools to
operate.15 By “policy drift” “rules remaine[d] formally the same but their impact change[d] as a result of
shifts in external conditions” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010b, 17). There was little change in the formal rules
of the game and the institutions of education in India saw few changes at the apex level.16 Actors inside
and outside the country, however, provided opportunities for the half-hearted compliance of formal rules.
The centralization of education financing and international integration provided greater financial resources,
while an increasingly activist Court system reacted to this and carved out space for private actors. With
the large increase in resources also came problems of capacity and implementation that the Indian state was
unable to meet and gave the courts and civil society organizations greater impetus to challenge rulings in
court.
The election of the Rajiv Gandhi led Congress government in 1984 and, more specifically, the passage of
the National Policy on Education (NPE) of 1986, marked the beginning of a slow-moving and endogenous
process that laid the foundation for the growth and normalization of low-cost private primary education.
Using archival records of policy debates around the drafting and passage of the NPE in 1986, official Indian
15The idea of “policy drift” and endogenous policy change has been developed by a number of institutionalist scholars, including
work by Hacker (2004); Mahoney and Thelen (2010b) and Streeck and Thelen (2005).
16By institutions, Douglas North (1990) provides a useful working definition when he defines institutions as “the rules of the game
in a society or. . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, 3).
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government and international aid and financial institution documents from 1984 to 2016, Supreme Court
cases legislating on education as well as secondary sources, I argue that Indian policy on education drifted
from a policy that attempted to increase access and enrollment to education through government schools
to policy that tacitly recognized and normalized the role of private schools. Decreasing quality and legal
rulings that reduced the costs of labor and normalized private schools combined to create conditions favor-
able for the growth of private education, particularly low-cost private schools independent of the Indian
Government.
I spend the rest of this chapter tracing the various stages of this argument and test the argument regarding
the gap between state territoriality and state functionality in Chapter 4. Here, I argue that the NPE of
1986 allowed for two developments. First, it allowed for education to remain on the concurrent list of
the Indian constitution which opened the door for increased funding for education.17 This dramatically
increased the financial outlay on education and, combined with the opening of the Indian economy to
foreign investment, allowed international aid and lending institutions to become involved in the planning
and financing of education in India. This rapid increase in funding as well as international development
organization involvement in education created pressures for the rapid hiring of new teachers that neither
state bureaucracies or treasuries could keep up with. To solve this problem, the Central and various state
governments turned to irregular or “para” teachers to fill the labor shortage, normalizing the use of lower
cost teachers. This normalization, later codified into law, allowed low-cost private schools to also hire low
cost teachers and helped drive their growth.
The second development was that the NPE signaled to civil society organizations and Courts that chal-
lenges to states inability to provide education would receive a sympathetic hearing. The NPE explicitly
called for greater involvement of civil society and private actors in the provision of non-traditional educa-
tion. Over time, this allowed for coalitions from civil society, some involved in private education, to push
for greater recognition of private education in official policy. Although these efforts eventually backfired,
with the Government and Courts increasing regulation on private actors through the Right to Education
Act in 2009, the Government of India finally began paying attention to the role that private actors play
in education in India. This culminated with the normalization of private actors in the education service
provision through Section 12.1C of the Right to Education Act of 2009.
17In the case of conflict between Central and State government policy for an item that appears on the concurrent list, it is Centrla
policy that prevails (Pandey, 2000, 15).
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Since 1986 there have been a series of major policy reforms and legislation, including the NPE in 1986,
the District Primary Education Program (DPEP) in 1994, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All or SSA)
in 2001, the 86th Amendment to the Indian Constitution in 2002, and finally the Right to Education Act
in 2010.18 Although this flurry of legislative, legal, and policy activity would suggest large swings in the
content of Indian education policy, especially in light of the lack of attention paid to education prior to
1986, I argue that the legacies of the NPE can be found in more recent education pronouncements and very
little has formally changed. In the next sections, I provide an overview of the various education policies,
beginning with the NPE in 1986, progressing through DPEP in 1994, which I also evaluate empirically in
Chapter 4, and on to more recent education policies such as SSA and more recent government efforts to
redraft the NPE in the third National Policy in Education in 2016.
3.2 Policy Drift in Indian Education Policy from 1986-2010
Upon his landslide election in 1984 following his mother’s assassination, Rajiv Gandhi quickly education
an important plank of his administration. He created the Ministry of Human Resource Development out
of the Ministry of Education and the new ministry combined the old Ministries of Culture, Sports, Youth
Affairs, Women’s Welfare, Integrated Child Development, and Censorship of Films with the intention of
incorporating all elements of human capital development under one umbrella ministry.19 He also appointed
Narasimha Rao as his first Minister of Human Resource Development. Rao was previously the Education
Minister for the State of Andhra Pradesh, one of the states with the most liberal policies for private provision
of primary education (Aggarwal, 1999, 25).20
Gandhi announced his intentions to draft a new National Policy on Education to replace the first NPE
of 1968 early in 1985.21. The early thinking on the new NPE could only be thought of as “more of the same”
as much of the language in Gandhi’s broadcast to the nation in early January mimicked the first NPE from
1968. There is one hint, however, of what was to come when it was suggested that the “most important
suggestion being that the education must be employment oriented”.22 This suggested a re-orientation of
education policy in India from one that was still seen in terms of nation-building as highlighted by this
18SSA is now the government program used to implement constitutional guarantees provided in the RTE act.
19Narasimha Rao, Minister of Human Resource Development, Motion Re: Challenge of Education — “A Policy Perspective”,
319-322
20In an important note for the future of Indian education policy, Narasimha Rao later became Prime Minister of India in the
early 1990s when India fully liberalized its economy and plans were drawn up for the signing of DPEP with international financial
institutions.
21Rajiv Gandhi, Broadcast to the Nation, 5th January, 1985; Parliamentary Written Answers, December 5, 1985, 179-180.
22MP Mool Chand Daga Parliamentary Oral Answers, January 24, 1985, 3-4.
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quote from Rao on the floor of parliament “It is our endeavour that the product of our education system
would be self-confident individual with a strong commitment to democratic values and secularism, concerned
with the emergence of a nation united in purpose from amongst people speaking different languages, professing
different religions, pursuing a variety of life styles,” [Emphasis added].23 The demands of education in India
prior to the second National Policy on Education were a nation building one, similar to France during the
19th Century (Weber, 1976) or during the evolution of print capitalism in Europe (Anderson, 1983). As the
1986 National Policy states, “The National Policy of 1968. . . aimed to promote national progress, a sense
of common citizenship and cultural, and to strengthen national integration [emphasis in the original]”
(Government of India, 1986), an unsurprising goal for a post-colonial state with high levels of religious and
linguistic diversity.
Responding to this rhetoric Myron Weiner (1990, 7) scathingly argued that “[s]ince independence the
government of India, every commission appointed by the government, the ruling Congress party, all op-
position parties, and all state governments have advocated. . . establishing compulsory universal, primary
education for all children up to the age of fourteen,” yet had failed to do so. I diverge from his interpreta-
tion and argue that the NPE presented a slow shift from the past through which Indian education policy
re-oriented itself by centralizing education funding and decentralizing education administration. First, the
NPE presented a commitment from the Prime Minister to focus on education. It was the first time since
Independence that the head of government had so clearly focused on education. With this renewed focus
also came real action: the Central Government increased its expenditure on education while also encour-
aging investments in education from state-level governments and foreign sources. This was also facilitated
by a prior centralization of education policy making through the Forty-Second Amendment of the In-
dian Constitution that moved education from the state to concurrent list in 1976.24 The NPE also laid
the groundwork for subsequent education policies such as the DPEP, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and Right to
Education Act.25
The second NPE, however, shifted the focus on education policy to improving human capital for an
economy being integrated into an increasingly competitive world. In the words of the NPE, “[India] has
23Motion Re: Challenge of Education — “A Policy Perspective” (320)
24Government responsibilities in India are divided into State, Concurrent, and Central lists, with each designating what level of
government is responsible for each level of education. By moving education from the State to Concurrent lists, the Central Govern-
ment was establishing a commitment to education that had no exited previously.
25Indeed, much of the text of the Right to Education Act is drawn directly from the NPE.
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reached a stage in its economy and technical development when a major effort must be made to derive the
maximum benefits already created and to ensure the fruits of change reach all sections,” (Government of
India, 1986). Among other goals, the second NPE sought to “lay special emphasis on the removal of dispari-
ties and to equalise educational opportunity,” by increasing the number and reach of elementary education,
providing a greater number of teachers in schools, hiring teachers from disadvantaged groups, and improv-
ing school infrastructure (Government of India, 1986). This move brought it more inline with the idea of
education as a form of human capital in which governments can make investments to compensate for the
likely private under-investment (Becker, 1994). This also marked the beginning of the shift of education
from secondary and tertiary education to primary education (Singh, 1988).
3.3 A Renewed Commitment to Education
Prior to the second NPE the Central Government had been hesitant to interfere with state-level govern-
ments in their educational choices, allowing some states to lag far behind in their provision of education
(Weiner, 1990, 56). This led to less than optimal financial outlays as “[s]tates provided virtually all invest-
ment and recurrent cost financing. Most states accorded low priority to primary education. . .Efforts to
improve primary education were limited to small-scale pilot programs in a few states” (World Bank, 1997,
198). The National Policy on Education led to the Central Government expanding both its leadership and
financing role in basic education, particularly through centrally sponsored schemes (World Bank, 1997).
This increased role for the Central Government would have likely not been possible without the in-
creasing centralization of education policy. In 1976 Indira Gandhi passed the Forty-Second Constitutional
Amendment that moved a number of subjects, including education, from the State to Concurrent list.
While the 42nd Amendment was part of a larger project of centralization of power under the Emergency
government rather than a deliberate focus on education, the National Policy on Education and subsequent
policies were a deliberate attempt by the Indian government to centralize certain features of education, such
as the construction of some schools, as well as some of the financial responsibility for education provision
(Government of India, 1986; Tilak, 1997). It was not until the National Policy of Education in 1986 that
this was more than lip-service.
This centralization allowed for a number of things: it vested Parliament with the authority to legislate on
education and allowed it to set national policies on education (World Bank, 1997, 195), while also allowing
the Central Government to establish educational standards. Most importantly, this centralization resulted
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in a shift in the burden of financing of education from state governments to the Central government (World
Bank, 1997). While recognizing that previous levels of educational investment had been chronically low,
the NPE called for raising education funding to six per cent by the Seventh Five Year Plan, and higher
from the Eight Plan forward (Kolhatkar, 1997, 122).26 This financial outlay, however, was not to be borne
solely by the public purse. The NPE also argued that “[r]esources, to the extent possible, will be raised by
mobilising donations, asking the beneficiaries communities to maintain school buildings and supplies of
consumables” (Government of India, 1986). The original draft of the NPE sought to charge fees to parents
so they understood “the value of education” (Deva, 1985), although this language was quickly removed
in the face of opposition from most legislators (Resolution Re: Draft National Policy on Education-1986
(332-333). The most explicit calls for private sector actors was in vocational and secondary and tertiary
education, especially in the Programme of Action (Ministry of Human Resource Development, 1992), but
there was no mention of private financing of education in the final version of the NPE that were presented
on the floor of parliament.
Drafted by Narasimha Rao, the former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and contemporary Minister
of Human Resource Development, the 1986 NPE took matters of implementation seriously (Sitapati, 2016,
69). There were two main policy outcomes of the second NPE: the establishment of District Institutes of
Education Training (DIETs) and Operation Blackboard. The DIETs were that were designed to deal with a
backlog of untrained teachers (Batra, 2013), but were also an early example of the decentralization of educa-
tion administration that would have larger repercussions in later education policy. Operation Blackboard
was a major drive to provide all primary schools in India with better educational infrastructure, includ-
ing blackboards, books and other teaching equipment, and a second teacher in schools that only had one.
Viewed in terms of the last goal, Operation Blackboard appears to have a mixed record (Chin, 2005; Dyer,
1996). An unintended consequence of the second NPE in general and Operation Blackboard in particular
was the large amount of the education budget now dedicated to teachers’ salaries that accounted for 95%
of State-level expenditures on education (Dyer, 1996). This last point created an important legacy for the
NPE and subsequent education policies across India that has had large consequences for Indian education
policy, particularly the entrance of private actors.
The National Policy on Education of 1986 set in motion a number of processes that began to lay the
26It is important to note that these lofty targets have never been met, with education expenditure hovering at around four per cent
of GDP (Mangla, 2015b).
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foundations for implementation gaps in Indian education policy that I later argue allowed for private school
growth. It institutionalized the centralization of education policy making and, more importantly, Central
government expenditures on education. Central government expenditure allowed for significantly higher
levels of expenditure on education that, with India’s later opening to foreign funding and decentralization
of education management meant that India was channeling far more resources to the local level than it had
previously. It also began the decentralization of education administration to lower tiers of government that
often lacked the capacity to absorb new resources.
In the next section, I show that this increase in education funding from domestic and foreign sources
created a rapid increase in demand for labor and provision of education that allowed for the hiring of low-
cost teachers in both the government and private sector. While India’s opening to external financing, ideas,
and interactions is certainly important for the growth of private education, many of the foundations for
the increasing role of private providers were laid far before India liberalized its economy in the 1990s with
the passage of the National Policy on Education in 1986 and Central government commitment to funding
government education.
3.4 Creating Facts on the Ground: The Legacies of the National Policy on Education
The introduction of the NPE, decentralization of education management, introduction of Operation Black-
board, and renewed focus on education since 1986 created the conditions for the first stage in drift in Indian
education policy. The NPE had as its ultinmate goal the universalization of education and the NPE and
actors involved with its drafting encouraged state governments to also expand education, while liberaliza-
tion and integration into the international economy allowed for even more increased funding for education.
While this resulted in a move, still ongoing, to universalize primary education, there were several steps be-
fore national level policies that influenced the direction that policies such as the District Primary Education
Programme (DPEP) would take.
The efforts to universalize education across India began nationally with the DPEP, but this legacy can be
traced earlier. The opportunity emerged as a result of four factors. First, India’s liberalization and opening
to international financial institutions allowed the Central Government and state level governments to enlist
international development organizations for development projects. Market liberalization also created a
belief among policy makers that India needed educated workers for its labor force, and the government
should take an active role in addressing this shortage of workers. Second, “epistemic communities” in
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international education began to have a large influence on Indian education policy making, particularly
after the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All in 1990. Third, with the policy centralization
begun with the NPE, the Central Government began to take a more active role in education policy making.
Fourth, broader moves to decentralize management of public services, particularly through the 73rd and
74th constitutional amendments, created demands to decentralize education administration. I address all
these factors in turn before providing details on the policy that emerged out of this confluence of events:
The District Primary Education Programme (DPEP).
While Operation Blackboard left management and administrative legacies on Indian education policy,
the next major legacy of the National Policy on Education had larger repercussions on the sources of fund-
ing and hiring practices of subsequent education programs across the country. With tacit encouragement
from the Central Government (especially the Minister of Education, and later Prime Minister, Narasimha
Rao, who had been a Member of Parliament from Andhra Pradesh beginning in the late 1970s), several states
across India introduced state-level programs to expand access to basic education (Sitapati, 2016).27 These
programs had two important features. First, with India’s increasing integration into the international econ-
omy, that began slowly at first in the 1980s but gained full speed in the early 1990s, and accompanying
budget deficits, states were encouraged to seek financing from international development organizations.
Second, with the rapid expansion of education came a rapid demand for labor to fill newly opened teaching
positions. As a result, state governments turned to contract or “para” teachers to fill these posts. Contract
teachers were hired on a temporary basis at salaries much lower than their regular counterparts that were
hired under Central Government salary structures. I summarize these state-level projects in Table 3.1 and
expand on their influence below.
Scheme State Year Para-Teachers Foreign Funding
Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Programme Andhra Pradesh 1984 No ODA28
Shiksha Karmi Project Rajasthan 1987 Yes SIDA29
Mahila Samakhya Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Karnataka 1989 No NEDA30
Bihar Education Project Bihar 1991 Likely yes UNICEF31
Lok Jumbish Programme Rajasthan 1992 Yes SIDA32
Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Program Uttar Pradesh 1993 Yes World Bank33
Education Guarantee Scheme Madhya Pradesh 1997 Yes No34
Table 3.1: State-Level Education Programs 1984-1997
27The states that introduced major education programs, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh
represent roughly 50 percent of the total population of the country at the time.
49
The state-level programs coincided with India’s larger integration into the international economy. Lib-
eralization allowed for Indian state governments to borrow from international financial institutions and
development organizations for development projects (Kirk, 2005, 2010; Wu, Kaul and Sankar, 2005). In the
spirit of structural adjustment, the World Bank also sought to re-orient its lending from propping up insol-
vent state enterprises such as state electricity boards and expanded its lending to “development” oriented
projects such as health, education, and rural development (Kirk, 2005, 79). At the same time, India was
concerned that structural adjustment programs would lead to cuts on social services, so sought to protect
certain sectors — one of them being education. To protect these sectors, for the first time the Indian gov-
ernment allowed state governments to borrow from abroad to finance education (Sankar, 2007). Prior to
this, different states could invest different amounts on education depending on their respective priorities.
Liberalization also coincided with the end of single-party rule at Centre and created what Yogendra
Yadav (1999) called “India’s Third Electoral System” where federalized coalition governments at the Centre
became the norm.35 This has resulted in a situation where large national parties such as the Congress
and BJP have entered into political alliances with state and regional parties to maintain power. While the
Central government had policy interests in “second stage reforms” of public services (Naim, 1994), it felt
it could no longer coerce coalition partners to do its bidding and used financing from the World Bank
and other development organizations as leverage to have state-level governments implement reforms the
Centre wanted (Kirk, 2010). As the state government in Andhra Pradesh often provided support to coalition
governments at the Centre, The World Bank knew that “the state’s political clout made it harder for the
Centre to rescind support for the focus states program once it was set in motion” (Kirk, 2010, 46).
On top of this increase in international financing, the increasing centralization of education funding
begun after the NPE also led to an increase in Central funding to the states for education and auxiliary
programs like the Midday Meal Scheme that provided a cooked meal in schools for children (Jha et al.,
2008). The Central government began to use Centrally Sponsored Schemes as a way to maintain control
28Sources: Ayyar (2008); Kumar, Priyam and Saxena (2001); Lacey, Cooper and Torrance (1993).
29Sources: Ayyar (2008); Ramachandran (2001, 2003).
30Sources: Ayyar (2008); Priyam (2015).
31Sources: Ayyar (2008); Govinda and Josephine (2005); Kumar, Priyam and Saxena (2001).
32Sources: Kumar, Priyam and Saxena (2001); Priyam (2015).
33Source: Kumar, Priyam and Saxena (2001).
34Source: Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998); Leclercq (2002, 2003).
35Notwithstanding the most recent 2014 elections that saw a single party gain a majority at the Centre, although they had previ-
ously entered into a pre-electoral alliance with a number of parties.
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over state finances and discipline state governments (Saxena, 2005a, 3-4).36 This increasing centralization
was a two-way street, however, with the states also looking to reduce their fiscal burdens. States began to
rely more on Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) and transfers from the Centre to make up for shortfalls
in their own budgets (Dreze and Sen, 2002; Jha et al., 2008). In one particularly salient example, the Chief
Minister of Andra Pradesh had the entire DPEP program in the state of Andhra Pradesh transferred to
Central responsibility, as this reduced the state of Andhra Pradesh’s debt burden to the Central government
and World Bank to zero (Saxena, 2005a, 8-9).
The first state-level project to focus on the universalization of education in India was the Lok Jumbish
project in Rajasthan. Inspired by the National Policy on Education focus on women’s education, Lok
Jumbish sought to reduce gender disparities in education. One of the notable features of Lok Jumbish was
the engagement of NGO groups in helping the government provide education (Bordia, 2000, 316, 320).
The novelty of Lok Jumbish and then the Bihar Education Project in Bihar, the Basic Education Project
in Uttar Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Programme (APPEP), and the Shiksha Karmi
and Mahila Samakhya programs were that they were all sponsored by foreign donor agencies (Rao, 1998,
11). This represented a change in financing as much of the earlier expenditure on education from the Cen-
tral Governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s “crowded-out” state spending on education as it was
mainly on infrastructure provision and teacher training and did not seek to complement state-level provi-
sion (Sankar, 2007, 4). This allowed state governments to shift education budgets for other purposes, not
radically changing the amount spent on education.
This large influx of foreign and Central government financing to state-level governments posed a prob-
lem for overmatched state governments and local bureaucracies. First, many state bureaucracies felt lit-
tle ownership over the programs and showed little political commitment over their functioning (Saxena,
2005a). One of the results of the increasing use of CSSs and centralization of development in the 90s was
that with the increasing centralization of funds came a reduction in monitoring from the Centre to the
local level (Saxena, 2005a, 10). As Naresh Saxena (2005a) argues, “[m]ost schemes follow a blue print and
top-down approach, with little flexibility given to field staff.” He is critical of CSSs for being distance from
36It is important to note that the process of using CSSs “to pass [state] legislation. . .without obtaining State’ agreement” (Saxena,
2005a, 6) began much earlier under the Indira Gandhi government. However, like the Forty-Second Constitutional amendment and
its later uses, while Indira’s motivations were to maintain greater control over recalcitrant state-level governments, their use under the
Gandhi and Rao administrations were to promote investment and development in sectors that state governments would otherwise
ignore - a claim that rings true as far as education is concerned (Weiner, 1990).
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the recipients and unable to monitor their implementation for lack of staff. Functionaries at the World
Bank, however, continued to believe that local level institutions were strengthened by the influx of money
from external donors (World Bank, 1997, 204).
In some cases, the Central government bypassed the States entirely and sent money directly to the
district level (Jha et al., 2008, 137). This money flowed directly from central government to district level
organs like the district education officers (Jha et al., 2008, 136) - put heavy pressure on these bodies to receive
a lot of money they did not receive before. Although most of financing for primary education came from
the states, there was a large decline from previous decades where almost all of education financing came from
the states, moving from 93 percent of total expenditure to 75 percent of total expenditure (Jha et al., 2008,
110). The increased financing of education from the Central Government and international organizations
along with a focus on decentralization begun with the establishment of DIETs through the NPE, resulted
in new responsibilities and financing for local bureaucracies and forced the implementation of education
programs to pass through what Kapur and Mukhopadhyay (2007) called “the eye of the needle” of local
bureaucracy where capacity is lowest and implementation ability the weakest.
Along with an increasing reliance on the Central government for the financing of education, state gov-
ernments engaged in cost-cutting measures to relieve strained state budgets. The largest one was the appoint-
ment of temporary, or para, teachers to fill vacated teaching posts. With the Seventy-Third Constitutional
amendment, functions such as teacher recruitment were devolved to panchayats (Sharma, 1999), the lowest
level of Indian government, and panchayat governments were encouraged to hire para-teachers (Jha et al.,
2008, 111). While there was a hiring freeze in the regular teaching force that mimicked the overall public
bureaucracy (Kapur, 2010b), the new state-level education programs circumvented this public hiring freeze
by hiring teachers through temporary contracts as it allowed them to reduce costs without reducing the
quantity of education (Béteille and Ramachandran, 2016; Dreze and Sen, 2002; Jha et al., 2008; Robinson
and Gauri, 2011). In the most dramatic example, during the EGS, the state of Madhya Pradesh reportedly
stopped hiring regular teachers and only hired contract teachers (Fyfe, 2007; Robinson and Gauri, 2011).
Para-teachers were hired for a fixed term for under a year and paid less than regular teachers and emerged as
states began to rapidly expand school infrastructure and needed teachers to fill empty school posts (Béteille
and Ramachandran, 2016; Govinda and Josephine, 2005). Govinda and Josephine (2005) trace their genesis
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to the Himachal Pradesh Volunteer Teacher Scheme started in 1984,37 but they were adopted by five large
state governments as they attempted to rapidly expand access to education.
The use of para-teachers in foreign-funded programs began in the 1980s with the Shiksha Karmi and
Mahila Samakhya programs to try and reach adult learners and drop-outs (Robinson and Gauri, 2011, 5), two
of the explicit goals of the NPE. While early projects did not always employ para-teachers, later programs
began to follow the earlier models and employ a greater number of para teachers. The use of para-teachers
increased in 1990s to meet various needs, including improving student-teacher ratios, staffing new schools,
and replacing existing teachers — all but the last explicit goals of DPEP and later SSA. For example, the EGS
in Madhya Pradesh “guaranteed the provision of a teacher, her or his salaries, training of teacher, teaching-
learning material and contingencies to start a school within 90 days wherever there was a demand from a
community” [Emphasis Added] (Gopalakrishnan and Sharma, 1998, 2546). It took the Central Government
some time to recognize the existence and widespread use of para-teachers, as their first mention in an official
policy document was in 1999 (Government of India, 1999; Govinda and Josephine, 2005).
Although none of these programs explicitly engaged private actors, in the next section I will argue that
the increased financial resources for education and local-level implementation as well as the increasing use of
para-teachers set the foundations for two important pillars on which private education in India was built:
the widespread use of low-cost labor, and implementation gaps where private schools could thrive. The
greater use of para-teachers led to the court system to hear a greater number of cases against the use of
para-teachers brought by teachers themselves, and their later legitimization.
Over this period, the Government of India has also significantly devolved a large number of functions
to the local level. This began seriously with the passage of the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian
constitution that formally recognized the Panchyata Raj and Local Administrative Bodies as the third, and
most local, level of administration in India.
The decentralization of political selection and devolution of administrative power over issues such as
education greatly increased the number of political units responsible for the operation of something basic
like a school. As others have shown, the proliferation of administrative units can reduce government capac-
37Although this is likely their earliest implementation, this program differs from the ones I mention in Table 3.1 on a number
of dimensions. First, the Himachal Pradesh program was not designed as a program to fulfill the promise of “education for all”, but
rather to complement the existing teaching cadre. Second, unlike six of the seven program I reference in Table 3.1 that were funded by
international development organizations, the Himachal Pradesh program was funded from the state coffers. Himachal Pradesh has
also often been a leader in implementing education programs and the bureaucracy is marked by an ability to quickly adapt to changing
circumstances (Mangla, 2013, 2015a).
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ity and accountability (Escobar-Lemmon and Ross, 2013; Grossman and Lewis, 2014). In India specifically,
it has created what Lant Pritchett (2009, 4) called a “flailing state” and described as a situation where “the
national level [institutions] remain sound and functional but this head is no longer reliably connected via
nerves and sinews to its own limbs”. One of the impacts of this decentralization of political and adminis-
trative power was to overwhelm the ability of the local level education bureaucracy to engage in education
policy making. In a survey conducted by the World Bank soon after the passage of DPEP, The World Bank
found that District Education Officers (DEOs), ostensibly the new face of decentralized education man-
agement and support where spending less time on instructional support after decentralization reforms and
DPEP than they had been before (World Bank, 1997, 204). This was often corroborated by my own inter-
views with DEOs across Andhra Pradesh who were often frustrated because they were office bound and
merely paper pushers, dealing with the larger politics of teachers and schools rather than the administration
and education taking place in schools.
Decentralization also created problems of coordination between the political and bureaucratic arms of
the state that previously had little interaction with each other. While panchayat governments previously had
little power, they now had to coordinate across multiple levels of panchayat governments and with newly
empowered district level education bureaucrats, creating a Gordian knot of administrative and political
responsibility (World Bank, 1997, 204).
These programs would largely have been a footnote if they did not have influence beyond their states.
However, the Central Government and World Bank explicitly used the examples of district level programs
to implement what was at the time the largest education program in the world,38 the District Primary Edu-
cation Programme (DPEP). In a process of policy diffusion from state-level programs, DPEP explicitly drew
from the programs in Table 3.1, especially Lok Jumbish in Rajasthan and APPEP in Andhra Pradesh (The
World Bank, 1994b). One of the ways in which the Central Government and the World Bank mimicked
the implementation of local government programs was precisely through the hiring of contract teachers.
States were often encouraged to hire contract teachers with DPEP, and later, SSA funds (Béteille and Ra-
machandran, 2016; Govinda and Josephine, 2005; Robinson and Gauri, 2011).
As policies diffused upwards from state-level programs to national-level implementation, the features of
these earlier programs were quickly integrated into DPEP. Policies encouraged in the NPE and implemented
38This has now been surpassed by the program that replaced DPEP in 2002 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan.
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in state-level programs now became national-level policies. While the formal rules governing education in
India had changed little since the NPE, it had now been extended to the largest education program in the
world with international organization support from the World Bank. Interacting with larger changes to
India’s governance structure, such as the decentralization of governance to panchayat governments, policy
had effectively “drifted” from attempting to universalize education to relying on para-teachers and local-
level bureaucracies to implement universal education. I argue that these two features, the reliance on para-
teachers and local-level bureaucracies, led to the next stage in this drift: challenges in the court systems that
further institutionalized this service regime.
3.5 Reacting to Facts on the Ground: The Judiciary and Codifying Spaces for Private
Schools
The next stage in the drift in Indian education policy represented a move from the expansion of government
education services to involvement from civil society and the Courts in legislating on this expansion. In this
section I argue that the Indian courts were reacting to facts on the ground created by state-level education
programs and later expanded by DPEP and SSA, but that in these reactions, they further consolidated a
service regime that facilitated private education.
In this section, I focus on three cases that I believe were particularly important to the growth of the
private sector across India: A. Sundarambal vs. Government of Goa and Daman and Diu in 1988, Mohini
Jain vs. State of Karnataka in 1992, and Unni Krishnan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh in 1993. All three were
brought forward as public interest litigation and used the courts to legislate in favor of a larger group of
people.39 The increasing activism of civil society through the legal system was facilitated by the rise of
“public interest litigation” (PIL) that began in 1978.40 The Courts facilitated the rise of private schools in
two ways; first, public interest litigation, particularly through the cases of Mohini Jain and Unni Krishnan,
the Courts created incentives for the Indian state to cut back on the quality provision of services (Supreme
Court of India, 1988, 1992, 1993).
39These are the paradigmatic examples from education. See Khosla (2010) for a larger list from housing, education, and health.
40Public interest litigation abandons the requirement of standing “that litigation be carried on by an aggrieved person” (Neuborne,
2003, 502). Beginning in the late 1970s, the Indian Supreme Court began to take a more expansive view of standing “to meet the needs
of a developing country” ((Craig and Deshpande, 1989; Neuborne, 2003, 358) and Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v Union
of India AIR 1981). Instead, any individual or group who has suffered no legal injury can bring a case to the court on behalf of an
aggrieved party if it was felt that a right was violated (Khosla, 2010, 743). The Courts began to hear a greater number of public interest
cases in India as it was felt that many of the poor are unlikely to be in a position to seek justice from the Courts. It has opened the
Courts to hearing cases on rights to housing, education, healthcare and a host of other developmental issues that were never previously
present, although some commentators have argued that the Courts have been less sympathetic to public interest cases in recent years
(Bhushan, May 1-7, 2004).
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After the state-level programs I highlight in Table 3.1 began to increasingly rely on para-teachers, the
move at the local and state-level was also supported in the Courts. The Indian Supreme Court and High
Courts have increasingly sided in favor of the use of para-teachers (Robinson and Gauri, 2011). The land-
mark case, however, was the case of A. Sundarambal where the Supreme Court argued that para-teachers in
the private and public sectors are not “skilled or unskilled” labor, but part of a “noble vocation” (Supreme
Court of India, 1988). This definition as a “noble vocation” is important as it excludes teachers from being
defined as “workmen” under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and are not subject to the protections of
this act, or to the wage scales under the Central Government’s Central Pay Commission.
This interpretation allowed for the Supreme Court and various High Courts to legislate in favor of
State governments and private schools that chose to employ contract teachers at low wages. As a result,
“the Supreme Court, while sympathetic to contract teachers claims in the 1980s, began to more frequently
deny petitions for regularization, equal pay, and other labor rights starting in the 1990s. Today the Court
appears far more likely to deny than accept a petition brought by contract teachers, and to favor the govern-
ment’s power to hire teachers as it desires” (Robinson and Gauri, 2011, 4). Although an exact count of how
many contract teachers are employed by the various State governments and Central government in India
is difficult, estimates put their number at about 500,000 in 2005 (Fyfe, 2007, 5). With the freedom to hire
para-teachers, the Central and State governments began to take notice and recommended them as part of
official policy and recommendations for education programs (Ministriy of Human Resource Development,
1999).
The increasing normalization of para-teachers, and legislation in favor of employers of para-teachers
instead of employees, did not escape the notice of private schools particularly low-cost private schools. By
the 2000s, private schools began to move into rural areas and hire contract teachers and enjoy the cost savings
that this contract allowed (Robinson and Gauri, 2011, 7). The cost savings from employing para-teachers
is substantial, with regular teachers being paid anywhere from |5,000-8,000 per month, while para-teachers
are paid around |1,000 in rural areas (Fyfe, 2007, 6-7).
The various Courts of India were forced to adjudicate on labor laws regarding teachers as the hiring of
para-teachers became common practice in government schools as a result of state-level education programs.
The facts created by various state-level programs – namely the increasingly common use of para-teachers
– alongside Courts more friendly to liberalizing labor laws, created a situation that normalized the hiring
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of para-teachers in laws. Private schools jumped on these laws to make widespread use of para-teachers.
Although they are not called “para-teachers” in the private school system, their contracts and hiring prac-
tices closely resemble those of para-teachers in the government system (Dixon and Tooley, 2005; Jain and
Saxena, 2010; Tooley and Dixon, 2005). These have allowed private unaided schools to maintain costs low
and expand to rural areas where they previously could not operate due to cost considerations.
The next set of legislation that the various courts in India were called on to adjudicate were on the
Government’s commitment to providing education. One of the largest spaces that the PIL movement
opened was for the guaranteeing of social rights. The original drafting of the Indian Constitution clearly
differentiated between “Fundamental Rights” in Part III of the Constitution, such as the right to life and
personal liberty, and “Directive Principles of State Policy” in Part IV, of which education was one. Whereas
judicial enforcement is guaranteed for Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principles of State Policy are not
enforceable in any Court but “are nonetheless fundamental to the governance of the country [and the State
has] an obligation. . . to comply with these principles when making laws,” (Craig and Deshpande, 1989, 357).
The cases most often brought under PIL involved situations where the government failed to follow
through on its duty to enforce well-established legal norms (Khosla, 2010; Mehta, 2010; Neuborne, 2003).
This “rights-based approach” empowered “prospective recipients to make legal claims on promised benefits,
and has emerged as a mechanism to make the state more accountable,” (Kapur and Nangia, 2013, 10). As
Pratap Mehta (2010) argued, “a rights-based approach is necessitated by a backdrop of serious state failure.”
In short, with respect to education, the cases most likely to be brought to courts using PIL were those cases
where the Government failed to properly implement its programs. On top of this, the way these cases were
adjudicated, rights were only extended to eligible recipients as opposed to all citizens in the country. So to
provide one example, the right to housing was only adjudicated to citizens who would have otherwise been
eligible for a government housing program - citizens ineligible for this program would not fall under the
right to housing (Khosla, 2010).
The Supreme Court also began to remove the barriers between Parts III and IV of the Constitution,
arguing that the minimum requirements to the right to life also involved a number of directives in Part IV
of the constitution such as education and housing (Craig and Deshpande, 1989; Khosla, 2010; Neuborne,
2003, 362-3). This in turn allowed for the Courts to hear challenges to the “Right to Education”, previously
unenforceable by the courts system. These came to a head with the cases of Mohini Jain and Unni Krishnan
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in 1992 and 1993 respectively. In Mohini Jain, the Supreme Court held that the “right to education flows
directly from the right to life,”41 while Unni Krishnan confirmed the ruling from Mohini Jain and reaffirmed
that the right to life included the right to education.42
There are two important points to note in support of a process of policy drift. First, although both
Mohini Jain and Unni Krishnan dealt with claims against tertiary education institutions denying access to
education, the Courts interpreted the cases broadly and argued that they should apply to primary and
secondary education institutions, particularly those mentioned explicitly in the Indian Constitution (“all
children until they complete the age of fourteen years”). This allowed for a larger movement pushing for
the right to education to be enshrined in the Constitution. Second, the right was also interpreted broadly in
terms of where the service was provided, with both government and private facilities falling under the ambit
of the rulings. In Mohini Jain, the Court argued that “[w]hen the State Government grants recognition to
the private education institutions it creates an agency to fulfill its obligation under the Constitution. The
students are given admission to the educational institutions — whether state-owned or state-recognized —
in recognition of their “right to education” under the Constitution.” These two features allowed for an ex-
pansive reading of jurisprudence that allowed civil society actors and actors within subsequent governments
to begin to mobilize around the passage of the Right to Education Act of 2009.
What this series of legislation did, especially as related to the eventual passage of the Right to Educa-
tion in 2009, was codify and normalize private schools in Indian law and include them as part of India’s
education provision regime. While the NPE in 1986 made no mention of private schools as an important
pillar upon which India could meet its commitment to universalizing education, the last two major policy
pronouncements on education policy by the Indian government, the Right to Education Act and the draft
of the third National Policy on Education in 2016, have made frequent reference to the role that private
schools play in fulfilling India’s commitment to universalizing education. While the Right to Education
sought to regulate private schools and also bring them under greater government sanctioning, the other
effect that provisions like Section 12.1(c) had was to normalize the idea of private schools as part of the
larger service provision landscape in India.
41Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992).
42Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993).
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3.6 Conclusions
The Government of India has largely been successful in attempting to universalize education. There are
more children in school today than there were at the beginning of market-oriented reform, literacy in India
has increased dramatically, most villages in India have a primary school. The way that this has been achieved,
however, has deviated from the intentions of the policy, deviations that have implications for subsequent
policy making in India. Borrowing from the institutionalist literature, endogenous institutional changes
have led to informal institutions responding by providing close, but qualitatively better, substitutes to those
provided by the state. These institutions, in the form of recognized and unrecognized private schools, have
“filled in gaps” by “facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework,”
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 728).
In the words of Paul Pierson (2003), the process that first created the conditions in which private
schools could operate, and then normalized them through legal codification, was a “big, slow-moving,
and. . . invisible” process of endogenous institutional change. Actors within the state, civil society, and In-
dian courts slowly modified the existing rules of the game from a system that privileged the public supply
of education that then opened space for private actors, and later began to normalize and institutionalize
them with greater regulation. This process exhibits features of policy drift, where, for the most part of the
period under study (1986-2009) “rules remain formally the same but their impact changes as a result of shifts
in external conditions” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010b; Hacker, 2005, 17).
The starting point for this process can be traced to the introduction of the National Policy on Educa-
tion in 1986 by the Rajiv Gandhi government. The National Policy set in motion three processes. First,
it established a Central Government, and later international development organization, commitment to fi-
nancing education. Second, it formalized the non-formal provision of education labor through non-formal
education policies. Third, it began the decentralization of education management through the creation of
DIETs.
The Courts system in turn reacted to these new facts created by education policies. Challenges to the
use of para-teachers became more frequent, and over time, the Courts sided in favor of the Central and
State governments that used para-teachers (Béteille and Ramachandran, 2016; Robinson and Gauri, 2011).
Challenges to the inability of the state to provide education were also brought to Courts, and the Courts
interpreted this failure broadly by including the private sector as a key actor in India’s education provision
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regime (Khosla, 2010). These rulings both normalized the private sector, and ensured that a key input for
low-cost private schools — labor — was justified by the Courts system, too.
This renewed commitment to education, however, put India on a path of primary education provision
that accentuated a disjuncture between the size and reach of the state on one hand, and the proper function-
ing of the state on the other. Through the centralization of education policy and financing, India was able
to credibly commit to providing and expanding education. However, through the decentralization of the
management of education, the lofty objectives of the central government were left unfulfilled at the local
level. This in turn provided an opening for the low-cost private sector to enter. In Chapter 4 I show that
the growth of government primary schools led to the growth of the private sector.
While I have looked at the long-run implications of endogenous institutional change, in Chapter 4, I
empirically test the impact that one particular policy, DPEP, has had on the growth of private schools.
There, I leverage the assignment rules of DPEP to study the effects this program that both decentralized
education provision and rapidly increased the funding of education at the local level had on the private
sector response.
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CHAPTER 4: FRIENDS OF THE STATE? STATE CAPACITY AND PRIVATE
SCHOOL GROWTH IN INDIA
In Chapter 1, I argued that private services in low-income democracies are dependent on the prior growth
and expansion of state capacity for themselves grow. There, I argued that the rapid expansion of state “terri-
toriality” without a accompanying expansion of state “functionality” (O’Donnell, 1993, 1358) in education
service provision leads to private sector entry. This rapid expansion of “territoriality” without concomi-
tant expansion of “functionality” has created what Pritchett (2009, 3) has colorfully called a “flailing” state
where “the capability of the Indian state to implement programs and policies is weak.” This gap between
the intent and the execution of the Indian state has opened space for what Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 729)
call “substitutive informal institutions” where these institutions “achieve what formal institutions were de-
signed, but failed, to achieve.” I suggest here that in the realm of education those informal institutions take
the form of private schools that seek to fill gaps in state provision.
In this chapter, I test that proposition empirically by exploiting the introduction of a major education
program, the District Primary Education Programme or DPEP, in 1994 that sought to increase funding for
primary education and increase local state capacity in the provision of primary education by decentralizing
education decision making and increasing resources for primary education. I use a variety of data sources
and empirical methods and find that, on the whole, in districts that DPEP was introduced we see a growth
in government schools, or state territoriality, but no improvement in the educational outcomes DPEP was
supposed to address, or no improvement in state functionality. This in turn I argue resulted in a faster
growth of private education in districts in which DPEP was introduced. As in Chapter 1, I suggest this
is for two reasons. First, the rapid decentralization of school decision making extended the reach but did
not extend the capabilities of the Indian state. Second, private services, particularly private services catering
to low-income communities, require inputs from the state on both the demand and supply side to thrive.
In this chapter I find that private schools tend to co-locate in districts with a large growth in government
schools. In the rest of the chapter, I provide greater context on the District Primary Education Programme
and what we should expect to see after the introduction of the program, outline the data sources I use, and
present the results that support my theory.
As I outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, India has enacted a number of significant primary education policy
reforms since 1986 - including the second National Policy on Education (NPE) in 1986, the District Pri-
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mary Education Program (DPEP) in 1994, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA or Education for All) in 2004, and
The Right to Education (RTE) Act in 2009 - that have rapidly expanded government provided primary ed-
ucation. This legislative activity over the past 30 years marks a profound shift from the first thirty years of
India’s independent history when, aside from a few empty promises in the Constitution of India (Weiner,
1990), the Government of India found little time for education. The increased activity is all the more sur-
prising given that the early 1980s also saw India slowly opening to the world economy, an action that was
early thought to lead to constrained government budgets, reduced policy space, and reduced social spending
(Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra, 2008; Wibbels and Arce, 2003).
While the intentions of these policies have certainly been noble, the results of these policies, however,
have been far from policy makers stated intentions. While on one hand, the Indian government has been
very successful in increasing access and availability of free, public, primary education, the unintended conse-
quences of these policies have served to undermine government policy. The quality of government provided
primary education in India is poor and constantly declining (ASER, 2015a), government teachers are of-
ten absent or exert low effort while present (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Chaudhury et al., 2006), and, most
importantly for this chapter, the demand side response over the past thirty years has been to abandon the
public sector for low cost private schools (Tooley, 2009; Rangaraju, Tooley and Dixon, 2012).
This chapter argues that exit from the government sector has been most pronounced in areas where,
paradoxically, the government has been most successful at fulfilling central government policy and increas-
ing access to primary education. Using three waves of the Economic Census of India from 1991, 1998, and
2005, and school construction data from the school report cards collected by the District Information Sys-
tem of Education (DISE) at the National University of Education Planning and Administration (NUEPA)
I construct a district-level panel of school construction from 1986 to 2002 as well as a richer panel from
three waves of the Economic Census of India in 1990, 1998, and 2005. I find that the largest growth in
private schools was in locations that also saw the greatest expansion in primary public education. I suggest
that this is a result of two factors. First, we cannot understand the expansion of private schools without
understanding government politics towards private education. I argue here that private school growth was a
direct response of government school expansion.43 The rapid expansion of government schools resulted in
43I use the term “government school” to refer to schools that would be called “public schools” in the U.S. and “state schools” in
the U.K. and the term “private school” to refer to what are called “public schools” in India and the U.K. and “private schools” in the
U.S.
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a concomitant decline in government school quality. The Government of India focused on increasing access
without a similar focus on quality, leading to flight from the public sector. Second, this was occurring over
a period where the Indian economy was growing at an average of 6 percent per year, rapidly increasing rural
incomes. This increased flow of money changed both material capabilities as well as aspirations, aspirations
that were often manifested in demands for primary education.
I leverage the introduction of DPEP, not as the only source of growth in state capacity in Indian ed-
ucation policy over the last 30 years, but as an example of increasing state territoriality I argue has been
occurring in India. Because of DPEP’s clear assignment rules, I can provide cleaner causal evidence of in-
creases in state capacity leading to greater private school growth. In Section 4.4.6, I test the more general
proposition that private schools tend to co-locate in areas with greater number of government schools and
find the results are stronger there, although the causal interpretation is more muddled.
In Figure 4.1, I plot the ratio of private schools to all schools by district and by the three main types of
private schools in India: aided, unaided, and unrecognized schools.44 Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the South,
and the area around Delhi in the North have the largest concentrations of private schools. The Keralan and
Tamil private schools are likely Catholic schools or locally-managed schools that are also supported by the
Government of India (and this is further confirmed by the ratio of aided schools in the top-right panel of
Figure 4.1 that suggests that Kerala and Tamil Nadu as well as Maharashtra have the most number of private
schools that receive aid from the Government of India). This pattern, however, masks both the nature and
growth of private schools across the country since 1986.
In Figure 4.2, I plot the growth of private schools since 1986 when the second National Policy on Ed-
ucation was drafted. Here we see that Kerala and Tamil Nadu had large ratios of private schools before
market-oriented reforms and continue to do so today. The fastest growth in private schools, however, oc-
curs in districts that had a low initial stock of private schools, particularly in the West and Andhra Pradesh45
Most of the fastest growth of private schools comes from unaided schools that receive no financial assistance
from the government. This again squares with my larger argument that the expansion, but not deepening,
of state capacity leads to greater private school entry. Without a highly capable state (that likely existed
44Aided private schools are schools that receive financial support from the Indian Government, unaided schools receive no support
and as a result have fewer restrictions on curriculum and hiring practices, and unrecognized schools are schools that have not been
recognized by the Indian Government.
45The bottom right-hand panel of 4.2 suggests that Andhra Pradesh has seen the fastest growth in unrecognized schools. I am
hesitant to draw too many inferences from the data on unrecognized schools however, as the DISE school report cards data is self-
reported and likely undercounts the number of unrecognized schools across the country.
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Figure 4.1: Private Schools as a Percentage of All Schools in 2013
in Kerala and Tamil Nadu prior to market-oriented reforms), private schools cannot formally rely on the
government for financial support.
In the section that follows, I outline the main goals of the District Primary Education Programme that
I leverage as an education program that greatly expanded state capacity by decentralizing school adminis-
tration and providing a greater level of school financing, but did not increase local-level capacity to manage
primary schools.
4.1 Context: The District Primary Education Programme
In 1994, the Government of India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with The World Bank
and The European Commission to finance and provide technical support for DPEP (The World Bank,
1994a). While the Government of India had significant input and direction in determining the nature of
the program, the financing from the two IFIs allowed the Government of India to spend considerably more
money on public education than it had previously (Tilak, 1997). Additionally, the move to seek external
financing also allowed state level governments to finance the program through borrowing, a financing mea-
sure previously closed to states (Tilak, 1997; Kirk, 2005, 2010). These two features allowed for DPEP to be
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Figure 4.2: Growth in Private Schools 1986-2013
one of the biggest education programs in the country’s history, while also being sustainable (Rao, 1998).
DPEP had a number of goals in mind when implemented, including reducing gender differences in
enrollment, reducing primary education dropout rates, raising literacy rates, and provide access to primary
education for all children. As the program was intended to decentralize the management of implementation
of education programs, how this was achieved was left up to individual districts (Singh and Sridhar, 2005,
3863). Considerably financing was provided to the district level to increase local-level capacity to implement
the program, but the actual implementation was left up to states and districts to decide.
The main strategies of DPEP were to decentralize education planning and administration by having
districts formulate plans for education rather than district plans being derived from state-level plans, in-
crease teacher professionalization, increase the number of teachers in government schools, and improve
school-level infrastructure, either by constructing new schools or improving already existing school-level
infrastructure (Rao, 1998). All these were conducted with the eventual goal of increasing schooling and lit-
eracy for previously disadvantaged groups such as women, and scheduled castes and tribes. Because of this
very specific goal, districts with low female literacy were deliberately targeted to receive DPEP funding.
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The program was initially implemented in 39 districts across seven states, eventually expanding to 192
districts across 17 states, or 40 percent of India’s districts and 17 of India’s 32 states and territories at the time.
Figure 4.3 shows the districts that received DPEP funding across India.46 To be included in the program, a
district had to have a female literacy rate below the national average calculated the 1991 population census
(Rao, 1998), although states could also include districts that were above the mean female literacy cutoff at
their individual discretion.
Non-DPEP District
DPEP District
Figure 4.3: DPEP Districts
For my purposes, the implementation of DPEP allows me to leverage a program that greatly expanded
state capacity to the local level through greater focus and resources. This provides me with an opportunity
to see what happens when the Indian state explicitly attempts to increase and extend state capacity to the
local level with greater financing and penetration. We can look at the growth of private education after the
implementation of DPEP by looking at the effects of DPEP on the districts that received program financing
against districts that were excluded from the program. Given both assignment rules to the program (the
literacy cut-off) and a long time-series I have constructed of school construction, I can use a number of
46A complete list of districts and states included in DPEP is provided in Appendix B.7.
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methods to estimate the effect of the program, that I primarily identify as an expansion and extension
of state capacity, on the growth of private services in education. I turn to this now and provide greater
details on how districts were assigned to DPEP and how I leverage these assignments rules to understand
the growth in private services.
4.2 Hypotheses
For the purposes of this chapter, DPEP had two primary goals in mind. First, DPEP sought to increase
state “territoriality” by ensuring that every child in DPPE districts had a school within reasonable walking
distance. This often required building schools in villages where they did not previously exist. This leads to
hypothesis one:
• H1A: Districts that received DPEP should see a greater number of government schools built after
DPEP was implemented.
• H1B : Districts that received DPEP should have fewer villages without a government school.
At the same time, as a result of the Gordian knot of administrative and political responsibilities created
by DPEP along with the low levels of state capacity at the local level in India, I argue that DPEP should have
seen no increase in state “functionality”. While responsibilities for school management were decentralized
to the local level, this was done without increases in resources or training for local level actors to carry out
these tasks. I test this through the following hypotheses:
• H2A: Districts that received DPEP should have no better overall literacy or educational outcomes
after DPEP was implemented.
Given that DPEP specifically targeted minorities groups including woman, scheduled castes, and sched-
uled tribes, we can also test these effects more directly, leading to the following hypotheses:
• H2B : Districts that received DPEP should have no better female, SC, and ST literacy after DPEP was
implemented.
Finally, I argue that as a result of an increase in state territoriality without a accompanied increase in state
functionality, we should see a private sector response in an attempt to substitute for poor state performance
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). This leads to a set of hypotheses on the private sector response:
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• H3A: Districts that received DPEP should see a greater number of private schools built after DPEP
was implemented.
• H3B : Districts that received DPEP should have fewer villages without a private school.
In short, my argument progresses in three stages. I argue that large scale education programs in India
to date have increased the size and reach of the state (or state territoriality) without necessarily increasing
the ability of the state to properly carry out its functions (or state functionality). This gap, between the
presence but lack of function of the Indian state, has allowed for private providers to step in to provide
services to substitute for poorly functioning state services. In the next section, I present the data sources I
use to answer these questions and operationalize the variables I use to answer these questions.
4.3 Data & Methods
My main data comes from the School Report Cards (SRC) collected by the District Information System for
Education (DISE),47 and three waves of the Economic Census of India conducted by The Indian Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) in 1990, 1998, and 2005.48 I supplement these data
with district level demographic and infrastructure data from the population census of the India, a census
of village-level infrastructure collected concurrently with the census, and the National Sample Survey, an
annual smaller survey of demographic information and provide more details on these datasets below.
4.3.1 District Information System for Education
I use school construction data from the DISE school report cards data that includes the year that all rec-
ognized schools were established.49 The school reports card data is a self-reported survey of school-level
infrastructure and labor including the number of students, teachers, and funds received from Central Gov-
ernment Schemes such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. Each school is required to report what year they were
established every year they report data. I take the modal answer they provide over the ten years DISE has
been collecting data (2005-2015) and use this as the year of school construction.50 The school-level data
47The School Report Cards datasets is also increasingly commonly used in comparative and longitudinal studies of Indian educa-
tion. See Fagernäs and Pelkonen (2014), Khanna (2015b), and Vaishnav and Sircar (2013).
48The Economic Census has been an increasingly common dataset used in comparative and longitudinal studies of India, particu-
larly for its attempt to be a complete count of economic activity in India. See Novosad and Asher (2012); Harriss-White (2013), and
Iyer, Khanna and Varshney (2013) for other uses.
49Unlike the Economic Census, DISE school report cards data does not included a complete count of all schools. As data is self-
reported, the incentives for unrecognized schools to report to DISE are low and the data includes a very small number of unrecognized
schools, likely those seeking recognition in the near future.
50Although most schools report the same construction date across each wave in the DISE data, through errors of coding or admin-
istration, there are sometimes differences between survey waves. Given that I often have ten years of observations for some schools,
taking the modal answer to this question helps correct most errors.
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contains twelve million school-year level observations. I first collapse this data to the school-level and then
further collapse this data to the district level to include a count of the number of schools in every district
across India since Independence in 1947.51 I only use the district-level panel from 1986 as the period after the
drafting of the second National Policy on Education provides a different political economy to the period
prior.
4.3.2 Economic Census
The Economic Census is a complete count of all business establishments in India “engaged in [the] pro-
duction or distribution of goods or services other than for the sole purpose of own consumption,” located
within the geographical boundaries of the country except those engaged in crop production (MoSPI). Most
importantly for my purposes it is different from other administrative data sets in India in that it is a complete
census of all enterprises in the country (unlike the Annual Survey of Industries), and covers all enterprises
in the formal and informal sector (unlike self-reported data on schools from the District Information Sys-
tem for Education (DISE)). This means that I will have a complete count of all formal and informal schools
in India - a more comprehensive account of the private sector that will account for the many unrecognized
schools that a dataset such as DISE would miss. As I argue, this feature is especially important in the later
periods as many of the schools in India during this time were smaller, unrecognized schools that would not
have been recorded in datasets designed to collect official or self-reported data on education.
I use data at the district level from the three waves of the Economic Census. Data from the Economic
Census is provided at the firm level, but I collapse firms to create counts at the district level so that the
district is my unit of analysis.52 The Economic Census contains a small amount of information, but most
importantly for my purposes, asks whether an economic enterprise is privately owned and in what sector
the enterprise operates in. This allows me to identify all education institutions in 1990 and 1998, and all
primary schools in the latest round in 2005. While the inability to specifically identify primary schools in
the first two waves could be problematic, most of the educational institutions identified in the 2005 wave
were primary schools, a pattern I have no reason to believe was any different in the early period. I provide
scatter plots of the correlation between Economic Census waves and data from DISE in Appendix Section
B.5.
51Future iterations will geographically match the pincode data included in DISE data to legislative assembly boundaries to include
this at the electoral district level.
52Future iterations will geographically match villages across census waves and collapse the data to the electoral district level to test
the political effects of DPEP, too.
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The timing of the survey waves is also appropriate for my purposes as the Economic Census was con-
ducted in 1990, 1998, and 2005 and the policy period I am interested begins just after the first economic
census and finishes just before the final economic census as is shown in Figure 4.4. As I am interested in
testing the effects of a program introduced in 1994, I can compare outcomes between 1990 and 1998, and
1990 and 2005 respectively through a regression discontinuity framework.
1986: NPE
1990: Economic Census
1994: DPEP
1998: Economic Census
2001: SSA
2005: Economic Census
Figure 4.4: Education Policy Timeline and Data Availability
4.3.3 Population Census and Village Directories
I supplement these data with data from the population census of India and the village directories conducted
in 1991 and 2001. The population census contains information on basic demographic data at the village
level including population and literacy levels aggregated at the village level. The village directory contains
information on basic village amenities, also at the village level. For this chapter, I use population data from
the population census and information on the number of government schools from the village directories
all aggregated to the district level.
To construct the dataset, I first match the 1990 Economic Census with the 1991 Population Census
and Village Directories, and the 1998 and 2005 Economic Censuses with the 2001 Population Census and
Village Directory at the district level.53 The district-level panel provides approximately 375 district-years.
I then merge this data at the district level with the DISE school report cards data.
4.3.4 Annual Status of Education Report
Finally, I also use district level test score data from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) in 2007.
ASER is a large education NGO that conducts an annual nationwide test of reading, writing, and math
ability. The survey is a short questionnaire that collects basic demographic details on the parents of the
children as well as how children score on a series of reading and arithmetic tests. For reading, children are
53Future iterations of this chapter will provide data at the assembly constituency level as my fieldwork and secondary sources sug-
gest this is the level at which relevant decision on education policy are enacted in terms of fund distribution (as opposed to budgeting).
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asked to identify letters, words, paragraphs, and entire stories. For math, children are asked to identify
numbers from 1-9, 10-99, conduct basic subtraction and division. All tests are conducted in the vernacular
language of the village.54 Tests are conducted at the household, instead of the school, level to capture all
in-school and out of school children and all children in a sample household between the ages of 6-14 are
tested. Data is representative at the district level.
I use this data to test hypotheses on state functionality and only include children enrolled in government
schools to see the effects of DPEP on changes in learning in government schools. Unfortunately, as the first
nationally representative and publicly available set of ASER data is from 2007, I am unable to conduct a
robustness check for this data in Appendix B.
I provide summary statistics of the various datasets I use below. In Table 4.1, I provided summary
statistics of the variables used from the economic census, in Table 4.2, I provided summary statistics of the
variables used from the DISE school report cards data, and in Table 4.3, I provided summary statistics from
data used from the census of India.
54The ASER test also conducts a test of English reading comprehension, but I do not use this data as it would skew results to
districts in which English is the vernacular language.
71
Full Sample DPEP Districts Non-DPEP Districts
Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N
1990 Economic Census:
Government Schools 1,500 1,018 99 8,497 369 1,533 918 189 4,690 170 1,471 1,098 99 8,497 199
Private Schools 480 513 1 3,297 352 441 427 1 3,297 161 512 574 4 3,108 191
Villages with Government School (%) 59 24 8 100 369 59 24 8 97 170 60 24 9 100 199
Villages with Private School (%) 19 21 0 100 369 17 19 0 97 170 20 23 1 100 199
1998 Economic Census:
Government Schools 1,712 1,157 0 8,272 376 1,788 1,088 91 5,452 175 1,645 1,213 0 8,272 201
Private Schools 604 564 0 3,250 376 537 453 5 2,463 175 662 641 0 3,250 201
Villages with Government School (%) 66 19 0 100 376 67 19 4 99 175 66 19 0 100 201
Villages with Private School (%) 18 16 0 100 376 16 13 2 72 175 19 18 0 100 201
2005 Economic Census:
Government Schools 1,669 1,288 100 8,775 372 1,836 1,392 223 8,775 175 1,521 1,171 100 6,066 197
Private Schools 561 740 7 5,851 372 589 726 7 5,729 175 535 754 19 5,851 197
Villages with Government School (%) 68 20 17 100 372 69 20 17 100 175 68 19 23 100 197
Villages with Private School (%) 23 19 2 100 372 24 19 2 100 175 23 19 4 100 197
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics: Economic Census Variables72
Full Sample DPEP Districts Non-DPEP Districts
Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N
1990 DISE:
Government Schools 1,702 1,176 148 8,561 375 1,814 1,208 172 7,431 175 1,604 1,141 148 8,561 200
Private Schools 294 345 0 3,059 375 237 218 0 1,294 175 345 421 2 3,059 200
1998 DISE:
Government Schools 2,024 1,364 176 9,720 375 2,244 1,486 198 9,720 175 1,832 1,219 176 8,762 200
Private Schools 478 474 1 4,146 375 424 335 1 1,699 175 525 565 8 4,146 200
2005 DISE:
Government Schools 2,468 1,660 186 10,951 371 2,738 1,764 214 10,951 175 2,228 1,526 186 9,237 196
Private Schools 750 709 4 6,375 371 715 562 4 2,976 175 782 819 11 6,375 196
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: DISE Variables
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Full Sample DPEP Districts Non-DPEP Districts
Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N
1991 Census:
Population (1,000s) 1,590 890 0 7,511 373 1,683 833 31 4,955 175 1,508 931 0 7,511 198
Population 5-11 (1,000s) 211 132 0 1,088 373 224 121 4 729 175 199 141 0 1,088 198
Villages with Government School (%) 75 18 21 100 372 74 17 28 100 175 75 18 21 100 197
Literacy (%) 36 13 10 85 372 32 10 10 77 175 40 15 15 85 197
Female Literacy (%) 24 15 3 84 372 19 12 5 74 175 29 17 3 84 197
SC Literacy (%) 31 14 8 78 360 26 10 9 71 168 35 15 8 78 192
ST Literacy (%) 29 18 0 122 357 23 14 0 79 167 34 19 0 122 190
2001 Census:
Population (1,000s) 1,841 1,034 33 8,610 372 1,956 974 33 5,811 175 1,738 1,076 78 8,610 197
Population 5-11 (1,000s) 253 162 4 1,238 372 278 159 4 910 175 231 162 8 1,238 197
Villages with Government School (%) 79 16 24 100 372 80 15 36 100 175 79 17 24 100 197
Literacy (%) 50 12 22 85 372 47 10 24 78 175 52 13 22 85 197
Female Literacy (%) 39 14 12 84 372 35 11 14 75 175 42 15 12 84 197
SC Literacy (%) 45 14 12 81 372 42 11 13 77 175 47 15 12 81 197
ST Literacy (%) 37 14 0 81 354 35 13 0 80 167 39 15 0 81 187
2011 Census:
Population (1,000s) 2,071 1,211 32 9,694 371 2,209 1,125 32 6,181 175 1,947 1,273 84 9,694 196
Population 5-11 (1,000s) 264 199 3 1,264 371 289 204 4 1,158 175 241 192 3 1,264 196
Villages with Government School (%) 86 14 2 100 371 87 14 2 100 175 86 14 35 100 196
Literacy (%) 59 10 28 89 371 56 8 28 83 175 62 10 38 89 196
Female Literacy (%) 51 12 22 89 371 47 10 22 82 175 54 13 28 89 196
SC Literacy (%) 56 12 29 85 371 53 9 30 79 175 59 13 29 85 196
ST Literacy (%) 49 12 22 86 355 47 10 23 78 168 52 13 22 86 187
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics: Population Census Variables
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Next, I provide basic differences between DPEP and non-DPEP districts in the number of government
(Table 4.4) and private schools (Table 4.5, as well as changes in literacy rates (Table 4.6). Table 4.4 shows
that while DPEP districts had a greater number of government schools in the pre-DPEP period, they also
saw a growth of approximately 115 government schools after DPEP was implemented, and this difference
is statistically significant.
DPEP Status
Non-DPEP DPEP Difference
Mean government schools pre-DPEP 1263.81 1351.75 87.94
(17.93) (17.81) (25.47)
Mean government schools post-DPEP 1482.47 1686.04 203.57
(21.57) (22.77) (31.45)
Change in mean government schools 218.66 332.47 115.63
(27.85) (28.31) (40.11)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.4: Difference in Government Schools Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts
Table 4.5 conducts the same exercise for private schools and we find that DPEP districts had fewer
private schools before and after DPEP, although the difference in difference estimate is not significant.
DPEP Status
Non-DPEP DPEP Difference
Mean private schools pre-DPEP 267.39 179.13 -88.26
(7.75) (4.20) (9.27)
Mean private schools post-DPEP 430.30 339.81 -90.49
(11.72) (7.29) (14.41)
Change in mean private schools 162.91 159.51 -2.23
(13.77) (8.08) (16.77)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.5: Difference in Private Schools Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts
Finally, Table 4.6 looks at changes in literacy rates between DPEP and non-DPEP districts in 2001
and 2011, the two years in which literacy data exists. Here again we find lower levels of literacy in DPEP
districts, and while this gap has narrowed, the difference-in-difference estimate is not significant.
4.3.5 Operationalization of Variables
From the Economic Census, the main variable of interest is the number of private schools in a district
in each wave of the census. The Economic Census identifies whether an enterprise is privately or publicly
owned and the industry a firm is involved in. I code all privately owned firms engaged in primary education
as private primary schools. From the DISE SRC data I use the year schools were established to create a panel
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DPEP Status
Non-DPEP DPEP Difference
Mean literacy pre-DPEP 40.34 31.67 -8.67
(1.04) (0.79) (1.33)
Mean literacy 2001 52.38 46.53 -5.85
(0.91) (0.73) (1.19)
Change in mean literacy 1991-2001 12.04 14.86 2.82
(1.38) (1.07) (1.78)
Mean literacy 2011 61.84 55.80 -6.04
(0.75) (0.63) (0.99)
Change in mean literacy 1991-2011 21.51 24.14 2.63
(1.28) (1.01) (1.66)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.6: Difference in Literacy Rates Between DPEP and Non-DPEP Districts
from Independence in 1947 to 2014 of the number of government and private schools per district. I divide
the number of schools in both the economic census and DISE SRC data by the number of school-aged
children in the district estimated from district-level estimates from the National Sample Survey. From the
ASER data, I construct a summary index of the level that children achieve on the various elements of the
survey, using a summary index designed by Anderson (2008) to aggregate related variables.
I conduct a number of analyses to overcome the limitations of each individual dataset. First, I use a
difference-in-difference design using the data on school construction from the DISE SRC data. Second, I
use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using the district-level cutoff for the implementation of the Dis-
trict Primary Education Programme (DPEP). Third, I conduct a time-series-cross-sectional analysis using
district-years as the unit of observation in the panel.
4.3.6 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
For the difference-in-difference analysis, I use the year schools were established to create a district-year level
panel of the number of schools per district. I divide districts into those that received assistance under DPEP
and those that did not.55 I limit my analysis to the period between the second National Policy of Education
(1986) to the introduction of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) in 2002 as this provides eight years of observations
before and after DPEP was introduced in 1994, as well as providing a clean theoretical start and end point
for analyzing the effects of DPEP. As I argue in Chapters 1 and 2, the National Policy on Education changed
the political economy of education in India where there was a greater focus on primary education, as well
as a decentralization of education management across the country. While SSA had similar goals to DPEP,
55For a complete listing of districts that received DPEP funds, see Appendix Section B.7.
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SSA universalized the program across the country, which does not allow for clean identification of districts
that received greater education funding.56
For the time trends in government and private school growth by DPEP and non-DPEP districts, I plot
the number of government schools by the number of school-aged children in Figure 4.5 and the number
of private schools by the number of school-aged children in 4.6.57 Figure 4.5 confirms the original goals
of DPEP: districts that received DPEP funding saw an increase in the number of government schools after
DPEP and DPEP had the intended effect of nearly eliminating the government school access gap between
DPEP and non-DPEP districts. There is a sharp growth in government schools post-DPEP beginning in
1996 that leads to greater government school construction for the entire DPEP period.
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Figure 4.5: Difference-in-Difference: Government Schools
The dashed line represents the average number of government schools per school-aged children in districts that received DPEP funding
by year. The solid line represents the average number of government schools per school-aged children in districts that did not receive
DPEP funding by year. The horizontal vertical line at 1994 represents the year DPEP was signed.
Moving from the growth of government schools, to private schools, DPEP also saw a “crowding-in”
response from private schools. Figure 4.6 suggests that districts that received DPEP funding began with
56For a separate attempt to identify the effects of SSA at the sub-district level, see (Khanna, 2015a).
57I provide a test of the parallel trends assumption in Appendix Section B.1.
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a lower baseline number of private schools. After receiving DPEP, however, the gap between DPEP and
non-DPEP districts in the number of private schools per district narrows to nearly zero. Although the
post-DPEP break is not as dramatic and slightly later, subsequent analysis shows that there was a private
school response to the introduction of DPEP. The later response is to be expected as the private school
response should be delayed by a couple of years after the government school response.
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Figure 4.6: Difference-in-Difference: Private Schools
The dashed line represents the average number of private schools per school-aged children in districts that received DPEP funding by
year. The solid line represents the average number of private schools per school-aged children in districts that did not receive DPEP
funding by year. The horizontal vertical line at 1994 represents the year DPEP was signed.
To unpack the difference-in-difference results more formally, I fit the following equation:
Yi ,t =β0+β1DPEP Districti ,t +β2Post-DPEPi ,t +β3DPEP District x Post-DPEPi ,t + εi ,t (4.1)
where Yi ,t is the number of government or private schools in district i and year t, DPEP Districti ,t is a
dummy for whether district i received DPEP funding in 1994, Post-DPEPi ,t is a dummy indicator for ob-
servations years after DPEP was implemented in 1994, and DPEP District x Post-DPEPi ,t is an interaction
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term that takes the value of 1 for districts that received DPEP and the observation year is after DPEP was
implemented.
Our coefficient of interest isβ3 that I argue should be positive for both government and private schools.
With government schools, DPEP was to increase the number of schools in previously under-served districts.
With respect to private schools, if my theory that private services require strong state capacity to thrive
is correct, we should see a greater increase in private services in districts that received DPEP, a program
specifically designed to increase state capacity.
4.3.7 Regression Discontinuity Design
I also use a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design, using the literacy cutoff for DPEP eligibility as
the running variable to understand the local impact of receiving DPEP funds on government and private
schools in 1998 and 2005.58. The running variable for the RDD is the 1991 district-level female literacy rate
that determined which districts were eligible for DPEP funds. As not all districts below the average female
literacy rate were selected, and some states were allowed to include districts that were above the mean female
literacy rate at their discretion, I employ a fuzzy RD design instead of a sharp RD design. The fuzzy RD
design is essentially a two-stage-least-squared estimate in which the first stage is a dummy for assignment re-
gressed on the literacy cutoff, and the second stage uses the predicted values from this regression to estimate
the distance from the cutoff on our outcomes of interest Imbens and Lemieux (2008).59.
There is little possibility that states and districts can manipulate the literacy cutoff as the literacy rates
are derived from the 1991 population census conducted by the Census of India, an independent Central
Government agency. Additionally, the literacy rates come from 1991, three years before the borrowing
agreement for DPEP was signed, and long before the planning for DPEP began. While there was certainly
discussion on the criteria for inclusion in DPEP (see for example (Ministry of Human Resource Develop-
ment, 1992, 37)), this was never explicitly discussed as being based on female literacy or what the precise
cutoff would eventually be.
4.3.8 Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Analysis
Given that I employ a fuzzy RD design, I also use the same dataset from the fuzzy RD design to conduct
a time-series-cross-sectional analysis. Imbens and Lemieux (2008) suggest that as the running variable does
not perfectly predict assignment to treatment and the results from a fuzzy RD are local to the cutoff, to
58These two years correspond to the data availability in the Economic Census
59Robustness checks for assumptions around the fuzzy regression discontinuity design are presented in Appendix B
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use the same data to run a more general analysis on the full range of data. Here, I take the number of
government schools as a predictor for the number of private schools in a district. For this I estimate the
following time-series-cross-sectional equation:
Yi ,t =β0+β1Government Schoolsi ,t + γX
′
i ,t +δt +θi + εi ,t (4.2)
where Yi ,t is the number of private schools per 10,000 school-aged children in a district, Government
Schoolsi ,t is the number of government primary schools in village i at time t, X
′i is a vector of controls,
δt and θi are time and district fixed effects.
60 The controls include controls a district level population
control, district average consumption from the national sample survey, district level fertility rates, caste
fractionalization,61 and a lagged indicator of the number of private schools per 10,000 school-aged children.
4.4 Results
I present my results in three sections. The first stage presents results on state territoriality and shows that
state territoriality has increased measured as both the reach and size of the Indian state. Second, I look at
state functionality: Has the ability of the state to properly implement its policies improved? Finally, I look
at the private sector response.
4.4.1 State Territoriality
In this section I present results on both the reach of the state, measured as the percentage of villages with a
government school in a district and the average distance to a school, and the size of the state, measured as
the number of schools in a district normalized by the number of school-aged children in a district.
4.4.2 Reach of the State
The first part of my argument suggests that large-scale programs, such as DPEP, served to extend the reach
of the Indian state to locations it did not reach previously. As I outlined previously, I suggest this means
60Hausman tests between fixed and random effects estimators show no difference in estimates between fixed and random effects
and suggest using fixed effects.
61I include caste fractionalization to test an argument made by Ansell and Lindvall (2013) that argues that more fractionalized
countries should see a greater investment in private education. I define caste fractionalization using a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index
of group concentration commonly used to construct measures of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. I use the following formula:
Caste Fractionalization=
N∑
i=1
s2i
where si is the share of the total population belonging to caste i . I first calculate the village level caste fractionalization index using
census counts on the total number of schedule castes, scheduled tribes and other castes. I then take the district level mean of the village
level caste fractionalization. The measure is then the probability of any two randomly selected people in a district being from the
same caste. A value of 1 on the index suggests that everyone in a village is from the same caste, and a value of 0 suggests that everyone
in the village is from a difference caste.
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that the Indian state had a government school in more villages across the country.
In Figure 4.7 I plot a regression discontinuity plot of the percentage of villages within a district that had
at least one government school, using the DPEP literacy cutoff as the discontinuity to evaluate the impact
of DPEP. As we can see from Figure 4.7, districts to the left of the DPEP cutoff (in other words, those
villages that received DPEP) had a higher percentage of villages with at least one government school.
The regression discontinuity results, show the discontinuity plots for 1998 using DISE school report
cards data on the left and Economic Census data on the right. The bottom two panels show the same
information using the 2005 wave of DISE school report card data and the Economic Census instead. The
x-axis represents the distance from the literacy cutoff for receiving DPEP funds which was set at the district
mean levels of female literacy (39.3 percent) in the 1991 population census. Observations to the left of the
cutoff represent districts below mean levels of levels of literacy, although not all observations to the left of
the cutoff received DPEP funds.62
I explore this relationship more formally in Table 4.7. Here we find that although the relationship
between DPEP and government schools is negative in all estimations (a negative relationship between the
literacy cutoff and government schools suggests that DPEP districts had a higher percentage of villages with
government schools) as in the regression discontinuity plots, only the 1998 analysis using the Economic
Census finds significant results. Depending on the year and dataset used, DPEP led to between a 0 and 20
percent difference in the percent of villages with at least one government school. The relationship trends to
zero the further we move from DPEP in 1994, suggesting that the effect was a local one to the introduction
of DPEP. Although not always significant, this suggests that DPEP met one of its intended goals to ensure
that all children had at least one government school in their village. In data four years after DPEP in 1998,
districts that received DPEP were 20 percent more likely than non-DPEP districts to have at least one
government school in their village.
4.4.3 Size of the State
I also look at the absolute size of the Indian state through both a difference-in-difference analysis as I have
yearly data on the number of schools in a district, and a regression discontinuity design that exploits the
same assignment rule used above. Looking first at the difference-in-difference results, these confirm our
62To implement the regression discontinuity estimations, I use the Stata package provided alongside Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiu-
nik (2014b) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a). I restrict the estimation to two polynomials, following the recommendation
of Gelman and Imbens (2014).
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Figure 4.7: Villages with Government Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on the percentage of villages with government schools in a district. The literacy cutoff for receiving
DPEP funds is 39.3 percent. The points show the average percent of villages with a government school in a district within a small
bin of the literacy margin. The lines are the second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The
top left panel presents results using the economic census in 1998. The top right panel presents results using the population census in
2001. The bottom left panel presents results using the economic census for 2005. The bottom right panel presents results using the
population census for 2011. The plot is based on the procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
% of Villages in District with Government School
Literacy Cutoff -19.71∗∗∗ -1.32 0.00 -0.65
(7.49) (5.60) (4.85) (3.30)
Observations 376 372 372 371
Year 1998 2001 2005 2011
Data Source Economic Census Population Census Economic Census Population Census
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.7: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Villages with Government Schools
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expectations of the original DPEP policy. From Table 4.8 we can see that while DPEP districts had greater
numbers of schools before the program period and all districts saw an increase in the number of schools,
the coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP show that districts in which DPEP was implemented saw a
much larger increase in the number of government schools per 10,000 school-aged children after program
implementation. All the columns present poisson regressions as the number of government schools per
10,000 school-aged children represent a count with significant numbers of zero observations, particularly
in the early years. The first column presents results with no additional covariates, while column 2 includes
district fixed effects, column 3 includes year fixed effects, column 4 includes both district and year fixed
effects, while column 5 includes district and year fixed effects as well as district time trends. Looking at
the most demanding specification in column 5, DPEP districts saw an increase of 1 government school per
10,000 children per year.63
Government Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
DPEP District x 0.049 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049 0.049∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
Post-DPEP (0.036) (0.010) (0.036) (0.010) (0.008)
DPEP District -0.127∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.155∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017)
Post-DPEP 0.183∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.007) (0.056) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 4.370∗∗∗ 4.646∗∗∗ 4.315∗∗∗ 4.591∗∗∗ 4.686∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 7480 7480 7480 7480 7480
Districts 478 478 478 478 478
District FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
District Trends No No No No Yes
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.8: Difference-in-Difference: Government Schools
Next, I turn to regression discontinuity estimates that compare districts near the DPEP literacy cutoff
threshold. In Figure 4.8 I present the effect of receiving DPEP on the total number of government schools
normalized by the number of school-aged children in a district. The results here differ slightly from both the
difference-in-difference results presented above as well as the regression discontinuity estimates presented in
the section on state reach. Districts just below the DPEP literacy cutoff had more government schools than
districts just above the DPEP literacy cutoff, and this relationship holds irrespective of the dataset used.
63To calculate the effect size, I calculated the marginal effect of the coefficient of DPEP District x Post-DPEP from the poisson
regression point estimate.
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Figure 4.8: Government Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on the number of government schools in a district. The literacy cutoff for receiving DPEP funds is 39.3
percent. The points show the average number of schools in a district within a small bin of the literacy margin. The lines are the
second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The plot is based on the procedure developed by
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
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In all six plots, districts to the left of the literacy cutoff, districts that received DPEP funds, had a greater
number of government schools per 10,000 school-aged children in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2011 than districts
just to the right of the cutoff, although the relationship appears to be a small one. The plots also suggest
that the RD estimates are noisy, a result that more formal testing confirms.
Turning to the more formal results that account for the fuzzy nature of the design, I present these results
in Table 4.9. The fuzzy RD results are noisy in their point estimates of the number of government schools
per 10,000 school-aged children. The columns present results in chronological order, with the first and
fourth column presenting results from DISE data in 1998 and 2005 respectively, columns two and five from
the 1998 and 2005 economic censuses, and columns three and six presenting results from the 2001 and 2011
population censuses.
Government Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
Literacy Cutoff 0.84 -54.57 -8.40 5.94 12.17 3.08
(31.15) (36.49) (25.10) (40.20) (39.84) (37.24)
Observations 371 372 372 371 372 372
Year 1998 1998 2001 2005 2005 2011
Data Source DISE Economic Census Population Census DISE Economic Census Population Census
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.9: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Government School Growth
While no dataset presents significant results, the results switch signs depending on the data source used,
with point estimates ranging from an effect of DPEP of 55 more schools per 10,000 school-aged children
using the economic census from 1998, to 12 fewer government schools per 10,000 school-aged children using
the economic census from 2005.
To summarize the results for state territoriality, it would appear that DPEP reduced the number of
villages that did not have at least one government school, and had mixed results on the absolute number
of government schools depending on the method used. While the difference-in-difference estimates suggest
that DPEP had a larger effect on the number of government schools, the more local regression discontinuity
designs suggest that otherwise similar districts near the DPEP literacy cutoff show no difference in the
number of schools built after DPEP. DPEP seemingly increased the reach of the state by building schools
in villages that previously did not have any, DPEP had a more more effect on the effective size of the state.
So while DPEP allowed the Indian education bureaucracy to reach villages it previously did not, this does
not necessarily mean the size of the state also increased.
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While largely confirming expectations, the results presented above also represent the “first-stage” in our
expectations of the effects of DPEP. I turn to the second stage in my argument regarding state functionality.
If my argument holds, we should expect that DPEP had little effect on the ability of the Indian state to
execute its stated policies, in this case increase learning levels and improve literacy. It is these results I turn
to next.
4.4.4 State Functionality
While DPEP might have increased the reach of the Indian state, I argue it did not increase the ability of
state to accomplish its stated goals, namely improve literacy and learning levels. One of the specific goals of
DPEP was to increase general levels of literacy, as well as specific literacy for women, scheduled castes, and
scheduled tribes. In this section I test to see if this is true by looking at a general measure of learning from
ASER test score data, as well as literacy rates in general and for the specific groups mentioned above.
As a first take, I look at results on a test score index created from ASER test scores. I present a plot of
these results in Figure 4.9. There is a clear positive break around the cutoff, suggesting that districts above
the DPEP literacy cutoff that did not receive DPEP actually had higher test scores than districts that did
receive DPEP funding. Again, the graph plots local polynomials on either side of the DPEP literacy cutoff
of receiving DPEP on an index of ASER test score data.
Again, testing these results more formally in Table 4.10 we find a small but positive coefficient being
on the right hand side of the DPEP literacy cutoff, suggesting that districts that did not received DPEP had
higher test scores than districts that did receive DPEP. However, the result is indistinguishable from zero.
Test Score Index
Literacy Cutoff 0.02
(0.09)
Observations 369
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.10: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Test Scores
Finally, I look at results for the four variables DPEP was intended to improve directly: general literacy,
female literacy, scheduled caste literacy, and scheduled tribe literacy. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, DPEP
sought to reduce educational inequalities by targeting disadvantaged groups specifically. Here, I take the
levels of general, female, SC, and ST literacy in the 2001 and 2011 population censuses and plot their rela-
tionship to the DPEP literacy cutoff in Figure 4.10. The top row of the figure presents results for 2001, and
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Figure 4.9: Test Scores Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on an index of test scores in math, reading, and comprehension. The literacy cutoff for receiving DPEP
funds is 39.3 percent. The dots show the average test score in ASER data within a small bin of the literacy margin. The lines are the
second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The plot is based on the procedure developed by
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
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the bottom row presents results for 2011. Solely based off the regression discontinuity plots, it appears that
DPEP had no effect on the various literacy indicators.
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Figure 4.10: Changes in Literacy Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on district literacy levels. The literacy cutoff for receiving DPEP funds is 39.3 percent. From left to right,
the panels represent total district literacy, female literacy, scheduled caste literacy, and scheduled tribe literacy. The top row presents
data from the 2001 census, and the bottom row presents data from the 2011 census. The dots show the average literacy rate in 2011
within a small bin of the literacy margin. The lines are the second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of
the cutoff. The plot is based on the procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
Once again, I test this relationship more formally in Table 4.11 and find that the results support the
visual evidence from the graphs. The effects at the discontinuity suggest that receiving DPEP resulted in a
difference between -.88 percent for general literacy in 2011 to 6.65 percent for ST literacy in 2011. While
none of these results are significant, all specifications except general literacy in 2011, suggest that at best
DPEP had no effect on levels of literacy amongst the very populations it was intended to target.
In this section I have shown that DPEP, rather than improve literacy and educational outcomes for the
very groups it targeted, at the very best has had no effect, and at worst might have made outcomes worst. I
suggest that this is because DPEP had no effect on actual state functionality or the ability of the Indian state
to successfully accomplish its goals. This presents the second part of my argument that leads to my final
88
Literacy Female Literacy SC Literacy ST Literacy
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
Literacy Cutoff 0.12 -0.88 1.51 0.33 3.30 3.01 6.23 6.65
(2.18) (1.63) (2.72) (1.97) (2.83) (2.49) (6.41) (6.87)
Observations 372 371 372 371 372 371 354 355
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.11: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Literacy
argument — that the gap between an increase in state territoriality and state functionality after DPEP —
has allowed for a private school response to take advantage of the failures of the Indian state to adequately
provide education. It is to these results I turn to in the following section.
4.4.5 Private School Response
Finally, I turn to the effects of DPEP on the private school response. As I argued earlier, the gap between
state territoriality and state functionality should open a space for a private school response to cater to under-
served populations. In Figure 4.11 I repeat the plot from Figure 4.7 for private schools by looking at the
percentage of villages with at least one private school. As the Census of India only began collecting in-
formation on the number of private schools in the 2011 census, I only have data on private schools at the
village level from the economic census in 1998 and 2005, as well as the population census in 2011.
As expected, there is a negative relationship at the discontinuity between receiving DPEP, suggesting
that districts that received DPEP funding saw a greater increase in the percent of villages with at least one
private schools.
When testing this more formally in Table 4.12, confirming the results from the plot, I find that the effect
of DPEP is strongest in 1998, and wanes a little after this point. However, none of the specifications are
significant, although all three have the same signs.
% of Villages in District with a Private School
1998 2005 2011
Literacy Cutoff -4.34 -0.83 -3.13
(5.92) (5.57) (8.93)
Observations 369 366 365
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.12: Reggresion Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Percent of Villages with Private Schools
DPEP districts show a similar response with regards to private schools. Figure 4.12 plots the effects of
the DPEP literacy threshold on the number of private schools per 10,000 school-aged children after DPEP.
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Figure 4.11: Villages with Private Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on the number of villages with at least one private schools in a district. The literacy cutoff for receiving
DPEP funds is 39.3 percent. The dots show the percentage of villages in a district with at least one private school within a small bin
of the literacy margin. The lines are the second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The plot
is based on the procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
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In all time periods and data sources, we see a positive effect of receiving DPEP funds on a growth in private
schools: receiving DPEP funds results in more private schools after DPEP was introduced.
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Private Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
Figure 4.12: Private Schools Around DPEP Literacy Cutoff
The effect of DPEP funding on the number of private schools per 10,000 school-aged children in a district. The literacy cutoff for
receiving DPEP funds is 39.3 percent. The dots show the number of private schools in a district within a small bin of the literacy
margin. The lines are the second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The plot is based on the
procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
I present these results more formally in Table 4.13 where the columns progress chronologically, rely-
ing on three different datasets to test the relationship between DPEP and private school growth. As the
regression discontinuity plots suggest, there is a consistently positive relationship between receiving DPEP
funds and private school growth, resulting in between 1 and 35 more private schools per 10,000 school-aged
children in districts that received DPEP funding. None of these results are significant, however, so although
the point estimates are large, I hesitate to read too much into them.
Finally, I turn to the more general case that uses a difference-in-difference estimator to look at receiving
DPEP funding on the number of private schools in a district. This set-up is identical to that presented in
Table 4.8 with the dependent variable changed. Again, we see an increase in the number of private schools
in districts that received DPEP funding. From Table 4.14 the coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP
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Private Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
Literacy Cutoff -17.02 -14.00 -1.49 -34.98 -0.54
(11.14) (13.15) (7.98) (31.12) (9.70)
Observations 372 371 372 371 371
Year 1998 1998 2005 2005 2011
Data Source EC DISE EC DISE Population Census
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.13: Reggresion Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP on Private Schools
show that private schools were far more likely to locate in districts in which DPEP was implemented (and by
association where there was greater government school construction). The coefficient on all specifications
is significantly different to zero and the effect is also large, as receiving DPEP funding led to between a 0
school per year increase in the most demanding specification with district and year fixed effects and district
time trends in column 5, and 3 private schools per year increase in the remaining columns.
Private Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
DPEP District x 0.142∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.001
Post-DPEP (0.072) (0.021) (0.072) (0.017) (0.009)
DPEP District -0.712∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -2.296∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.108) (0.052) (0.079) (0.091)
Post-DPEP 0.513∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.016) (0.134) (0.043) (0.016)
Constant 2.913∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗ 2.645∗∗∗ 2.401∗∗∗ 2.730∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.043) (0.104) (0.060) (0.015)
Observations 7480 7480 7480 7480 7480
Districts 478 478 478 478 478
District FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
District Trends No No No No Yes
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.14: Difference-in-Difference: Private Schools
In this section I have shown that there was a small private sector response to the introduction of DPEP.
Depending on the estimator used, the introduction of DPEP financing led to a greater number of villages
with at least one private school and a small increase in the total number of private schools per school-aged
children.
The difference-in-difference results confirm our expectations: in the first stage, DPEP, a large school
financing, capacity building and decentralization program, greatly increased the number of government
schools in districts that received DPEP funding. Although DPEP was not solely focused on school con-
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struction, greater financial resources did result in greater numbers of government schools built after DPEP
was introduced. Unfortunately, these increased financial resources did not lead to any noticeable improve-
ment in educational outcomes, whether measured as literacy or independently measured test scores. In
the third stage, we also observe a private school response. Greater public resources “crowded-in” private
investment through the construction of a greater number of private schools.
Given the local nature of some of the tests presented above, in the next I use the full range of observations
to explore the effects of DPEP more generally.
4.4.6 Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Analysis
Given the structure of the Economic Census data, I can conduct a more general analysis of the data using
panel methods and test the idea that private schools co-locate in districts with more government schools.
I also construct a three wave panel consisting of the Economic Census, DISE school report cards, and the
population census in 1990, 1998, and 2005. Here, I run the estimation presented in Equation 4.2.
Results for this estimation are presented in Table 4.15. The odd-numbered columns report results using
the DISE school report cards data, while even-numbered columns report results using Economic Census
data. Looking at the most demanding tests in columns 5 and 6 that include a full battery of controls and time
and year fixed effects, the coefficient on government schools is significant across all specifications suggesting
that a growth in the number of government schools also leads to a growth in the number of private schools.
Private Schools per 10,000 School-Aged Children
Government 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Schools (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Consumption 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(Rs.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Caste 2.621∗∗ 1.780∗ 0.627 -5.814∗∗∗
Fractionalization (1.070) (1.075) (7.016) (0.838)
Fertility Rate -0.836∗∗∗ -0.301 -0.528∗∗ -0.211
(0.294) (0.414) (0.206) (0.417)
L.Private 0.000 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
Schools per 10,000 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 1298 1279 788 788 788 788
Districts 433 434 394 394 394 394
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Data Source DISE Economic Census DISE Economic Census DISE Economic Census
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.15: Time-Series-Cross-Sectional: Private School Growth
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Similar to the difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity results, the panel methods presented
above suggest that there is a private response to an increase in government schools. Although not an explicit
test of DPEP, the results do test the impact of increase government provision of education as well as the
idea that private schools “co-locate” with government schools. I find support for both of these ideas here,
and again the effect is a large one.
4.5 Discussion
In Chapter 1, I presented a theory that argued that the private sector in India, particularly the private sector
that caters to low-income households, follows an expansion of state capacity to fully operate. When the state
increases its territoriality, or geographic presence, but does not also increase its functionality, or ability to
fully implement its policies, I argue that this creates an opening for informal institutions, in this case private
schools, to enter.
Here I have shown how that operates through the introduction of a major education program that
increased state territoriality but did not also increase state functionality. Leveraging the introduction of
DPEP, a major primary education program in India that sought to decentralize education provision and
increase local level state capacity, I have shown that DPEP resulted in greater entry of private education
providers in districts that received DPEP funding. This works in three stages. In the first stage, I showed
that DPEP increased the reach of the Indian state by reducing the number of villages that did not have at
least one government school. Although effects were not as strong, DPEP also increase the total number of
government schools in a district. In the second stage, I show that receiving DPEP funding had no effect on
the outcomes it was supposed to improve: literacy and learning outcomes. In the final stage, I show that
DPEP districts also saw a private sector response with greater entry of private schools.
Depending on the estimate used, the effect of receiving DPEP funding is large. The difference-in-
difference estimator show that districts that received DPEP funding received on average about 1 more school
per 10,000 school aged children, while regression discontinuity estimates suggest that close to the literacy
eligibility cutoff for receiving DPEP, the effect size could be as larger as 50 schools per 10,000 school aged
children.
4.5.1 Data Limitations
The purpose of using these two finely grained but individually flawed data sets is to “triangulate” between
data records (Lustick, 1996; Herrera and Kapur, 2007) to come to a more accurate accounting of what
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was happening in this period. While the DISE data provides a long-term count of recognized schools and
schools that wish to be recognized, the Economic Census data provides a closer account of schools that
avoid recognition. Individually, both these datasets are flawed and likely do not provide an accurate count
of either government or private schools. In the aggregate, these datasets are largely similar as I show in
Appendix Section B.5 Figures B.10 through B.15, but to rely on either one independently is likely to lead
to biased estimates.
Limitations to DISE Data
The District Information System for Education Data is collected through self-reporting of primary and
upper primary schools across India. The survey is sent to all recognized schools in India that are registered
with the Indian government. While this should include a complete sample of all official schools in the
country, it has the disadvantage of missing many unrecognized schools. While unrecognized schools can
still submit data to DISE, the number of schools that do out of the entire population is likely small. For
example, the DISE sample finds that approximately two percent of the total schools reported in the DISE
data are unrecognized schools. From my own experiences in the field and other accounts (see Mehta (2005)
for a plausible lower bound), this is a severe undercount of the number of unrecognized schools relative
to recognized schools. Finally, the DISE data was first collected in 2005. While data on the year schools
were established is valuable, there is strong selection in schools that have survived to 2005 to report data. I
am likely undercounting a number of private schools that opened before 2005 but then closed before DISE
began collecting data.
A second concern is that as DISE data is self-reported by individual schools, there is reason to believe that
there is correlation between what I am looking to measure (increases in state capacity), and reporting of my
final outcome (the presence of private schools). This is most obvious from the reporting of unrecognized
schools as displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. There are only a couple of states, most noticeably Andhra
Pradesh in the South, that reports a large number of unrecognized schools. This likely has nothing to do
with the number of unrecognized schools in Andhra Pradesh relative to the rest of the country and rather
with a greater focus on the the tracking and reporting to unrecognized schools by local-level officials across
Andhra Pradesh. This correlation between individual state-level state capacity and the quality of the data
provided is likely not present in the Economic Census data that is collected by the Census of India, a central
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government agency (Kapur, 2010b). This provides a further reasons to triangulate between data sources and
not rely on either the DISE or Economic Census data on its own.
Limitations to the Economic Census Data
The Economic Census provides a complete count of all economic activities in India that employ more than
one person. While this complete count has the benefit over the DISE school-level data of being able to
capture every school, whether recognized or unrecognized, there are two limitations to this data. First, the
Economic Census is only collected every seven to eight years, beginning in 1990, leading to a limited panel
of data from 1990, 1998, 2005, and when publicly available, 2012. Second, the data does not allow us to
perfectly identify private schools for the first two waves of the data, collapsing all schools under “Education
Institutions”. I overcome this second issue by using the ratio of schools to all other educational institutions
from the more restrictive labeling of schools in the 2005 wave and multiply all educational institutions by
this ratio in the previous waves.
Missing 2012
Finally, the Census of India has conducted, but not released, a 2012 wave of the Economic Census. If my
theory and the stylized facts of private school growth are correct, we should see an even greater number of
private schools in the 2012 wave. This would suggest an undercount of the effects of the increase in state
capacity on the growth of private schools in 2012. This is for two reasons: first, the greatest increase in
the number of private schools has occurred between 2002 and 2012, the exact period I stop measuring in
my difference-in-difference estimates. Second, 2002 saw the introduction of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan which
sought to expand DPEP to the entire country. If it is the rapid expansion of state capacity without any
focus on the quality of that state capacity that is driving private school entry, then the even faster roll-out
of SSA without the large amount of external financing that DPEP had should see an even larger private
school response.
4.6 Conclusions
Using school construction data from the DISE school report cards, and three waves of the Economic Census
of India, I have shown that private schools co-locate in districts that have seen an increase in state territorial-
ity, but no related increase in state functionality. I leveraged the implementation rules of a large Government
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of India primary education program, the District Primary Education Programme, designed specifically to
strengthen state capacity at the local level and expand the provision of government education to look at the
effects of an increase in state capacity on the growth of private services, in this case primary education. In
most estimates, the effects are large, with an increase in between 1 and 50 new private schools per 10,000
school-aged children in districts that received DPEP funding, and a one-to-one government school to pri-
vate school response. Some caution should be taken in interpreting these results, as not all specifications
are significant.
Returning to my argument in Chapter 1, O’Donnell (1993) and Pritchett’s (2009) suggestion that we
can separate state capacity into its territorial and functional components reveals what happens when there
is a rapid territorial expansion, but no subsequent increase in actual capacity. I suggest that these results can
be explained by implicit government policy that has encouraged private schools to co-locate in areas with a
lot of government schools. By providing complementary inputs to small and low-cost private schools such
as free midday meals, school uniforms, and books, government policy has allowed small private schools
to expand to places that economies of scale would have previously prevented them from operating. Pri-
vate schools have also exploited the failure of government schools to provide adequate education. While
the Government of India has rapidly expanded inputs to education, this has not been met with a related
expansion of outputs, creating a gap that allowed private schools to thrive.
On the other side, rapid government school expansion from 1991 to 2005 has also resulted in a concomi-
tant decrease in the quality of government schools that has driven exit from the government sector (ASER,
2015b). While the government has largely focused on increasing visible and easily measurable metrics of
education, there is little evidence from several years of educational testing that this has led to increases in
actual learning (Pritchett, 2013). In other words, the Government of India has provided both push and pull
factors to encourage exit from the government sector. This paper has shown that these factors are strongest
in areas where the government has paradoxically been most successful.
The Government of India has largely been successful in attempting to universalize education. There are
more children in school today than there were at the beginning of market-oriented reform, literacy in India
has increased dramatically, most villages in India have a primary school. The way that this has been achieved,
however, has deviated from the intentions of the policy, deviations, that I later argue, have implications for
subsequent policy making in India. Borrowing from the institutionalist literature, rapid formal institutional
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changes have led to informal institutions responding by providing close, but qualitatively better, substitutes
to those provided by the state. These institutions, in the form of recognized and unrecognized private
schools, have “filled in gaps” by “facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional
framework,” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 728).
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CHAPTER 5: THE LESSONS PRIVATE SCHOOLS TEACH: USING A FIELD
EXPERIMENT TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
5.1 Introduction
Government services have often been found to act as important sites of political socialization. Through
interactions with institutions and functionaries of the state, individuals learn important lessons about their
worth as citizens and the functioning of democracy, form preferences over government services, and under-
stand the value of political participation. At the same time, private actors are providing a greater number of
basic services across the developing world (Cammett and MacLean, 2011). What then happens when gov-
ernments no longer provide basic services and are replaced by private actors? Do private actors remove the
link to this political socialization process? To answer these questions, I explore state exit in India, where
citizens have increasingly turned to private organizations for basic services. Scholars have feared that as
states cease to provide services and private actors emerge to fill the vacuum, citizens will become politically
ambivalent as they no longer require the state to provide services (Hirschman, 1970; Ravitch, 2014). Despite
the importance of these questions, making conclusive causal claims is difficult as the growth of private ser-
vices tends to be historically contingent and highly endogenous to political outcomes. I use a randomized
private school voucher program to overcome these problems and provide clear evidence on the effects of
private schools on political socialization. I find that access to private schools did not depoliticize citizens
as some have feared, instead shaping economic preferences by making citizens more comfortable with a
greater role for the private sector in service provision.
Specifically, I leverage a randomized school voucher lottery to understand the political consequences
of state exit. In 2008, households across five districts of Andhra Pradesh, a large state in South India, were
offered the chance to enter a private school voucher lottery, and winners could send their child to a private
elementary school for five years. I returned five years later and employed a number of methods, including
an original survey of 1,200 households that entered the lottery, 30 semi-structured interviews with program
participants and education bureaucrats in Andhra Pradesh, and participant observation of government and
private schools to test the effects of private services on political outcomes. I find that households that sent
their children to private schools become more comfortable with paying out of pocket for other services that
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are currently provided by the government, which I take as evidence of increasing comfort with the private
sector. Additionally, conditional on perceiving their school to be of a high quality, households are also
open to a greater role for the private sector in service provision and employment. Political participation –
measured either by voting, a number of more costly partisan actions, or associational group membership –
does not differ between treatment and control groups. I argue that while exit from government services has
an effect on mass publics, it is on economic preferences, and not political behavior. Evidence suggest that
this is driven by two factors: access to new networks through which to make political demands, and belief
in private providers as permanent economic actors. In short, state exit matters politically, but in terms of
preferences more than participation.
These findings are important not only for what they tell us about the Indian case, but what they reveal
about private service provision more generally. While social science has traditionally assumed that the state
is the primary provider of basic services (Post, Bronsoler and Salman, 2015), the private sector is increasingly
an important service provider both in the U.S. (DiIulio, 2014; Morgan and Campbell, 2011a,b), and in the
developing world (Cammett and MacLean, 2011). My estimates allow me to speak credibly about the effects
of such shifts across a range of political outcomes, and have implications for those interested in service
provision, market-oriented reforms, privatization, and political behavior more generally.
How, then, does this work? In the next section, I draw from literatures on policy feedback, political
clientelism, and education and politics in India, as well as my own semi-structured interviews and partici-
pant observations conducted concurrently to the survey to generate testable predictions on how the private
provision of education could have an impact on the mass publics’ preferences and behavior.
5.2 Theoretical Expectations
Education provision provides an important test case for how public policy affects mass opinion. In an ar-
ticle that laid the foundations for the idea of “policy feedback” from policies to mass politics, Paul Pierson
(1993) argued that there were two mechanisms of policy feedback: resource and interpretive effects. Poli-
cies, Pierson argued, “create powerful packages of resources and incentives that influence the positions of
. . . individual social actors in politically consequential ways,” (610). For example, the G.I. Bill in the United
States reduced the cost of a university education for military veterans. As a result, those who took advan-
tage of the G.I. Bill were better incorporated as citizens by increasing their predisposition for involvement
(Mettler, 2002, 2005). Policies can also create beneficiaries that will later mobilize in defense of their bene-
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fits. Threats to cuts in Social Security and Medicare have often been met with a robust defense from senior
citizens (Campbell, 2003).
New policies also influence “the manner in which social actors make sense of their environment,” (Pier-
son, 1993, 610-1). Policies can change perceptions that shape subsequent preferences. As E. E. Schattschnei-
der claimed, “new policies create a new politics,” not only through a transfer of material resources, but
also a change of perspective (Schattschneider, 1935). Interactions with representatives of the state provide
citizens with examples of how the state views its citizens (Soss, 1999). Government programs and agencies
are often the first point of contact citizens have with the state and provide “lessons about how citizens and
governments relate, and these lessons have political consequences beyond the domain of welfare agencies”
(Soss, 1999, 364). Initial experiences with these representatives of the state can powerfully shape perceptions
and future engagement with government. The process of policy feedback does not always lead to greater
levels of participation and engagement, however. Experiences with the criminal justice system (Weaver and
Lerman, 2010), and some forms of welfare benefits (Soss, 1999), can serve to depoliticize citizens and see
them withdraw from the political arena as they learn to distrust the state.
While there is an extensive literature on policy feedback in advanced democracies, there are fewer tests
of these mechanisms in non-Western contexts. Lauren MacLean (2010, 2011) finds that citizens that receive
public services in rural Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are more likely to participate politically. Jaimie Bleck
(2011) finds that the mere act of sending children to government schools in Mali results in greater levels
of political participation and campaigning from parents. Both authors suggest this is because households
that make use of public services have incentives to ensure their continued provision and functioning. Their
arguments illustrate the individual level foundations behind exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970). (MacLean,
2002, 2010, 2011) argues that in response to the declining quality of public goods, citizens mobilized to
demand better services from government officials through increased participation. The response to declin-
ing public services was not “exit” as predicted by classical economics, but “loyalty” and “voice” as Albert
Hirschman suggested. (Bleck, 2011, 2013) views government schools as an explicit site of learning - families
with students in government schools use these students as “linguistic brokers” to overcome linguistic bar-
riers to greater political participation. Im and Meng (2015) find evidence of interpretive effects of policy
feedback in China, where experiences with some welfare policies have spillovers to broader demands for
government intervention.
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Despite the many positive findings within this research program, not all public policies exhibit policy
feedback. Lynch and Myrskyla (2009) found no evidence that pension systems created a class of beneficiaries
that would mobilize in support of their benefits. This points to the importance of understanding the design
of public policies (Soss, 1999). Soss (1999) argues that policies must be both “proximate” and “visible”
to beneficiaries for there to be policy feedback. In this sense, public education in India meets both these
criteria. Education’s benefits in general “are universal and not means tested. . . [and] benefits are largely in-
kind,” (Katz, 2010, 55). Schools in India are often the first point of contact citizens have with the formal
state (Corbridge et al., 2005), deliver the popular midday meal scheme (Drèze and Kingdon, 2001; Jain and
Shah, 2005), and often serve as election polling stations (Susewind and Dhattiwala, 2014). Public teachers
are often the most educated members of their community, and engage in a number of non-teaching activities
— such as election monitoring and conducting the decennial census — that make them highly visible in their
communities (Béteille, 2007). Teachers unions are powerful political constituencies in their own right, and
frequently lobby politicians and voters to act in their interests (Kingdon and Muzammil, 2001a,b; Kingdon,
2009).64 My own data suggests that upwards of 85 percent of government teachers served as either election
monitors or census enumerators in the past year in my sample villages. Finally, the Government of India
has undertaken a massive school construction drive over the last ten years that has ensured there is at least
one government primary school within 1 km of every settlement in the country (See the right axis of Figure
5.1 for the rapid growth in government schools across India).
Another consistent lens through which to view politics in the developing world in general, and India in
particular, has been that of patronage and clientelism. By clientelism, political scientists refer to “the direct
exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and
services,” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, 2). India has been described as a patronage democracy, where
politicians relate to voters through exchange of material goods (Chandra, 2004). Parties in India use the
promise of material goods to win votes (Wilkinson, 2006; Keefer and Khemani, 2009; Khemani, 2010), and
reward voters (Vaishnav and Sircar, 2013). Schools have often been seen as part of this exchange, and voters
have been found to respond positively to greater provision of education infrastructure (Vaishnav and Sircar,
2013; Fagernäs and Pelkonen, 2014).
In addition to the role that teachers and schools play in partisan politics, there is often political inter-
64While I was in the field, the teacher’s union of Andhra Pradesh was one of the organizers of a state-wide strike against the division
of the state of Andhra Pradesh.
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ference from above. There is frequent political interference from politicians in the sanctioning of teachers
(Interview with M. Somi Reddy, District Education Officer Ranga Reddy District, September 2013). One
survey respondent gave examples of how in the run-up to the 2014 legislative assembly election, the local
MLA had begun to visit their village more frequently and had recently promised |100,000 (approximately
$1,600 at the time of field work) to the village primary school to build a wall around the school and provide
board games for the children at the school (Anonymous Interview, Medak District, November 2013).
How, then, do we move from literatures on policy feedback and clientelism, that assume the state as
the primary actor, to the impact of private services? Both the policy feedback and clientelism literature
suggest that increased contact with the state, embodied through political parties and bureaucracies, state
institutions, and public policies should lead to greater participation. Removing this contact should reduce
the incentives and benefits from participation. Therefore, increased provision of private services should
also result in decreased participation, resulting in H1:
• H1: Private school voucher lottery winners will be less likely to participate in political forums.
Turning to interpretive effects, although not often framed using the language of policy feedback or
clientelism, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have begun to theorize on the impact of private
services on mass opinion. Using the randomized allocation of land titles to land squatters in low-income
neighborhoods in Argentina, Di Tella, Galiani and Chargrodsky (2007) find that the assignment of land
titles results in owners holding stronger market-oriented beliefs. They argue that greater exposure to the
private sector leads to qualitatively different experiences for recipients of land titles relative to households
that did not receive land titles. In a similar result, Earle and Gehlbach (2003) find that receiving property
rights in Eastern European transition economies leads to greater support for further economic reform and
freer markets. Amy Lerman (2013) finds that satisfaction with garbage privatization creates a ratchet effect
where clients that correctly attribute whether their services are provided privately and are satisfied with
their services are more likely to support privatization for other public services. Her mechanism suggests
that experiences with markets in one realm creates a spillover effect where citizens are more likely to support
markets in other realms. Jeffery and Jeffery (2008) argue that markets in health care in India will constitute
new citizens who are “energetic and entrepreneurial in shopping around,” (2008, 133).
This suggests that in households that previously lacked exposure to the private sector access to the pri-
vate sector makes the sector more accessible as households are able to understand the functioning of private
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providers. This accessibility should make households more comfortable with a previously unknown entity
leading to H2:
• H2 Private school voucher lottery winners should hold stronger market-oriented economic prefer-
ences.
Before proceeding to the data collection and results, I explore the Indian context in the next section and
introduce the field site in which I conducted the survey.
5.3 Setting the Context: Private Services in India and the Andhra Pradesh School Choice
Experiment
Over the last two decades the Indian government has rapidly increased public expenditure on welfare and
public services. This trend has been particularly pronounced in education. Since 1990, public expenditure
on elementary education has tripled (Goyal, 2009, 327). As can be seen in Figure 5.1, after the implemen-
tation of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA or Education for All) in 2002, a Central Government Scheme, India
has added an average 200 new government schools per district, or about 30 schools per district per year.
As a result, India has achieved near universal enrollment in education (ASER, 2015a), previously a pox on
India’s social development record (Weiner, 1990). Over the same period, Figure 5.1 also reveals the rapid
abandonment of the government education sector: in 2003 approximately 17 percent of primary school
children attended a private school which has nearly doubled to over 30 percent in 2014.65
In addition to expanding access to government schools, SSA also decentralized a large number of educa-
tion administrative functions to the village level and mandated the creation of Village Education Commit-
tees (VECs) and School Management Committees (SMCs), local level governing bodies tasked with manag-
ing schools. Alongside the 73r d constitutional amendment that decentralized political power to the local
level, villages in India are now tasked with deciding how school infrastructure funding should be spent (Jha
et al., 2008), suggesting that local participation would control significant financial resources. This type of
mandated decentralization has been shown to increase participation in other contexts (Davies and Falleti,
2015).
Academic and policy debates around education since the early 2000s have focused on two closely related
outcomes: increasing enrollment and retention (Banerji and Mukherjee, 2008) and improving test scores
65By comparison, in the United States ten percent of students attend private or religious schools (Private School Universe Survey
(PSS), 2010).
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Figure 5.1: Growth of Private Education in India.
The left axis measures the number of government primary schools per district. The dashed line corresponds to the left axis. The right
axis measures percentage of children per district enrolled in private primary schools. The solid line corresponds to the right axis.
(ASER, 2015a). The private sector has been seen as a solution to these twin problems as private provision is
believed to help the understaffed and overstretched public sector (Rangaraju, Tooley and Dixon, 2012) and
provide better quality education (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015). Lost in this debate, however, are
important questions on the appropriate role for states and markets in providing public services, and how
these then come to affect the relationship between citizens and the state they live in. The Government
of India’s Right to Education (RTE) act of 2009 specifically reserved 25 percent of seats in private schools
for “disadvantaged sectors”, essentially implementing a policy on the faith that the private sector will be
able to better educate the country’s poor. Some commentators have called the policy, “India’s civil rights
moment,” as it would bring disadvantaged groups in contact with the country’s elites [Author’s interview
with Menaka Guruswamy, Supreme Court Advocate, November 2012].66
There are three reasons why Andhra Pradesh represents an ideal field site for studies of policy feedback
and the impact of the private sector. First, Andhra Pradesh has often been lauded for its good governance,
rapid economic growth, and high quality public goods provision. Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu was
66Evidence from a similar policy in Delhi suggests that the policy is having a socially ameliorative effect at the individual student
level (Rao, 2013).
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dubbed one of India’s “CEO” Chief Ministers, who were lauded in domestic and international business
circles for providing a conducive economic climate for large business (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001). The
state also has less “petty” corruption than many other Indian states, which is often seen as the form of
corruption most burdensome for ordinary households (Bussell, 2010, 2012). The Government of Andhra
Pradesh has successfully implemented some of the Government of India’s flagship welfare schemes such
as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and the Public Distribution System (PDS)
(Khera, 2011b; Afridi and Iversen, 2013). The Government of Andhra Pradesh’s general competence in
providing public goods and general good governance suggests citizens would be more likely to respond
with “voice” instead of “exit” in the face of private options. The government has been shown to respond
in the past, and might be expected to respond in future situations, too. Therefore, my field site of Andhra
Pradesh provides a hard test case for theories of policy feedback as a result of exit from the government
sector.
Second, Andhra Pradesh has also aggressively led attempts in understanding the impact of private schools
on student learning outcomes. The survey I conducted followed a series of large scale of experiments be-
tween the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Azim Premji Foundation, and researchers from Harvard
University, the World Bank, and the University of California, San Diego (Muralidharan and Sundarara-
man, 2010, 2011a,b, 2015). The voucher experiment was explicitly designed to mimic Section 12.1(c) of the
Right to Education Act. Section 12.1c of the Act specifies that private schools must accept 25% of their
incoming class “belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood and provide
free and compulsory elementary education till its completion,” (Government of India, 2009, 5-6). In effect,
the policy serves as a private school voucher as the Government of India will pay for children admitted
under this clause to attend private schools (Government of India, 2009, 6). In cases where enrollment for
admission under this clause has been oversubscribed, admission was granted through a lottery (Rao, 2013).
This provided a particularly conducive research environment in which to conduct research on the effects
of the private sector.
Finally, the state has tremendous amounts of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. The state is the
furthest North of the South Indian states (see Figure 5.2 for location in India as well as survey districts.)
and has a significant Islamic colonial influence in its Northern districts and a strong British colonial legacy
in the East and South. I conducted fieldwork in five different districts across its three major regional areas,
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Telangana, Rayaleseema, and Coastal Andhra. The original private school voucher experiment purpose-
fully selected these districts to account for Andhra Pradesh’s tremendous social, cultural, and linguistic
diversity.67
Figure 5.2: Survey Districts in Andhra Pradesh
Although I provide some relevant details about the original voucher experiment here, interested read-
ers can consult the Appendix Sections C.4 and C.5 or Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) for further
details. The Andhra Pradesh School Choice Experiment (from here on APSC) sought to test what the im-
pact of private education would be on student achievement as measured by test scores. The original design
improved on traditional voucher experiments by relying on a two-stage randomization process. In the first
stage, suitable villages were identified in which there existed at least one recognized private school.68 All
villages were then informed that they would be entered into a private school voucher lottery run by the
Azim Premji Foundation, a well known education NGO in South India. Then villages were randomized
into treatment and control, creating a village-level counterfactual where some villages would be eligible to
receive private school vouchers and others would serve as the control group. Next, households within treat-
67I was in the field at the end of 2013 when the states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana were still united as the state of Andhra
Pradesh.
68The Government of India distinguishes between recognized and unrecognized private schools. A recognized private school must
be registered with the Government of India and meet a certain number of standards for infrastructural quality and pupil teacher ratios,
including having toilets for boys and girls, and a wall around the school premises.
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ment villages were then randomized in the second stage to receive vouchers, thereby creating a household-
level counterfactual. This improves on traditional voucher experiments by being able to not only identify
the effects of attending private schools on individual students, but also allows the researchers to study the
school-level effects of vouchers by understanding the impact of new students in a school on students already
in the school and on the school they then left behind by comparing treatment villages with control villages.
Due to resource constraints, I only sampled from treatment villages, so I was only able to explore indi-
vidual and not community level effects, fully aware that those questions are also of interest to researchers
in political science. The threshold for effects at the community level, however, are theoretically higher.
Effects from several students in one school would have to spillover to the village as a whole — a larger effect
than expecting schools to influence individuals within them.
5.4 Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses I rely on an original household survey of 1,202 households collected between
September and December 2013 in five districts of Andhra Pradesh. The survey was conducted by a team
of 11 surveyors administering an original in-person survey. The surveyors were hired for their familiarity
with the project and pre-existing relationships with households. Between August and December 2013,
I also conducted 33 semi-structured interviews with households that entered the lottery and participant
observation of ten schools in the sample villages (4 government and 6 private schools).
The survey sample was randomly drawn from the APSC Experiment. As the original experiment was
stratified by district, this newer sample reflected this stratification.69 The voucher was provided for five
years of primary education that covered Standard 1 through Standard 5 (equivalent to 1st through 5th
Grade), and I surveyed households when their scholarship child had finished 5th Grade and was enter-
ing secondary school. I exploited this randomization to conduct a “downstream experiment” on voucher
recipients. Downstream experiments “leverage previous randomization to identify the effects of these in-
terventions on new outcomes,” (Baldwin and Bhavnani, 2011, 10) and effectively work as a natural experi-
ment by exploiting exogenous variation created on the key independent variable by an external party. The
APSC experiment did not ask any questions regarding political attitudes or behavior. The randomization
provided clean identification of the effect of private services on the political attitudes and behaviors of re-
cipient households.
69To account for this stratification in econometric specification, I include district fixed effects in all analyses.
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5.4.1 Operationalizing the Key Outcome Variables
This paper is interested in the effect of private schools on two broad outcomes of interests: 1. Political
participation, and 2. Market-oriented beliefs. I operationalize these outcomes by grouping several related
variables into summary indices.70 Anderson (2008) recommends constructing the indices by taking the
weighted mean of the standardized means of the individual variables that compose the index. The weights
are used to maximize the amount of information captured by the index by giving greater weight to un-
correlated variables and is the inverse of the covariance matrix. By doing this, I increase statistical power
while being robust to over-testing as I am only testing one outcome instead of a series of measures. Using
an index ensures that researchers do not cherry-pick results that might be significant by chance and misin-
terpret the importance of individual components of the index. Following the convention established by
Anderson (2008), I report the results of each individual component of the index as well as the full index. In
the following section, I describe the individual components of each index and greater detail of the variable
construction and coding is presented in Appendix C.1.
Political Behavior
Partisan Participation is an index composed of four variables: whether a household member is a member of
a political party, whether they attended a political meeting over the past year, whether they canvassed for
a political party over the past year, and whether they distributed leaflets for a political party over the past
year.
Associational Membership is an index composed of three variables: whether a household member is a
member of a caste association, whether a household member is a member of a cooperative or labor union,
and whether a household member is a member of a self-help group (SHG).
Electoral Participation is an index composed of either stated intention to vote, or most recent voting
activity. The first two questions ask whether respondents intend to vote in the upcoming national (Lok
Sabha) and state elections (Vidan Sabha), while the third variable asks if respondents voted in the recently
completed local village (Panchayat) elections.71
I did not ask respondents directly what parties they had voted for or intended to vote for for two reasons.
70The full description of these variables are provided in Appendix C.1.
71The survey from which the data was collected was conducted between September and December 2013. National and state level
elections were held concurrently in two phases in April and May 2014 in Andhra Pradesh.
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First, due to limited resources, I would be unable to ask this question in a manner that protected respondent
confidentiality and the secret ballot while still maintaining a relatively large sample size. Second, I was
concerned about damaging the trust that surveyors and the implementing organization had established
with respondents over the previous six years of the intervention and was sensitive to concerns from the
implementing organization that wanted to continue working in these villages in the future.
Market-Oriented Beliefs
Turning to measurements of market-oriented beliefs, I attempt to measure market-oriented beliefs through
stated and revealed preferences for the private sector, and through a measure of how much money house-
holds would be willing to spend out of pocket to receive services from the private sector. I do this through
two indices, Preference for Private Services and Willingness to Pay for private services.
Preference for Private Services is an index composed of six variables, including: whether respondents
would prefer a job in the private sector or with the government, whether respondents would prefer the pri-
vate financing of services like health and education, whether respondents would prefer the private provision
of services like health and education, whether respondents continued to send their voucher child to a pri-
vate school after the private school voucher lottery was finished, the number of children in the household
in private schools, and whether respondents go to a private health care provider if a household member falls
sick.
Willingness to Pay for Private Services is an index composed of a respondent’s willingness to pay for two
government services: publicly provided education and food subsidies. I presented respondents with a hypo-
thetical scenario in which households could either receive a cash transfer from the government of a certain
value to purchase services on the private market, or continue to receive the service from the government as
it currently stood, attempting to reveal a respondent’s “willingness to pay” for two important government
services: government-provided education and food ration subsidies. For example, in the case of education,
I gave respondents the hypothetical option of either receiving a school voucher and being able to shop for
a school for their children as they pleased, or using the government school system. For school vouchers
(food rations), starting with the amount of Rs. 3,000 per year (200 per month), surveyors asked respon-
dents whether they would prefer to receive government provided education at that amount (their ration
that month) or a specified amount of cash. The amount was increased in Rs. 500 (50) increments until a
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maximum offer of Rs. 10,000 (1,000) was reached.72 If the respondent did not accept any offer below Rs.
10,000 (1,000), the surveyor asked directly for the minimum amount the respondent would be willing to
accept instead of government provided education (subsidized rations at government ration shops).
I also repeated this exercise for food subsidies. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is one of the
Indian government’s largest public welfare programs and provides Below Poverty Line (BPL) households
with subsidized grains and cooking oils. I chose to present a hypothetical concerning the PDS because
there have recently been moves to replace the direct subsidy of food distribution with cash transfers to
households so that they can buy the same foods on the private market (Kapur, 2011). I call these two
variables a respondent’s willingness to pay for private services. A lower value on these two variables suggests
that households would be willing to receive a lower cash transfer from the government and make up any
potential difference between the cash transfer and the market price for education or food through their own
out of pocket expenditure.
I suggest that their revealed preference for this willingness to pay represents a respondent’s relative pref-
erence for market services. I pick these two services as they are two services that have a potential “price” for
their provision that a respondent could understand and calculate, as opposed to the government’s workfare
program or acquiring a below-poverty line card. The two services represent clear subsidies from the state
to individuals and removing them would force households to bear expenses out of pocket. The choice I am
forcing households to make is between having the respective service be subsidized by the state or shopping
for that particular service on the open market. The willingness to pay measure asks households to put a
concrete price on what price they put on the government services, with a lower valuation representing a
lower valuation of the government provided service.
5.5 Results
Given that assignment to private schools was randomly assigned, there should not be any unobservable
differences between households attending private and government schools. There was covariate balance
between treatment and control households in my reduced downstream sub-sample as reported in Table 5.1.
Summary statistics for the variables used in this paper are provided in Table 5.2. Approximately 50 percent
of households that were offered vouchers were still sending their children to private schools after five years.
Additionally, 21 percent of households that did not receive a voucher sent their children to private schools
72For school vouchers, surveyors also informed households how much that amount was worth per month to facilitate calculating
the amounts.
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on their own accord.
Difference in Means Standard Error
Household Income (Rs.) 4055.87 3047.11
Household Land (Cents) -3.87 6.40
Male (%) 0.01 0.03
General Caste (%) -0.00 0.02
Voted: Lok Sabha 2009 (%) -0.00 0.01
Voted: Vidhan Sabha 2009 (%) 0.00 0.01
Visakhapatnam (%) 0.01 0.02
East Godavari (%) 0.04 0.02
Kadapa (%) -0.04 0.03
Medak (%) -0.02 0.02
Nizamabad (%) 0.01 0.02
Table 5.1: Balance Tests Between Treatment and Control Groups
Although there were considerable numbers of non-compliers (see Table 5.3), particularly at the begin-
ning of the experiment, I rely on the unconditional Intention to Treat (ITT) estimator of the form:
Yi =β0+β1Ti +βdi Zi +µi , (5.1)
Where Yi is my outcome of interest,β1 is the unbiased estimate of winning a voucher on the outcome of
interest (the intent-to-treat or ITT estimate). I estimateβ1 both with and without controlling for household
socioeconomic characteristics and individual respondent characteristics that include log household income,
gender of the respondent, the household caste, a dummy for Muslims, the age of the respondent, whether
there are any salaried employees in the household, the level of education, and the number of school aged
children. I also include a set of district fixed effects (Zi ) to absorb geographic variation, increase the precision
of the estimate, and account for the stratification of the village-level lottery at the district level.
While the text will mainly discuss results of the ITT estimate, I also present results of the Treatment
on the treated (TOT), using the original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for students
that were in private schools after five years. These results are presented in the same figures as the two ITT
estimates in Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.73
5.5.1 Political Behavior
Turning to the results, Figure 5.3 presents the results for a series of partisan political activities. Although
voucher winning households show higher levels of partisan political participation, the effects are both small
and statistically insignificant. Rates of partisan political activity are generally low, ranging from about three
73In the main body of the paper, I present all regression results graphically in Figures 5.3 to 5.11. Interested readers can consult
Section C.6 in the online Appendix for the full results in table form, including coefficients on control variables.
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Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N
Voucher Winner (%) 66.31 47.29 0.00 1.00 1202
Private School at Endline (%) 47.29 49.95 0.00 1.00 1161
Income (Rs.) 8266.49 4448.04 0.00 33000.00 1201
Male (%) 38.52 48.68 0.00 1.00 1202
General Caste (%) 18.39 38.75 0.00 1.00 1202
Muslim (%) 8.90 28.49 0.00 1.00 1202
Age 36.02 6.72 18.00 70.00 1165
Salaried Employees in Household? (%) 14.36 35.08 0.00 1.00 1170
Years of Education 3.78 3.77 0.00 15.00 1201
School Age Children in Household 1.77 0.70 1.00 5.00 1202
Partisan Political Participation Index 0.00 0.79 -0.40 2.85 1202
Member of a Political Party (%) 3.42 18.19 0.00 1.00 1198
Attended Political Meetings (%) 32.55 46.88 0.00 1.00 1195
Canvassed for a Political Party (%) 14.12 34.84 0.00 1.00 1197
Distributed Political Leaflets (%) 8.75 28.26 0.00 1.00 1189
Associational Membership Index 0.00 0.64 -1.03 1.60 1202
Member: Caste Association (%) 19.18 39.39 0.00 1.00 1194
Member: Cooperative (%) 10.77 31.01 0.00 1.00 1189
Member: SHG (%) 73.62 44.09 0.00 1.00 1194
Voting Index 0.00 0.67 -2.84 0.26 1202
Intend to Vote: Lok Sabha (%) 91.84 27.39 0.00 1.00 1188
Intend to Vote: Vidhan Sabha (%) 91.38 28.08 0.00 1.00 1183
Voted: Panchayat (%) 95.79 20.10 0.00 1.00 1187
Private Services Index 0.00 0.79 -0.60 2.50 1202
Private Job (%) 10.09 30.13 0.00 1.00 1199
Private Services (%) 20.05 40.05 0.00 1.00 1202
Private Financing (%) 22.08 29.09 0.00 1.00 1200
Voucher Child in Private School (%) 22.62 41.86 0.00 1.00 1198
Number of Children in Private School 0.37 0.68 0.00 4.00 1202
Choose Private Health Facility (%) 59.70 49.07 0.00 1.00 1201
Willingness to Pay Index -0.00 0.72 -1.39 8.63 1202
Voucher Willingness to Pay (Rs.) 10379.97 3615.13 0.00 25000.00 1078
PDS Willingness to Pay (Rs.) 1319.84 1052.52 0.00 15000.00 994
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics
percent of respondents that claim they are a member of a political party, to a high of 32 percent claiming
that they attended a political meeting, and having access to private schools does not change this engagement
substantially. Even though the survey was conducted during a highly politicized period, immediately fol-
lowing village elections and five to eight months before highly salient state and national elections, rates of
partisan political engagement remain low and similar between treatment and control. Voucher winning
households are less than 10 percent of a standard deviation more likely to engage in partisan political activ-
ities than non-voucher households, with this effect increasing, and being driven, with the costliness of the
activity. While there are small differences (from a low baseline) of membership in a political party, voucher
winning households are more likely to claim to have distributed leaflets for a political party.
Turning to non-partisan forms of participation Figure 5.4 shows that in the index of associational mem-
bership, as well as the individual components of the index, we see a small increase in associational group
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Compliance Rate in Treatment Villages
Offered Voucher
No Yes
Total 1,117 1,980
Took-up Admission NA 1,408(51%)
In Private School After Five Years 236 980(21%) (49%)
Table 5.3: Compliance Rate: Full Sample
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Partisan Political
Participation Index
Member of a
Political Party
Attended a
Political Meeting
Canvassed for
 a Political Party
Distributed Leaflets for
 a Political Party
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Regression Coefficient
Partisan Political Participation
Figure 5.3: ITT: Political Participation
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
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membership, significant at the 10 percent level. This result is driven almost entirely by membership in
self-help groups, where there is between a 0.05 to 0.15 standard deviation increase in self-help group mem-
bership.
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Associational
Membership Index
Caste Associations
Cooperatives
SHGs
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Regression Coefficient
Associational Membership
Figure 5.4: ITT: Associational Participation
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
Figure 5.5 sees similar effects using a different measure of political participation. Although election par-
ticipation in India is consistently high, and higher amongst low income households (Banerjee, Duflo and
Glennerster, 2008; Banerjee, 2011) — 91 percent of respondents reported voting in national or state-level
elections and 97 percent of voters reporting they voted in local elections — there were no differences in elec-
toral participation between treatment and control households. The first panel of Figure 5.5 reports an index
of electoral participation at the national, state, and local level and shows no difference in participation.74
The next two panels, reporting intended turnout in national and state level elections, show a statistically
indistinguishable difference from zero. The final panel, reporting turnout in recently completed local elec-
tions, shows a small positive increase in participation amongst the control group, but this difference is not
robust to alternative specifications with controls or the instrumental variables specification.
Returning to my original hypothesis on political participation, I cannot reject the null that exit from
74As fieldwork was conducted in late 2013, after recent local, or panchayat, elections conducted in September 2013, and before
state and national elections eventually held in late April and May 2014, I asked voters about their actual turnout in local elections and
intentions to turnout in state and national elections.
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Index
Intention to Vote:
Lok Sabha
Intention to Vote:
Vidan Sabha
Turnout:
Panchayat Elections
−0.2 0.0 0.2
Regression Coefficient
Electoral Participation
Figure 5.5: ITT: Intention to Vote
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
public services decreases political participation. On all measures of political behavior, partisan political
participation and electoral participation, treated households show no difference in participation relative to
control households. Households that exited to the private sector are no less likely to exercise their voice
than households that remained in government schools. Indeed, for some measures of political participa-
tion, exiting the private sector might even increase political participation, an effect I return to later while
discussing mechanisms and causal pathways. At least for behavior, I fail to find any effect on private schools
on political behavior as the findings of policy feedback would suggest. I now turn to economic preferences
to understand if the content of political engagement does change, given that political participation was so
high.
5.5.2 Economic Preferences
I measure economic preferences of respondents in two ways: first, I construct an index of the preference for
private services and the private sector through a series of questions on both stated and revealed preferences
for the private sector. Second, I attempt to elicit a respondents “willingness to pay” for private services
by presenting a hypothetical scenario on the amount of subsidies they can receive from the private sector.
Returning to hypothesis 2, I argued that exposure to the private sector through private schools has increased
voucher recipients comfort with the idea of the private sector.
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Turning to the comfort with the private sectors, I present results from the index and entire set of indica-
tors in Figure 5.6. The index itself is positive, significant, and robust to different specifications. Having won
a private school voucher increases both stated and revealed comfort with the private sector by between 0.1
and 0.25 standard deviations as shown in the first set of coefficient plots in Figure 5.6. In other words, this
suggests that having access to private school vouchers results in between a 4-10 percent increase in the num-
ber of respondents that say they would be more comfortable with the private sector providing services such
as health and education. The second set of coefficient plots, which reports results on whether respondents
would prefer a job in the private sector, presents the hardest test of comfort with the private sector. Jobs
with the Indian state often represent a salaried income, guaranteed employment, and solid pension, while
jobs in the private sector are often precarious and ephemeral (Jha, 2015). In this test of comfort with the
private sector, there is no difference between treatment and control groups, and might even be a negative
relationship between receiving a private school voucher and preference for a job in the private sector.
Turning to the other components of the index, however, we see a much stronger relationship with
receiving a private school voucher and comfort with the private sector. Questions on whether a respondent
would prefer the private provision of services currently provided publicly, the private financing of services
provided publicly, whether households continued to send their voucher child to private schools after the
voucher had expired, the percentage of children in the household in private schools, and whether households
would use private health services when household members are sick all show a positive relationship between
receiving a private school voucher and comfort with the private sector. Aside from the hard test case of a job
in the private sector, having access to private services results in both stronger stated and revealed preferences
for the private services.
To unpack another set of plausible preference changes, Figure 5.7 presents the results of the willingness
to pay measures. Indeed, this is where we see the strongest results. As we can see from Figure 5.7, pri-
vate school voucher winning households are more likely to express preferences for lower valuations of cash
transfers and this result is both statistically significant and large in magnitude. Voucher winning households
are willing to accept approximately Rs. 240 lower transfers for both school vouchers and food subsidies.
For school vouchers, this represents a change of about 2 percent from the control mean, but for the food
subsidy, this represents fifteen percent of the accepted amount amongst control households. Most impor-
tantly, Rs. 200 is about 1 percent of a household’s monthly income, a significant difference in out of pocket
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Figure 5.6: ITT: Preference for Private Services
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
expenditures for services they currently receive at a highly subsidized price from the government. Through
access to private schools, voucher winning households are more likely to suggest that they would reduce the
level of government subsidies on key public goods such as food subsidies and government private services
and turn to the market for these services. This suggests a process of socialization that has occurred within
voucher winning households, making them more comfortable with the idea of the private sector providing
basic services.
5.6 How do Preferences Change?
Returning to Pierson’s differentiation between material and interpretive effects, my finding that respon-
dent’s developed stronger market-oriented beliefs suggest space for interpretive effects, but little evidence
of material effects. But why? In this section I suggest that this effect is a result of changed experiences with
service providers. These differential experiences have little to do with the relative quality of private and
government schools, but with the perceived permanence of private providers. There is also evidence that
access to private schools brought recipients into contact with new politically relevant actors and I suggest
this had an effect on stated and revealed preferences. I find little evidence for the primary material channel,
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−0.9 −0.6 −0.3 0.0 0.3
Regression Coefficient
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Figure 5.7: ITT: Valuation of Public Serives
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
namely differential investments in children’s education.
Here I present several pieces of evidence that are suggestive of how preferences changed. Voucher win-
ners did not evaluate the “front-line functionaries” of the Indian state any differently than the control
group,75 did not have different evaluations of the Indian state broadly defined, and did not attach less im-
portance to the provision of public goods in upcoming elections. Instead, the two channels through which
voucher winners differed from the control group was in the networks they had access to to make political
claims, and their confidence in the private sector as a primary actor.
5.6.1 Evaluations of Front-Line Functionaries
One potential mechanism through which we could see preference and behavior change is through the rela-
tionships households have with the front-line functionaries of the Indian state, in this case schoolteachers
and principals. Earlier I suggested that exit from government schools might serve to break these links that
villagers might have with front-line functionaries, and remove the discretion the front-line functionaries
have in influencing the distribution and treatment households receive of public services. Other research
in India and other countries suggests that government teachers play an important role in the political pro-
75The front-line functionaries, or street-level bureaucrats are government workers “have wide discretion over the dispensation of
benefits or the allocation of public sanctions” (Lipsky, 2010, xi).
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cess and have an influence on decisions people make about politics (Béteille, 2007, 2009; Kingdon, 2009). I
also suggested that the involvement of teachers in the lives of respondent households was high. On top of
there being at least one government primary school in each village, government teachers remained highly
visible to all respondents, whether in treatment or control. For example, Figure 5.8 shows that 67 percent
of respondents across treatment and control reported that they had experience with government school
teachers working as census enumerators, and 79 percent of respondents claimed that they had experience
with government school teachers working as election monitors. This is in a context where the last national
census occurred two years before I fielded my survey and the last elections took place the month before I
fielded the survey. Despite exiting the state as a service provider, the front-line functionaries of the state
were still highly visible, and respondents had favorable impressions of them.
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Teachers in this Village
Work as Election Monitors
Teachers in this Village
Work as Census Enumerators
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Regression Coefficient
Non−Teaching Work of Government School Teachers
Figure 5.8: ITT: Local Level Monitoring
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
Along with a strong presence of government teachers in the lives of respondents, irrespective of whether
they were in treatment or control, respondents also believed government teachers to be impartial govern-
ment functionaries. In Figure 5.9 I ask respondents whether they thought government teachers cared about
the well-being of their students and whether they also treated all students equally. Again, we see no differ-
ences between treatment and control in these two analyses.
Differential access or treatment by the government teachers as the front-line functionaries of the Indian
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Evaluations of Government School Teachers
Figure 5.9: ITT: Front-Line Functionaries
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
state does not seem to be a plausible mechanism for preference change in this case. Households in both
treatment and control reported equally high levels of contact with government teachers, and believed those
teachers to be impartial in their treatment of students. Although government teachers have a large amount
of discretion in the treatment of citizens inside and outside of schools, this does not appear to be driving
preference formation. Additionally, the fact that they are so prevalent in the lives of respondents suggests
that exit does not break ties to the front-line functionaries of the Indian state. Indeed, exit reduces the
relationship between citizens and government teachers to one exclusively outside of schools: as census enu-
merators and in the polling booth, situations in which government teachers potentially have more power
over citizens.
I now turn to two mechanisms that I suggest are plausible mechanisms for understanding the change of
economic preferences of voucher winning households and are also consistent with a scenario where political
behavior is left unchanged. There is evidence to suggest that voucher winning households had access to new
political networks that were of political consequence, and that voucher winning households experienced
not a difference in quality of private schools, but an idea of permanence of the private sector. I argue that it
is this consistency that allowed for respondents to reveal greater comfort with the private sector.
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5.6.2 Claim-Making Networks
Beginning with channels of claim making, I try to gain purchase on these networks in two ways. I asked
respondents to tell me how they would gain access to a variety of services, ranging from having their child
admitted into a preferred government school or dealing with the land administration agency or police. I ask
a number of questions given the large number of services a respondent could approach the Indian state for
and further details on the questions and how they were coded are provided in Appendix Section C.1. I split
answers into two groups: whether a respondent would make a claim on that particular service through a
state or non-state channel.76 I present results on two separate sets of regressions in Figure 5.10 and 5.11, the
first which reports whether respondents reported approaching a representative of the state to access that
particular service, and the second whether respondents reported approaching a non-state actor for access to
that service.
Figure 5.10 shows that there is a decrease in the amount that voucher winning households approach offi-
cial representatives of the state to make claims for state services. This is driven by three services: admissions
to government schools, admission to a government hospital, and accessing work in the government’s rural
employment guarantee scheme. Mirroring this decrease in contact with state actors, Figure 5.11 shows a
move towards non-state representatives for access to state services. The effects are also large, at the high end,
the difference between treatment and control represents between a 5 to 10 percent higher probability that
a voucher winning household would approach a non-state actor to make a claim on the Indian state than a
state actor. It appears that one of the mechanisms through which access to private schools changed prefer-
ences was through the political networks of claim making respondents had available to them. The contacts
with private school teachers and principals were frequently cited in qualitative interviews, and these were,
by definition, not available to households that did not send their children to private schools. Exit is not
merely represented by the direct exit from government schools to private schools, but also through the exit
from making claims on state agents, to using non-state actors as intermediaries through which to approach
the Indian state.
These new networks were not always positive, however, as one respondent in Visakhapatnam made
clear. The respondent originally jumped at the opportunity to enter the voucher lottery as it would allow
her to send her son to the local convent school that had a strong reputation in her neighborhood and had
76I do not distinguish whether the state channel that respondents report approaching is the correct state channel through which to
access that services, rather where the channel is a state channel or not.
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Claim Making with State Representatives
Figure 5.10: ITT: State Claims
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
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Non−State Claim
Making Index
Admission to Preferred
Government School
Accessing Below
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Accessing a
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Dealing with the Police
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−0.25 0.00 0.25
Regression Coefficient
Claim Making with Non−State Representatives
Figure 5.11: ITT: Non-State Claims
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
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been open for more than 100 years. Once in the school, however, she felt that both her and her son were
discriminated against as lower caste Hindus by the sisters at the school (Anonymous Interview, Visakhapat-
nam District, November 2013). She removed her son from the school and re-enrolled him in a government
school after just a few years in the convent school as a result of this poor treatment.
5.6.3 Private Sector Permanence
Finally, a preference change channel that was made abundantly clear during semi-structured interviews was
the idea of the permanence of the private sector. As mentioned previously, voucher winners viewed private
schools differently to the control group. For voucher winners, the ability to send their children to private
schools for five years, the access to private schools after the voucher period was over, and the new networks
made available to voucher winners suggests that a strong mechanism through which respondents became
more comfortable with the private sector was through the idea that the private sector was now a permanent
economic actor.
One role of the vouchers was to make the functioning of the private sector more “legible” to voucher
recipients.77 A voucher lottery loser, when asked if they would prefer to hold a government or private sector
job, argued that government jobs were more stable because private companies were likely to leave if profits
dried up. When asked about the value of private education, they expressed a similar fear that private schools
were likely to abandon their village when they realized there were no profits to be made in low-income rural
areas (Anonymous Interview, Medak District, September 2013). While a voucher winner also expressed a
similar preference for government employment, they cited the benefits of government employment, not
the uncertainty of private employment. This suggests that comfort with private service providers and
the permanence of a private actor in the lives of respondents has effects beyond merely the direct service
provided, instilling confidence with the private sector as a permanent economic actor. Another voucher
lottery loser who sent her three grandchildren to a local Islamic religious school, was concerned that private
school fee structures were too complex for her to understand. On the other hand, the local Islamic religious
school provided education to Muslim families for free so she did not have to worry about understanding or
paying fees (Anonymous Interview, Visakhapatnam District, September 2013).
77The policy feedback literature has often argued that one of the mechanisms of policy feedback has been to make the government
and public services more legible by helping citizens understand the workings of the state.
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5.7 Alternative Explanations: English Language Education
A potential alternative explanation to the idea of private sector contact and permanence is one in which
what matters is not access to private schools, but access to English language schools. The demand for English
language education was a common reason given during interviews for why families entered the voucher
lottery. English language education is believed to be an entry to a larger market economy and higher lifetime
earnings (Fernandes and Heller, 2008; Kapur, 2010b; Ohara, 2012).78
If it is these newly met aspirations that are driving the new economic preferences, then we should see
stronger results for households that sent their children to English language schools instead of merely private
schools. To test this potential explanation, I use the original voucher lottery assignment to instrument for
whether the household sent their voucher child to an English language school.79 For ease of interpretation,
I only present the indices used in the analysis above.80
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Figure 5.12: ITT: English Language Education
Each group of coefficient plots represents results for a regression on the dependent variable labeled on the left axis. The first plot
represents the unconditional intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate with district fixed effects of winning the voucher lottery on the outcome
of interest. The second plot is the ITT with controls and district fixed effects. The final plot is the Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
using original assignment to treatment and control to instrument for whether households kept their children in private school for five
years with the same set of controls as the second regression.
78Jaimie Bleck (2013) finds a similar effect with French language education in Mali, where French speaking children server as
linguistic brokers for the rest of the family. The broader point here is that knowledge of the hegemonic language serves as a form of
access to material and symbolic goods.
79There are, of course, two sources of bias in the choice of an English language school. The first source of bias, that is corrected
through an instrumental variable framework, is one in which non-compliers in the control group send their children to English
language schools on their own accord. The second source of bias with English language schools, however, is the decision of the type of
school once the household has won a voucher. This source of bias presupposes that there is a market of schools from which consumers
can choose their preferred school. I address this source of bias as a potential alternative explanation below.
80Interested readers can consult the appendix for the full set of results using the indices and individual components of the index.
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Figure 5.12 presents the results of a regression that uses assignment to treatment and control to instru-
ment for whether households sent their children to English medium schools.81 The results largely mirror
earlier results, with small differences in point estimates in the results on preference for the private sector
the only difference between the instrumental variable results here and earlier.82
From these results, I cannot reject the possibility that at least some of the effects I find are being driven by
access to English language schools as opposed to just private schools. The results are largely similar between
the two specifications while the coefficients between the two results are substantively similar.
5.8 Discussion
Five years after households were entered to a private school voucher lottery, I find that households that had
access to private schools were more likely to hold stronger market-oriented beliefs. However, these market-
oriented beliefs had no effect on political participation as measured through partisan activities, voting, or
associational membership. I suggest that there were two channels through which this happened: new net-
works for political claim-making that provided households with access to private services, and confidence
in the permanence of the private sector. I cannot rule out the possibility that some of this was driven, in
part, by access to English language schools, instead of just private schools, as households that won a voucher
lottery had greater access to both.
Returning to Pierson’s original distinction between resource and interpretive effects, one set of results
stands out. While access to private schools are unable to change a household’s political beliefs and behavior,
it does change economic preferences, increasing household’s preferences for markets in basic service provi-
sion. While school vouchers have not given households material resources to impact their political choices,
I argue here that they have provided households with a qualitative different experience of the private sector
in the form of private schools. I posit two potential channels through which might have happened: in-
creased networks through which households can make claims on the Indian state, and a belief in the greater
permanence of the private sector.
Revisiting the results and my initial hypotheses, I find that voucher winning households are no more
likely to participate in a number of partisan and electoral forums, from becoming members of political
parties, to propensity to vote. There are small differences in households associational membership, with
81This assumes that only private schools are English medium schools, a reasonable assumption at the primary level.
82For example, the exact point estimates on the willingness to pay index for sending children to private schools for five years or
English language schools can be see in Columns 5 and 6 in Table C.24.
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voucher winning households reporting higher levels of membership in groups like self-help groups, a pop-
ular form of non-partisan association in Andhra Pradesh (Srinivasan, 2012). The overwhelming evidence,
however, is one of little difference between treatment and control households on political engagement,
suggesting that the role of exit is not to disengage households from the Indian state.
There are, however, differences in what I broadly call “market-oriented beliefs”. Households report a
greater preference for services to be provided privately, reveal this behavior by sending a greater number
of children to private schools, even once the school voucher has expired, and report a greater willingness
to receive cash transfers instead of in-kind transfers from the Indian government. The last set of results are
particularly large, with households willing to forgo approximately 10 percent of their monthly income to
receive a cash transfer instead of in-kind transfers from the government for education and food subsidies.
Returning to the claims made by Jeffery and Jeffery (2008), the mere access to private services seems to
create a class of citizens more comfortable with the idea of “shopping around”.
My measures of preference for cash transfers above in-kind transfers from the government are also not
idle hypotheticals. The preference for lower cash transfers mirrors a salient debate in Indian policy circles
and represents an attempted shift to pro-market service provision (see (Swamy, 2015) and (Davala, 2015)
for two recent takes on the debate), as a shift to cash transfers and a lower revealed price for cash transfer
preferences suggests respondents are more willing to “fend for themselves”. It also represents a different
form of welfare provision - moving from a world where citizens receive in-kind transfers, to a situation
where the state is more distant and acts as a financier but not direct provider. I take a lower willingness to
pay as a indication for a larger relative preference for this latter model of welfare provision. Although I do
not expect respondents to have internalized the elite-level debate, differences between the two groups does
suggest a greater level of comfort with self-sufficiency and paying out of pocket for a certain type of good
that has traditionally been provided by the state.
I argue that these changes in economic preferences happen because of two effects. First, voucher lottery
winning households gain access to new networks of claim-making that allow them to make claims on the
state through non-state actors on top of only relying on official state channels of claim making. Voucher
winning households are more likely to rely on non-state actors to gain access to state services and less likely
to rely on state actors for the same access. I suggest this is because of access to new networks provided
in schools through principals and teachers. Finally, semi-structured interviews revealed the idea of the
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permanence of the private sector. While control households revealed an uneasiness with the private sector
as an ephemeral actor, voucher winning households had a greater comfort in the idea of private schools not
closing or leaving their villages.
5.9 Conclusions
The evidence presented here suggests that providing access to private services through private school vouch-
ers has the potential to influence economic preferences, although effects are muted with respect to political
behavior. Returning to the concerns of Jeffery and Jeffery (2008), it would seem that the increase of pri-
vate service providers are constituting a new form of citizenship that is more comfortable with “shopping
around.” However, concerns that exit from the private sector would lead to the individual level depoliti-
cization are not supported by these results. Households that had access to private schools were no less likely
to participate in a number of political and non-political forums and showed no lower likelihood of voting
in local and national level elections, even participating at higher rates in some instances. The literature on
citizenship in India and my own fieldwork suggest two potential explanations for this finding. First, there
is mounting evidence that citizens derive a strong intrinsic benefit from political participation. Mukulika
Banerjee (2008, 2011) argues that elections are seen as a form of celebration, and the festival like atmosphere
brings individuals out to vote. She describes elections as “communitas” that “suspends the rules of normal
social order and brings instead a rare flowering of egalitarianism,” (Banerjee, 2011, 94). Indeed, in my own
fieldwork, individuals often expressed a sense of duty in participating politically - “we must vote” exclaimed
one interviewee (Anonymous Interview, Kadapa District, November 2013).
More cynically, however, individuals also derive direct material benefits from political participation.
Ahuja and Chhibber (2012) quote a rickshaw puller who claims that “if I don’t vote, I am dead to the state.”
Individuals vote because they expect to gain direct material benefits from being seen to have participated.
This squares with findings in Latin America that suggest that in the era of a secret ballot, political machines
do not buy votes, but the turnout of potential supporters (Nichter, 2008). Again, I found support for this
proposition in fieldwork where respondents (incorrectly) believed that if they did not vote they would be
struck off electoral rolls that were used to not only determine eligible voters, but also the beneficiaries of
government programs (Anonymous Interview, Nizamabad District, October 2013). If they did not vote,
they were dead to the state.
There are important lessons for countries after market-oriented reforms. Welfare arrangements that
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include a large number of non-state providers are becoming the norm in both the OECD (Wolch, 1990;
Gottschalk, 2000; Gingrich, 2011), and the developing world (Thachil, 2009; Cammett and MacLean, 2011).
The question is not only germane to India. In education specifically, Chile has a long history of using private
school vouchers to encourage poor families to attend private schools (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Neilson,
2013). In Kenya, private schools attract the poor with better educational outcomes (Bold et al., 2011; Duflo,
Dupas and Kremer, 2012). The growing number of madrassas in Muslim majority countries such as Mali
and Pakistan can also be seen as a similar manifestation of state exit (Andrabi et al., 2006; Bleck, 2011).83
Beyond the developing world, the increasing prominence of charter schools - publicly funded but privately
operated - in the United States is but one example of state “exit”. These schools are privately managed
but publicly funded (Ravitch, 2011). If these forms of welfare arrangements become the status quo, it is
important to understand this form of service provision. This paper suggests that in regions with high levels
of patronage, while actual political behavior might be unchanged, citizens opinions are changing by private
service provision. The evidence presented here suggests that policy makers might find it difficult to roll
back any reforms towards privatization enacted today as long as these reforms continue to build a mass
public more comfortable with the idea of the private sector providing a large number of services.
Related work that has looked at the expansion of private education in Pakistan (Andrabi, Das and
Khwaja, 2013) suggests that private service providers rely on critical inputs from the government, such
as a well educated local population from which to recruit teachers and doctors. Instead of seeing the private
and government sectors as competitors, they might instead be complements: to function, the private sec-
tor requires a functional state. Preference for greater privatization might emerge only when the state has
already provided a basic safety net from which the private sector can benefit and citizens can fall back on.
This paper also improves on many existing studies of policy feedback in two ways: first, it is based
on a randomly introduced policy experiment thereby providing clean causal estimates of the effect of the
private sector, and second, it is based on a household level survey thereby providing evidence of the mi-
crofoundations at work in policy feedback. Reviews of policy feedback have often noted that a common
problem plaguing studies of policy feedback have been their inability to make strong causal inferences as
they were based on observational data or data at high levels of aggregation (Lynch and Myrskyla, 2009;
Campbell, 2012). This study addresses both of the shortcomings of that literature to offer insights into the
83There is a similar growth in religious education in India, see Thachil 2011.
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microfoundations on the relationship between policies and mass opinion, as well as providing clean causal
identification on the policy of interest.
Finally, I contribute to a larger literature of the effects of institutions on individual-level preferences and
behavior. Broadly defined as policy feedback (Pierson, 1993), I extend this literature to India and also to
the idea of the private sector as a politically relevant actor. Given the rising prominence of non-state actors
in service provision (Cammett and MacLean, 2011), it is important for political scientists to take non-state
actors and the private sector seriously. My findings suggest that the private sector can have strong effects
on the economic preferences of individuals. More work, and perhaps using a difference research design,
is needed to understand whether there are also political effects, work that I undertake elsewhere in the
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This project has sought to answer two questions around the growth of private education in India. First,
why do we see such a large growth in private education in India over the last thirty years? Second, what
are the downstream consequences of this growth for citizen-state relationships? In answering these two
questions, I have suggested that the answers are likely related.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that we need to trace the growth of private education to changes made
in India’s education policy in the mid-1980s. Specifically, the National Policy on Education of 1986 set in
motion a set of processes, including the liberalization of labor, decentralization of education management,
and centralization of education financing and policy making, that created conditions conducive for the
growth of low-cost private schools. In Chapter 4, I test this empirically by relying on the assignment rules
for a large, national government education expansion program. I find that districts that decentralized and
increased financing for government provided education in 1994 saw the largest growth of private education
in later years. It is important to note that I specifically do not address the demand side of the growth of
private education, although I do contend with several alternative explanations in Chapter 2 and find that
they are inadequate in explaining either the timing, location, or form that private schools take in India’s
new education provision regime.
I then turn to the second question and leverage an existing private school voucher experiment and ask
what effect the introduction of private school vouchers has had on citizen-state relationships in Chapter
5. Here I find that exit to the private sector has little effect on material relations with the Indian state:
households that send their children to private schools are just as likely to participate in a variety of partisan
and non-partisan political forums. Households that exit to the private sector, however, change their relative
orientation to the state and private sector in the provision of services and show a greater preference for the
provision of services privately.
In a foundational piece on the various approaches available to a citizen in response to a decline in services,
Albert Hirschman (1970) argued that a person could respond with either exit - abandoning the service
entirely - or through voice and loyalty - voicing their disaffection to attempt to arrest the deterioration in
quality of the service. Hirschman’s (1970) key insight was that, unlike the neo-classical economic model,
when a service declined, exit was not the disciplining solution neoclassical economists believed. Instead,
the people that were first to exit were most often the most vocal and engaged users of a service. This
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would lead to an even greater deterioration of a service as there would not be anyone to further arrest the
services decline. Hirschman (1970) applied his theory to a number of scenarios, including the decision to
exit government schools to the private sector in the U.S.
A citizen’s ability to exit, however, must be tempered through the reality that in some scenarios, exit is
a difficult proposition. As Paul Pierson (2000, 259) suggests, the exit option is simply not available in the
political arena as actors cannot simply exit political arrangements. This is especially true for citizens in a
democracy where political participation is conditioned by interactions citizens have with representatives
of the state. For example, Ahuja and Chhibber (2012) argue that there is a widely held belief that if citizens
do not participate politically they will be “dead to the state”. This squares with findings from my own
work where I found that people believed that if they did not participate politically they would be removed
from benefit rolls (Anonymous Interview, Nizamabad District, October 2013). The exit option, at least
materially, is simply not an option for large numbers of low-income citizens across India.
I call this a theory of policy feedback in a flailing state. India has done a great job expanding access to the
physical infrastructure of education. The reach of the education bureaucracy has expanded tremendously
over the last thirty years. Unfortunately, this has also resulted in failures of implementation where the
quality of education has been poor. While this implementation gap has drive exit, it has also conditioned
the nature of this exit. Citizens are now in contact with far more functionaries of the state than previously.
I now turn to discussing some of the scope conditions of my work, before discussing future directions and
ending on what I see as the potential contributions to literatures in political science and other disciplines.
6.1 Scope Conditions
6.1.1 Flailing States
The first major scope condition of my argument is the presence of a “flailing” state - a state that is capable of
implementing government programs, but unable to manage those programs effectively (O’Donnell, 1993;
Pritchett, 2009). A running theme throughout this project has been the ability of the Indian state to finance
and expand large-scale education programs. At the same time, the Indian state has been unable to ensure that
these programs were implemented evenly throughout the country. We should expect similar results in other
states that are capable enough to implement projects through their ability to raise and channel large amounts
of financial capital to government projects, but might otherwise have trouble with implementation. We are
likely to find situations like these in large, federal democracies such as Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, where
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the center of policy making and finance is far from the “eye of the needle”, or the local-level governments
that must eventually implement government policy (Kapur and Mukhopadhyay, 2007).
Therefore, one important scope condition of this project is a low-to-middle income states with the capa-
bilities to raise and distribute large sums for government programs, but with low implementation capacities
at the local level. Although perhaps not as important, this also suggests that these effects will be stronger
in federal democracies where there is likely a division of responsibility between the governmental unit that
provides the financing for a project and the one that provides the service, especially if it has been decentral-
ized to the most local level. There is an underlying assumption in the American politics literature, of which
much comparative politics takes its lead, that the state is functional from head to tail, an assumption that
cannot be sustained in the Indian case.
6.1.2 Experience Goods
The second scope condition involves the nature of the good provided. I have argued that two key properties
of education is both its local nature in terms of provision, and its distinctly human character. By this
I mean to suggest that much of the experience of education is filtered through interactions parents have
with teachers and principals, or the “street-level bureaucrats” (Handler, 1996; Lipsky, 2010). One of the
unanswered puzzles in education is the governance of local-level functionaries (Mbiti, 2016). It is unlikely
we would see similar effects in other government services such as security where the face of the state — the
police officer or soldier — are further removed from the day to day operation of the service.
One example of this has been the relative success of the Government of India’s National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA). While there have been accounts of large leakages from the program
(Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013), the experience of the downstream recipient has largely been positive in the
form of increased wages in both the government and private sector (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Khera, 2011a).
The actual amount that citizens employed under the NREGA have to deal with government functionaries
is minimal and continues to be reduced (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2014).
So what other public services exhibit similar features to education? I would suggest that education falls
into a class of “experience goods” in which “customers can only assess the quality of a seller’s product by
purchasing and consuming it” (Hörner, 2002, 644). Healthcare is another experience good, where citizens
are subject to asymmetrical information and do not know the full quality of the service they are getting
before receiving it. The empirical evidence in India suggests this to be true, where the overall levels of
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health care training are low (Das et al., 2012), and consumers are largely receiving the same quality of service
between private and government offerings (Das et al., 2015).
I would argue that healthcare and education are a special type of public service that deserves a separate
analytical category within political science (although they have received ample individual attention within
their own disciplinary specialization). They are goods where the consumer (citizen) interacts with a repre-
sentative of the state that retains significant amount of discretion in the provision of that good (Handler,
1996; Lipsky, 2010). The distinct nature of different types of public goods, and the fact that they have
differential effects, is beginning to receive attention in the literature within political science (Kramon and
Posner, 2013).
Beyond merely thinking about the nature of the good being provided, it is also important to think
about the nature of the state in which the good is being provided. It is unlikely that private providers
would be provided with the same amount of freedom to operate in more restrictive political environments,
a finding noted in other studies of private providers (Brass, 2010). Indeed, in authoritarian settings, the
service providers are religious, not merely private operators (Cammett and Issar, 2010). It is likely that the
private provision of roads or water, to give two examples, would likely have a different set of effects on
political engagement and beliefs.84 The scope conditions suggest a number of avenues for future directions
in research that I turn to now, as well as discussing other potential extensions to this project.
6.2 Future Directions
There are two extensions I touched on above, as well as three other research extensions I explore in greater
depth in this section. We can think of the effects of privatization of experience goods across policy areas (i.e.
a different type of goods other than education) and geographic contexts (i.e. different countries). Second,
we can ask what the effects of extending education for all across contexts and form of providers. This
project has also been silent on the effects of private schools on children. And finally, beyond households,
the entrance of private schools has the ability to affect other schools in the area.
6.2.1 Privatization and Experience Goods
Following the discussion of the scope conditions of this project, would the findings of this project extend
to other experience goods such as healthcare in India and elsewhere? And do the findings in this project
generalize to all of India? A simple way to test this proposition would be to use Indian Human Development
84A recent conversation with Johannes Upperlainen suggests that this is certainly true from a field experiment conducted on private
electricity provision in North India. Private provision of electricity resulted in greater demand for government infrastructure.
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Survey (IHDS) panel data, that has a limited number of questions that resemble those used in this project
(see Appendix D). Would the findings generalize outside of Andhra Pradesh, or are there specific contextual
factors of the politics of Andhra Pradesh (and Telengana) that drive the results?
Second, it would also be possible to use data such as the IHDS to test exit in healthcare. If I am correct
about the particularities of experience goods, we should see similar effects of exit from government health-
care services on political beliefs. While the IHDS data is not ideal as the shock to exit is not exogenous as
in the field experiment used in this project, it would still allow us to understand the effects of exit in other
contexts.
The second potential extension of this project is across geographic areas. As I raised in the scope con-
ditions, middle-income democracies that are able to channel significant finances to development projects
but are unable to properly implement them should potentially see the same causes of the growth of private
services as we do in India. Would we see the same processes operating in countries that have decentralized
service provision such as Brazil and Mexico?
6.2.2 Political Responses to Education for All
The changes in India have mirrored changes in the other parts of the Global South. Since 1994, 17 coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa have provided free public education (Bold et al., 2010; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012;
Croke et al., 2016). The response there, where studied, has shown a similar exit to the private sector (Bold
et al., 2010; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012; Valente, 2015). The United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), adopted in 2000, sought to achieve universal primary education by 2015. While the preponder-
ance of evidence emerging about attempts to fulfill this goal suggest that the policy has been successful in
superficially achieving this goal, there is work emerging that suggest that the way this goal has been achieved
was not in the form intended by the United Nations. One of the unexplored consequences of this policy,
that I seek to unpack further in this project, is the private school response.
There already exists robust research findings on the political reactions to education for all (Croke et al.,
2016; Duflo, 2001; Harding and Stasavage, 2014; Stasavage, 2005b,a), although most of these works have
never been united systematically to understand the scope conditions of these findings. Are there com-
mon responses between countries, and does democratization operate in the same way everywhere? David
Stasavage (2005b) struck a cautious note when he argued that we should be careful in assuming that democ-
ratization functionally would lead to greater investment in education as has been commonly assumed. For
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example, later evaluations of Kenya’s education for all programs have shown similar exit to the private sec-
tor (Bold et al., 2015; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012), although through different mechanisms than those I identify
here. Would we see similar private school exit in other countries that have rapidly expanded access to basic
education? Or are the effects conditioned by the ability of the state to quickly implement policies?
6.2.3 Private Schools and Students
A large avenue for future research are the effects that private schools might have on students rather than
parents as I explore here.85 We know that private schools teach differently (Muralidharan and Sundarara-
man, 2015) and that private school teachers are seemingly more accountable (Kremer et al., 2005) — does
this have spillover effects to what and how students learn in schools? Andrabi et al. (2010) have found that
students in private schools in Pakistan score higher on tests of citizenship than students that study in gov-
ernment schools. There are a number of potential mechanisms for this result, ranging from instructional
ones where private school teachers are simply teaching more and therefore private school students learn
more, to ideological ones where private school teachers teach different content.
A key difference between Pakistan and India is that India has arguable remained democracy for all of its
post-Independence history. It is plausible that the differences in citizenship tests found in Pakistan between
government and private schools is down to ideological positions taken in government and private schools,
while these are unlikely to emerge in India. As discussed above, however, there are possibilities that there
are differences in the experience of the service as there are with healthcare services in India (Das et al., 2015).
could the mechanisms be through the form the service takes, particularly when it is filtered through teachers
and (the absence of) bureaucrats?
6.2.4 School-Level Responses
Finally, this project has focused on the impact of the universalization of education on the growth of private
education, and the growth of private education on political socialization. I do not ask, however, what the
impact of private schools have been on the government school system and government bureaucracies. This
research area has received considerable attention in American political science research as well as public
thought with the rise of the charter school movement (Ravitch, 2011). The concern in American educa-
tion and policy circles have been that the growth of charter schools will reduce coalitions in support of
government schools and potentially lead to school closures (Chabrier, Cohodes and Oreopoulos, 2016).
85I thank Fernando Reimers and Guy Grossman for each raising this point separately.
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Throughout this project, I have collected significant amounts of geo-located data on the opening of pri-
vate schools that I have yet to explore. A future step will be to leverage this data to look at what happens
under two scenarios that are increasingly common in India. First, what happens in a village when a private
school opens? How does the local government school respond to competition? Does enrollment decrease,
or does the type of student enrolled change? This would help further answer questions regarding the mech-
anisms I find in Chapter 4. Findings in Kenya suggest that when education was expanded in Kenya, it was
the wealthiest and highest achieving students that abandoned government education for private schools.
Do we find similar effects in India? Finally, do schools change their allocative behavior? Do government
teachers change their allocation of time to non-teaching activities and do head teachers allocate resources
differently?
A second avenue to explore is what happens under the significant demographic change underway in
India, particularly in respect to migration to cities and declining fertility rates.86 Do government schools
in rural areas respond to this change by closing or shrinking their labor forces? We have already seen
responses in some states such as Kerala, that did not require a large increase in their education labor force
under programs such as DPEP and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. As fertility rates had already plateaued in Kerala,
the state did not need to quickly hire large number of teachers at the start of the program.
6.3 Contributions
Although I have touched on the contributions this project makes in individual chapters, I revisit them here
in a unified way. While I contribute to the academic literatures on policy feedback and non-state providers,
I also contribute to the policy discussion on education in India as the third National Policy on Education
is currently being drafted and debated in Delhi.
This has implications for how we think about education policy in the Global South and further, how
we think about private education and its effects. The policy response in India in the early part of the 21st
Century has been to bring private schools under greater regulation and scrutiny. It appears that part of this
response, however, should also include strengthening the ability of the state to implement policy and a focus
on quality now that the quantity problem has been solved. The political incentives for this, however, will be
difficult as politicians are far more likely to focus on highly visible markers of effort: school construction,
school supplies, and other outward signals of effort (Mani and Mukand, 2007; Fagernäs and Pelkonen, 2014).
86I thank Devesh Kapur for bringing this mechanism for school level changes to my attention.
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6.3.1 Causal Inference and Policy Feedback
One consistent critique of policy feedback has been that studies of policy feedback have not paid close at-
tention to issues of causal inference and research design (Campbell, 2012). As policy feedback is necessarily
concerned with change over the long duree, it is hard to either run controlled experiments to study long-run
effects, or find naturally occurring events in history. As such, policy feedback has often relied on the tools
of comparative historical analysis by considering pathways not taken, sequencing, and alternative explana-
tions. However, these approaches have not been able to shake the charge that endogenous variables might
be responsible for the effects we attribute to a policy (for example, citizens with experiences with the crim-
inal justice system might be systematically different form those without experiences in the criminal justice
system, and no amount of post-design corrections would be able to fully account for these differences as in
the case of Weaver and Lerman (2010).) Second, policy feedback has also been accused of being insensitive
to the mechanisms of policy feedback and the policy design that allows for some policies to exhibit positive
feedback, while others to suggest null results (Lynch and Myrskyla, 2009). Lynch and Myrskyla (2009) urge
greater attention to design of policies to understand why some policies might exhibit positive feedback and
others not. Third, the grandest ambition of policy feedback — that the behavior and political socialization
created by policy feedback has long lasting institutional effects — has not always been proven in the behav-
ioral turn within policy feedback (Campbell, 2012, 346). Finally, policy feedback has rarely been applied
to the developing world, with most studies of policy feedback in American politics.
Chapter 5 certainly answers the call of the first critique by following-up on a voucher lottery experi-
ment. Through the experiment, we can be sure that on average there are no endogenous differences between
recipients that received the voucher lottery and those that did not. I also provide some mechanistic answers
that Lynch and Myrskyla (2009) call for. The final charge, however, that we can both observe the “pol-
icy” and the “feed” but not the “back” in “policy feedback” cannot be answered by this project. Without
long-term follow-up data, impractical for a dissertation project, I cannot say whether private education will
radically alter the education provision landscape in the villages I was working in.
I do, however, make a contribution to the literature of policy feedback in the developing world and
explore the constraints of porting theories of policy feedback to India. I have argued that my project is
an example of policy feedback under constrained choice. While policy feedback in American Politics and
advanced industrialized democracies assumes a functional state apparatus that can fully implement policy
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to allow for feedback, I have argued here that what we find in so-called “flailing” states is an incomplete im-
plementation of policy. What this causes, particularly in the example of education, is a full implementation
of state territoriality, where the Indian state was able to extend its reach through a new education programs,
but incomplete ability to fully implement policy.
6.3.2 The Role of Non-State Providers in Service Provision
This project has also attempted to formalize the observation that private schools have thrived where the
government has failed to provide quality education (The PROBE Team, 1999, 102). While these observa-
tions have often lacked explicit mechanisms, in this project I argue that we see greater private schools for
a couple of reasons. First, in Chapter 3 the push to universalize education created conditions that allowed
for private schools to thrive. Labor laws were loosened to allow for the rapid hiring of school teachers to
open government schools. At the same time, this allowed for private schools to also hire low-cost teach-
ers and expand to regions they did not operate in before. Second, in Chapter 4, I test these propositions
empirically and find evidence that private schools have grown fastest in regions where government schools
also expanded the most. I contribute to the literature on non-state providers in education specifically with
reference to India by formalizing hypothesis we have long held about the growth of private providers.
Historical Context, Field Experiments and the Study of Non-State Providers
This project also provides historical context to a number of fields that have considered historical context of
secondary importance including the comparative study of NSPs, the study of education in India, and field
experiments. By doing so, it hopefully highlights the role that context can have in better grounding our
thinking on the growth of NSPs across the developing world and education in India, as well as a way to think
about how to integrate historically grounded political science with the increasing use of field experiments
(for a recent critique, see Riofrancos and Falleti (2016) and a recent attempt at just this, see Steinmo (2015)).
With few exceptions, much of the literature on the growth of NSPs can be accused of being ahistorical,
a criticism that Kusner and MacLean (2015, vii) recognize. NSPs, particularly religious organizations have
been part of the service provision landscape across the developing world, often long before the emergence
of the nation-state in the post-colonial period. I find strong evidence of this in the data I present in Figures
2.1, 2.3, and 4.2 that suggests that states like Kerala and Meghalaya have long had a large number of private
education providers.
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Must of this ahistoricism emerges from claims that the types of NSPs we are seeing today are radically
different from those in previous periods. Kushner and MacLean (2015) argue that the nature of nonstate
provision in the developing world is much different than in the past, with the sheer numbers and types of
actors requiring a different take on the problem. While I try to avoid this ahistoricism in this project by
tracing the evolution of education policy beginning with what I call the post-National Policy on Education
(NPE) era from 1986 on, and use the most comprehensive data beginning in 1990, it is also clear that we
are in a different service provision world, with a vastly different number of financing models available, and
different actors, other than religious groups, emerging to provide private services. One of the goals of this
project was to strike a middle ground between the call for greater awareness of history and recognizing
when antecedent conditions are causally irrelevant (Slater and Simmons, 2010).
Next, the study of education in India has either been narrowly focused on program evaluations of con-
temporaneous education programs (inter alia (Khanna, 2015b; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015; The
PROBE Team, 1999)), or focused on the long duree of Indian education from Independence (or before) to
the period in which the author was writing (inter alia (Singh, 2010; Weiner, 1990)), with an underlying
assumption that education policy in India is made independent of context, or that the entire history of
education is relevant for understanding contemporary outcomes, with no attention to different periods in
India’s political economy.87 I tread a middle ground in this project by identifying a clear break in India’s
political economy that began with the introduction of the second National Policy on Education that I argue
has influenced education policy and outcomes until the present day. While historical legacies are certainly
at work, as in the case with Kerala that has seen little growth in private schools since 1986, but still has high
numbers of private schools historically, this period presents a number of different conditions that call into
question lumping them with India’s prior history of education policy.
To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies that looks explicitly at private school expansion across
India and understand what has driven the phenomenon88. This has implications for how we think about
education policy in the Global South and further, how we think about private education and its effects.
The policy response in India in the early part of the 21st Century has been to bring private schools under
greater regulation and scrutiny instead of recognizing failures of the state system.
87For one notable example, see Priyam (2015).
88others have studied exit narrowly as part of a specific intervention (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015) or as a second order
spillover effect (Khanna, 2015b)
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Returning to my discussion in Chapter 1 around Hirschman’s (1970) argument about exit, voice, and
loyalty, my results suggest a number of things for Hirschman’s model. First, where states are unable to fully
implement policy, exit can be incomplete. Continued participation does not necessarily mean continued
satisfaction. This fits into Clark, Golder and Golder (2016) expanded formal model of Hirschman (1970)
where they argued there is a fourth behavioral response to a decline in the quality of services: neglect.
Neglect is exactly what I find in the response to the poor quality of public schools combined with the
increase demand for education. Families exited to the private sector but were still active in a number of
other political forums.
To end on an optimistic note, the slow-moving ship that is Indian education seems to be recognizing
the effects of poor implementation and private school exit. Civil society organizations such as ASER have
drawn attention to the government’s failings at the provision of basic education. The first draft of the third
National Policy on Education was sharply critical of government education policy, and recommended a
renewed focus on quality rather than the expansion of education (Ministry of Human Resource Develop-
ment, 2016; Subramanian, 2016). While it remains to be seen whether these criticisms are taken seriously
by the incumbent government and actually implemented into new policy, the tone of the conversation over
Indian education policy is now focused on implementation gaps and the growth of private education — the
two issues at the heart of this project.
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Mincerian Regressions
Table A.1 presesnts Mincerian wage regression using National Sample Survey data from 1990, 1998, and
2005.89 As these rounds did not include wage data, I use consumption data in place of earnings data to
calculate returns to education. The regressions use logged consumption data as the dependent variable.
The reference category in each regression is “Illiterate”.
There are increasing returns to education in each wave of the data. In 2005, however, there is no dif-
ference in any category below having at least a primary level of education, suggesting that the returns to
education only begin to manifest above the primary level. This suggests that the rate of return on education
has increased as India has developed.
Log Consumption (Rs.)
1990 1998 2005
Literate Without 0.146∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.071
Formal Schooling (0.011) (0.016) (0.055)
Literate but 0.169∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.009
Below Primary Schooling (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Literate w/. 0.260∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
Primary Schooling (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Literate w/. 0.364∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
Middle Schooling (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Literate w/. 0.673∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
Secondary Schooling (0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
Constant 5.131∗∗∗ 5.857∗∗∗ 6.324∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 134919 124423 177633
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Reference category is Illiterate
Table A.1: Mincerian Regression of Returns to Education on Consumption
89These rounds were chosen as they coincide with the rounds of the Economic Census of India.
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APPENDIX B: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
B.1 Difference-in-Difference Parallel Trends Assumption
To test whether there really was a discontinuous growth in private and public schools after the introduction
of DPEP in 1994, I conducted a series of placebo tests where I varied the year of “treatment” and looked
at the effect size of this different date. In Figure B.1 I replicated the analysis in the second column of Table
4.8 by changing the year of treatment from 1987 to 1994 (the “real” treatment year). Each coefficient plot
represents the point estimate on the Post-DPEP x DPEP District interaction term in column 2 of Table 4.8
with the 1994 coefficient representing the same regression as Table 4.8. The error bars around the point
estimate represent 95 percent confidence intervals with robust standard errors.
As we can see, the only two significant results are when we change the “treatment” year to 1994 or 1995,
suggesting that there is a real discontinuous jump in the number of public schools in DPEP districts after
the introduction of DPEP in 1994.
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Figure B.1: Placebo Test: Difference-in-Difference Public Schools
I repeat the same exercise in Figure B.2 for private schools and the results presented in column 2 of Table
4.14. Unlike the results in Figure B.1 it appears that the parallel trend assumption does not hold for private
schools: there is a greater growth of private schools in DPEP districts before DPEP was introduced. This
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test suggests that the parallel trends assumption does not hold for private school growth in DPEP districts
prior to the introduction of DPEP.
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Figure B.2: Placebo Test: Difference-in-Difference Private Schools
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B.2 Regression Discontinuity Design Assumptions
There are a number of assumptions in fuzzy regression discontinuity designs beyond the regular regression
discontinuity assumptions. The first general assumption is that there are sufficient observations around the
treatment cutoff to allow for a local estimation of the effect of a change in treatment and that there is no
manipulation of observations around the running variable.
It is highly unlikely that there is manipulation of observations around the cutoff of literacy rates. The
cutoff was based on mean district level literacy rates from the 1991 census. The census organization in India
is a Central Government organization independent of state-level control or manipulation. Furthermore,
states could also select districts that were above the literacy cutoff to include in DPEP, so if there were other
reasons to attempt to channel funds to a particular district, states could simply select them in this way.
In Figure B.3 I present a McCrary (2008) test that confirms that the density of the data is indistinguish-
able across the DPEP literacy cutoff.
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Figure B.3: McCrary (2008) Sorting Test
A second requirement for fuzzy regression discontinuity designs is that there are sufficient observations
in the treatment group near the discontinuity to power the discontinuity design. Figure B.4 the density of
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observations by treatment status around the control. Encouragingly, there are a larger number of districts
that received districts to the left of the literacy cutoff, suggesting that the literacy cutoff running variable
both identifies treatment status well, as well as provides sufficient power to identify potential effects.
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Figure B.4: Probability of Falling on Either Side of DPEP Literacy Cutoff by DPEP Districts
B.2.1 Pre-Treatment Covariates
I also look at whether there are large differences in pre-treatment covariates on either side of the disconti-
nuity by running similar estimates as I do in the main body of the paper with pre-treatment covariates. In
Figure B.5 and Table B.1, I look at the effect of falling on either side of the DPEP cutoff on the percent of
villages with a government and private school in 1990, the number of government and private schools per
10,000 school-aged children in 1990, the total number of schools in 1990, and general, SC, and ST literacy
in 1991.
None of the pre-treatment covariates are significantly different from zero except for the number of
private schools per 10,000 school-aged children which is positive. This suggests that non-DPEP districts
had more private schools per 10,000 school-aged children in the pre-DPEP period, a result confirmed by
Table 4.5.
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Figure B.5: Regression Discontinuity Pre-Treatment Variables
% Gov. Schools % Priv. Schools Gov. Schools Priv. Schools Total Schools Literacy SC Literacy ST Literacy
Literacy Cutoff 3.92 -35.84 202.90 113.08∗ 72.46 -1.96 -20.89 -37.80
(57.22) (48.37) (254.18) (64.41) (222.52) (11.10) (20.82) (59.94)
Observations 369 369 366 350 371 372 360 357
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.1: Regression Discontinuity Pre-Treatment Discontinuity Check
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B.2.2 Robustness to Bandwidth Choice
In Table B.2, I replicate column 1 from Table 4.7, but allow the choice of bandwith to vary from 6 to 12
(with 9 being the bandwith originally chosen in the specification I report in Table 4.7.). These results are
not sensitive to bandwith choice as all bandwidth choices produce similar estimates.
Bandwidth
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Literacy Cutoff -24.93∗∗∗ -23.24∗∗ -20.33∗∗ -19.78∗∗∗ -18.72∗∗∗ -17.35∗∗ -16.37∗∗
(9.64) (9.08) (8.16) (7.52) (7.16) (6.91) (6.70)
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376 376
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.2: Regression Discontinuity Bandwidth Robustness Check
B.2.3 Robustness to Cutoff Variation
I also replicate the results from Column 1 Table B.2 by changing the literacy cutoff, creating a placebo cutoff
to see if this affects results. I present the resulting plots in Figure B.6 and point estimates in Table B.3. The
original cutoff point is 39.3 percent, closely replicated by column 3 that presents the literacy cutoff at 40
percent. Although the plots are quite noisy, the resulting estimates suggest that it is only at the closest cutoff
point to the true literacy cutoff point that we see an effect.
Literacy Cutoff
20 30 40 50 60
Literacy Cutoff -4.69 -2.04 -12.18∗ 9.69 -14.44
(11.42) (8.67) (7.34) (10.52) (12.44)
Observations 440 440 440 440 440
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.3: Regression Discontinuity Cutoff Robustness Check
B.2.4 First Stage in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
As I employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I am effectively running a two-stage regression with the
distance to the literacy cutoff on DPEP status in the first round, and then using the predicted probabilities
from this regression as an instrument for DPEP status in the second round. I provide a table of this first-stage
regression here in Table B.4.
The F-stat of 41 meets conventional levels for a strength of instruments.
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Figure B.6: Regression Discontinuity Varying Cutoff
Distance from -0.01∗∗∗
Literacy Cutoff (0.00)
Constant 0.44∗∗∗
(0.02)
Observations 376
F 41.00
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.4: First Stage RD
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B.3 Using National Sample Survey Household Level Data
As a robustness check to the results I find in Chapter 4, we can also use the education rounds of the Na-
tional Sample Survey to perform similar tests on a different source of data. The National Sample Survey
conducted surveys on education in 1986-87, 1995-96, 2007-08, and 2014. Although the panel is not as clean
and proximate to the passage of DPEP, it does allow us to test household level effects of DPEP on private
enrollment, expenditure, distance to schools, and literacy.
For this, I use the four nationally representative education waves of the National Sample Survey (NSS)
conducted in 1986-1987, 1995-1996, 2008, and 2014. The NSS education rounds are stratified by rural and
urban areas for each district. Surveying is then further subdivided into four sub-rounds each lasting three
months. The NSS oversamples some types of households and therefore provides sampling weights. All
statistic and estimates are adjusted with these sampling weights.
The education sub-rounds of the NSS provide data on household level participation in education and
out of pocket expenditure on education. Beginning with the 71st round of 2014, the NSS began to ask
detailed questions about exit to the private sector, including the reasons households chose private over
public education. Unfortunately there is only one round of this data and was administered too late to be
useful. Along with detailed individual level data on educational attainment and expenditure, each round
provides data on household consumption, expenditure and other household-level demographics.
First, I plot regression discontinuity plots to visualize the impact of DPEP around the DPEP threshold
on the four variables of interest from the NSS data: distance to the nearest government school, the number
of children in a private primary school, whether a household has at least one child in a private primary
school, and the logged out of pocket expenditure on education.
The figures support the earlier results from Figure 4.12 at the household instead of district level. House-
holds in DPEP districts were more likely to send their children to private schools and more households
had at least one child in private schools than households in non-DPEP districts. There is no clear rela-
tionship from the regression discontinuity plots between DPEP funding and out-of-pocket expenditure on
education, although we should remember that these do not take into account the fuzzy nature of DPEP
assignment. I account for the full implementation of DPEP next by fitting a fuzzy regression discontinuity
model similar to the models in Tables 4.13.
In Table B.5, I fit a regression discontinuity model identical to those used in Chapter 4 of the distance to
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Figure B.7: Discontinuity Plots Using National Sample Survey Data
The top left plot presents the effect of DPEP funding on a household’s self-reported distance to a government school. The top right
plot presents the effect of DPEP funding on the number of children in a household in private primary education. The bottom left plot
presents the effect of DPEP on whether a household sent any children to private primary schools. The bottom right plot presents the
effect of DPEP funding on logged out of pocket expenditure on private education in 2010 Rupees. The literacy cutoff for receiving
DPEP funds is 39.3 percent. The points show the average percent of villages with a government school in a district within a small bin
of the literacy margin. The lines are the second-order local polynomial best-fit lines fit separately on each side of the cutoff. The plots
are based on the procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b).
Source: Author’s calculations from various rounds of the National Sample Survey
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to School Private School One Child in Private School Log Expenditure (Rs.)
Literacy Cutoff -0.33∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09)
Observations 40092 54161 54034 53603
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable in column one is an ordinal variable that measures the distance to the nearest primary
government school in four ranges: 1 = Less than 1 km; 2 = 1 to 2 kms; 3 = 2 to 5 kms; 4 = Greater than 5 kms.
Column 2 is the number of children in the household in a private primary school. Column 3 is a dummy for whether
the household has at least one child in private primary school, and column 4 is the logged out of pocket expenditure on
primary education in 2010 Rupees.
Source: National Sample Survey, 52nd Round, Schedule 25.2 (1996).
Table B.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of DPEP
the nearest government school, the number of children in a private school, whether at least one child is in a
private school, and the log out of pocket expenditure on education by the household. Within the NSS, the
distance to the nearest primary school is coded as 1 if the household is less than 1 kilometer from a primary
school, 2 if it is between 1-2 kilometers from the nearest primary school, 3 if it is between 2-5 kilometers to
the nearest primary school, and 4 if it is more than 5 kilometers to the nearest primary school.
Column 1 suggests that, contrary to the findings in Chapter 4, households in districts that received
DPEP were further from a government school than households in non-DPEP districts. This finding con-
tradicts findings from the Economic Census, DISE, and Census of India that all suggest that the introduction
of DPEP significant reduced the number of villages without a government school. The NSS data is, how-
ever, self-reported, so households answering this question might not have known that a new government
school opened near them. Regardless, this results merits further unpacking.
Column 2 suggests that households in DPEP districts were more likely to send their children to a private
school than households in non-DPEP districts. The negative point estimate suggests that households to the
right hand side of the DPEP implementation cutoff, or households that did not live in districts where DPEP
was implemented, were less likely to send their children to private schools. Column 3, which fits the same
model as column 2 but uses whether any children were in private school instead of the number of children,
suggests that households in DPEP districts were about eleven percent more likely to send their children
to private schools that households in non-DPEP districts. Finally, column 4 suggests that households in
DPEP districts spent more out of pocket on education than households in non-DPEP districts.
Apart from the result on the distance to the nearest government school, these results are consistent with
results using DISE and Economic Census data, supporting an interpretation that the introduction of DPEP
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created exit to the private sector. Therefore results at the household and district level all suggest that DPEP
had a substantial impact on exit to the private sector.
B.3.1 Discussion
The results using household-level data from the NSS support results from district level data from the Eco-
nomic Census and DISE. Districts that received DPEP funding saw a greater level of exit to the private
sector than districts that did not receive DPEP funding. The finding that households in DPEP districts
lived farther from a government primary school merits further unpacking, but one potential explanation
is that households were unaware of new government schools built near them. Finally, although the ef-
fects on out of pock expenditure on education are small, this is also consistent with a growth in low-cost
private school in DPEP districts that cater to low-income households. Together with the fact that more
households in DPEP districts are sending their children to private schools, along with low growth in out
of pocket expenditure on private education suggests that although households in DPEP districts are send-
ing more children to private schools, they are not spending much more out of pocket for education. This
suggests that the additional children being sent to private schools are not being sent to expensive private
schools.
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B.4 Exploring Alternative Explanations Using the National Sample Survey
A common alternative explanation for the growth of the private education sector and exit from government
provided services has been the relative exit of wealthier households upon the entrance of low-income house-
holds (Croke et al., 2016; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). Lucas and Mbiti (2012) find that with the elimination of
school fees after the implementation of education for all, private school enrolment grew. They show that
this is because wealthier households removed their children from government schools and enrolled them in
private schools. In an example from a non-democratic regime, Croke et al. (2016) find that the best educated
citizens are the most likely to disengage from the authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe. They argue this is in
part experience better economic outcomes and ar emore interested in democracy.
The National Sample Survey rounds on education allow us to test those hypotheses in India. In Figures
B.8 and B.9, I plot the distributions of out of pocket expenditure on education by income quintiles and the
three caste categories included in every round of the various National Sample Survey rounds on education.
The first thing to note is that out of pocket expenditure on education increases in every NSS survey wave
from 1986 to 2014, confirming the conventional wisdom that out of pocket expenditure on education has
increased since market liberalization. Second, there appears to be a dispersion of consumption by survey
waves. As India became wealthier, households that consumed more (a proxy for wealth) also appeared
to spend more money on education, increasing inequalities in private education expenditure. However,
although hard to tell from Figures B.8 and B.9, it does not appear that out of pocket expenditure on education
has changed by quintile in DPEP and non-DPEP states. These figures also only provide one of several ways
we can parse the NSS data — the NSS data also includes data on how many children attend private schools.
I now test these hypotheses more formally below.
B.4.1 Triple Differences in Private School Demand
To test the alternative hypothesis that the expansion of education led to wealthier households exited the
state in greater numbers, I fit a triple differences model similar to the model presented in Equation 4.1 but
also include a triple difference interaction term. The new model is presented in Equation B.1:
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Figure B.8: Out of Pocket Expenditure on Education by Consumption Quintile
The left hand plots present the expenditure distribution for states that received DPEP funding, while the right right hand plots present
the expenditure distribution for states that did not receive DPEP funding.
Source: Author’s calculations from various rounds of the National Sample Survey
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Figure B.9: Out of Pocket Expenditure on Education by Caste
The left hand plots present the expenditure distribution for states that received DPEP funding, while the right right hand plots present
the expenditure distribution for states that did not receive DPEP funding.
Source: Author’s calculations from various rounds of the National Sample Survey
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Yi ,t =β0+β1DPEP Districti ,t+β2Post-DPEPi ,t+β3Consumptioni ,t+β4DPEP District x Post-DPEPi ,t
+β5DPEP District x Consumptioni ,t +β6Post-DPEP x Consumptioni ,t
+β7DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Consumptioni ,t + εi ,t (B.1)
where Yi ,t is the number of children in the household that attend private schools (or if any child in
the household attends a private school or log out of pocket expenditure on education) in district i, in year
t, DPEP Districti ,t is a dummy for whether district i received DPEP funding in 1994, Post-DPEPi ,t is a
dummy indicator for observations years after DPEP was implemented in 1994, Consumptioni ,t is monthly
household consumption (a proxy for wealth), DPEP District x Post-DPEPi ,t is an interaction term that takes
the value of 1 for districts that received DPEP and the observation year is after DPEP was implemented,
DPEP District x Consumptioni ,t is an interaction term for consumption of households in DPEP districts,
Post-DPEP x Consumptioni ,t is an interaction term for household consumption in the DPEP era, and
DPEP-District x Post-DPEP x Consumptioni ,t is a triple interaction term for consumption of households
in DPEP districts after DPEP was implemented.90
Our coefficient of interest is β7, that, if the expansion of government schools caused by DPEP did not
cause wealthy households to exit from government schools, should be negative or insignificant in all speci-
fications. The alternative explanation suggests that one of the effects of the expansion of education would
bring previously underserved populations into the government school system. Wealthier households, who
always had access to government schools, would then exit from government schools as they would not want
their children educated in the same spaces as their children. If my explanation holds, we should expect the
coefficient on β7 to be either negative or insignificant.
I present the results of the regressions using the number of children in the household in private schools
in Table B.6, if any child in the household is in private school in Table B.7 and the logged amount of out of
pocket expenditure on education in Table B.8.
The coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Consumption in Table B.6 suggests that there was a
small compression in the differences in the number of children in private schools between high-consumption
90I use consumption instead of income due to the volatility of income at low-income levels and their resultant unreliability.
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Private School
DPEP District x -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
Post-DPEP x Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
DPEP District x -0.006 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.009
Post-DPEP (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
DPEP District x 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Post-DPEP x -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post-DPEP -0.130∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.067) (0.063)
DPEP District -0.068∗∗ -0.066∗∗ 0.064 -0.066∗∗ 0.068
(0.032) (0.032) (0.067) (0.032) (0.068)
Consumption 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.002∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.171∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.039)
Observations 63968 63874 63063 63874 63063
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the number of household members at-
tending a private school for class 1-6. Controls include gender of respondent, age of respondent,
and dummies for schedule castes and tribes.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.6: Triple-Differences: Private School
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Any Private School (%)
DPEP District x -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗
Post-DPEP x Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPEP District x 0.011 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.017
Post-DPEP (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
DPEP District x 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗
Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post-DPEP x -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001
Consumption (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post-DPEP -0.056∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.036) (0.032)
DPEP District -0.037 -0.041∗ 0.059 -0.041∗ 0.060
(0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.023) (0.053)
Consumption 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.109∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -0.043 0.124∗∗∗ -0.043
(0.013) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
Observations 63819 63725 62915 63725 62915
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable for whether at least
one member of the household attends private school for class 1-6. Controls include gender of
respondent, age of respondent, and dummies for schedule castes and tribes.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.7: Triple-Differences: Any Private School (%)
households and low-consumption households after DPEP was implemented. Although high consumption
households still sent more children to private schools than low consumption households, low consump-
tion households in DPEP districts nearly equalized the number of children they sent to private schools
after DPEP was implemented relative to high consumption households.
Turning to the effects of DPEP on the probability of a household having at least one child in a pri-
vate school, the coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Consumption in Table B.7 shows a similar
compression in differences between high consumption and low consumption households.
Finally, the coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Consumption in Table B.8 shows the same
results as Tables B.6 and B.7. All three specifications suggest there was a compression in the number of
children, probability of sending at least one child, and amount of out of pocket expenditure on education
between households in districts that received DPEP funding by consumption levels.
I repeat the same exercise using caste instead of consumption as the third difference of interest to account
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Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.)
DPEP District x -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗∗
Post-DPEP x Consumption (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
DPEP District x 0.402∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
Post-DPEP (0.143) (0.131) (0.125) (0.131) (0.124)
DPEP District x 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
Consumption (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Post-DPEP x -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
Consumption (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Post-DPEP 3.010∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗ 3.168∗∗∗ 2.896∗∗∗ 3.385∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.099) (0.087) (0.146) (0.130)
DPEP District -0.435∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.384 -0.401∗∗∗ -0.389
(0.123) (0.109) (0.363) (0.109) (0.362)
Consumption 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 2.403∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.092) (0.155) (0.092) (0.155)
Observations 63489 63397 62591 63397 62591
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is logged out of pocket expenditure on educa-
tion in 2010 Rupees. Controls include gender of respondent, age of respondent, and dummies
for schedule castes and tribes.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.8: Triple-Differences: Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.)
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Private School
DPEP District x 0.040 0.048 0.068∗ 0.048 0.069∗
Post-DPEP x Caste (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041)
DPEP District x -0.052 -0.033 -0.048 -0.033 -0.050
Post-DPEP (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037)
DPEP District x -0.007 -0.009 -0.022 -0.009 -0.023
Caste (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033)
Post-DPEP x 0.053∗∗ 0.007 0.032 0.005 0.030
Caste (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Post-DPEP 0.058∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.032) (0.068) (0.064)
DPEP District 0.001 0.004 0.130∗∗ 0.004 0.135∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.066) (0.027) (0.066)
Caste 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Constant 0.168∗∗∗ 0.061∗ -0.183∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.039)
Observations 63878 63874 63063 63874 63063
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the number of household mem-
bers attending a private school for class 1-6. Controls include gender of respondent,
age of respondent, and monthly consumption of the household.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.9: Triple-Differences: Private School
for the possibility that there is a preference for upper caste households to keep their children apart from
lower caste households.91 Caste is coded as a dummy variable with schedule caste and tribe households
coded as 0 and all other castes coded as 1.92 Table B.9 replicates Table B.6 with caste instead of consumption
as the triple interaction term of interest and Tables B.10 and B.11 replicate Tables B.7 and B.8 respectively.
The coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Caste in Table B.9 is positive in all specifications
although not significant in any. The positive coefficient in Table B.10 and negative coefficient in Table B.6
suggests that while households with higher levels of consumption might not discriminate in the contact
their children have with low consumption households, high caste households might discriminate and not
wish to have their children in new government schools with lower caste households.
Similarly, the coefficient on DPEP District x Post-DPEP x Caste in Table B.10 suggest the same effects
91This is similar to Gary Becker’s (1957) idea that some households will have a preference for discrimination.
92This is the lowest level of disaggregation the four waves of the NSS will allow over time.
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Any Private School (%)
DPEP District x 0.009 0.012 0.022 0.013 0.022
Post-DPEP x Caste (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
DPEP District x -0.024 -0.010 -0.025 -0.009 -0.026
Post-DPEP (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
DPEP District x -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
Caste (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Post-DPEP x 0.045∗∗∗ 0.018 0.035∗∗ 0.017 0.034∗
Caste (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Post-DPEP 0.028∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.035) (0.031)
DPEP District -0.002 -0.003 0.094∗ -0.003 0.096∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.053) (0.018) (0.053)
Caste 0.031∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.126∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 63729 63725 62915 63725 62915
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable for whether
at least one member of the household attends private school for class 1-6. Controls
include gender of respondent, age of respondent, and monthly consumption of the
household.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.10: Triple-Differences: Any Private School (%)
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Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.)
DPEP District x -0.078 -0.043 0.028 -0.043 0.028
Post-DPEP x Caste (0.093) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085) (0.088)
DPEP District x 0.237∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.117 0.245∗∗∗ 0.115
Post-DPEP (0.084) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080)
DPEP District x 0.059 0.049 0.016 0.050 0.017
Caste (0.078) (0.072) (0.079) (0.072) (0.079)
Post-DPEP x 0.055 -0.062 -0.091 -0.062 -0.088
Caste (0.060) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Post-DPEP 3.306∗∗∗ 2.608∗∗∗ 2.863∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗ 3.050∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.065) (0.064) (0.126) (0.116)
DPEP District -0.278∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.227 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.233
(0.070) (0.066) (0.365) (0.066) (0.365)
Caste 0.266∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
Constant 2.641∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.061) (0.144) (0.061) (0.144)
Observations 63401 63397 62591 63397 62591
Districts 377 377 377 377 377
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is logged out of pocket expendi-
ture on education in 2010 Rupees. Controls include gender of respondent, age of
respondent, and monthly consumption of the household.
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Table B.11: Triple-Differences: Log Out of Pocket Expenditure (Rs.)
with all specifications positive but not significant. As the dependent variable is a binary variable, the co-
efficient is easier to interpret than in B.9, and suggests that upper caste households in DPEP districts after
DPEP was implemented were between one and two percent .
Finally, the coefficient on DPEP Districts x Post-DPEP x Caste in Table B.11 is not significant in any
specification. As there are more upper caste households sending their children to private schools, but the
overall levels of expenditure on private schools are the same between households in DPEP and non-DPEP
districts, this suggests that the level of expenditure is lower per school in DPEP districts. Along with the
results presented in Figure B.7 and Table B.5, this suggests that exit has been more pronounced in DPEP
districts, and that this exit has been concentrated in low-fee private schools.
B.4.2 Discussion
Exploring the alternative explanation that one of the reasons driving exit was that wealthier households in
districts that rapidly expanded education would leave the private sector, I used four rounds of the National
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Sample Survey to see if there was differential exit by caste or consumption in DPEP districts. The results
from Tables B.6 to B.8 suggest that there was not differential exit by income levels, but the results from
Tables B.9 to B.11 suggest that there was differential exit by caste.
These results are consistent with an interpretation that there is a taste for discrimination among upper
caste households and that while government schools used to be a preserve for wealthier households, with
the rapid expansion of education, these households then moved to private schools. Given that Table B.11
does not have any significant results, but Tables B.9 and B.10 do suggest that this exit was also towards
low-cost private schools.
We should, however, be cautious in attaching to much causal significance to these results. While DPEP
status was as-if randomly assigned around a threshold of female literacy derived from the 1991 census, to
interpret the triple-differences results causally would also suggest that consumption and caste relationships
were randomly assigned around the same DPEP threshold. As such, the results should be interpreted in a
descriptive way, although they do help us understand the nature of exit to private schools.
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B.5 Data Consistency Between the Economic Census and the District Information Sys-
tem for Education
Given that the two main datasets I use in this chapter, the Economic Census of India and the District In-
formation System for Education School Report Cards data, were collected by two different organizations,
The Census of India and The National University of Educational Planning and Administration respec-
tively, there is some concern that data will not be consistent between the two sources. Additionally, as
the DISE School Report Cards data was self-reported by individual schools, there is further concern that
some schools, particularly those schools with lower capacity or that have not sought recognition from the
Government of India, would not report their data to DISE.
In the Figures below, I provide some evidence that the DISE data provides a relatively accurate portrait
of the number of schools in a district for every year in which I also have economic census data. In B.10,
I plot the number of government schools in the DISE data on the x-axis by district, and the number of
education institutions in the Economic Census on the y-axis for 1990. The diagonal line represents a 45
degree line where points that fall below the line represent districts that report more schools in the school
report cards data and points above the line represent districts that report more data in the Economic Census
data. The correlation coefficient for Figure B.10 is 0.65.
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Figure B.10: Government Schools: 1990
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Figure B.11 plots the relationship between government schools in the DISE data to the number of gov-
ernment education institutions in the Economic Census in 1998. The correlation coefficient for Figure
B.11 is 0.73.
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Figure B.11: Government Schools: 1998
Figure B.12 plots the relationship between government schools in the DISE data to the number of gov-
ernment education institutions in the Economic Census in 2005. The correlation coefficient for Figure
B.12 is 0.79.
Figure B.13 plots the relationship between private schools in the DISE data on the x-axis with the num-
ber of private education institutions in the Economic Census in 1990. The correlation coefficient for Figure
B.13 is 0.5.
Figure B.14 plots the relationship between private schools in the DISE data on the x-axis with the num-
ber of private education institutions in the Economic Census in 1998. The correlation coefficient for Figure
B.14 is 0.35.
Figure B.15 plots the relationship between private schools in the DISE data on the x-axis with the num-
ber of private education institutions in the Economic Census in 1990. The correlation coefficient for Figure
B.15 is 0.57.
There is a consistent relationship between the number of government schools reported in the DISE
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Figure B.12: Government Schools: 2005
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Figure B.13: Private Schools: 1990
167
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll l
l
l
l l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Private Schools: DISE
Pr
iva
te
 S
ch
oo
ls:
 E
co
no
m
ic 
Ce
ns
us
Data Consistency Between DISE and Economic Census: Private Schools in 1998
Figure B.14: Private Schools: 1998
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Figure B.15: Private Schools: 2005
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school report cards data and the number of government educational institutions reported in the Economic
Census. While the relationship is not as strong for private schools, this is both to be expected and encour-
aging. The Economic Census data was collected with the purpose of identifying all economic activity in
the country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the Government of India. This should result in differ-
ential counts between the Economic Census and the school report cards data where the Economic Census
collects more data on unrecognized schools that the School Report Cards data does not always capture.
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B.6 District Bifurcations
Between the 1991 population census and 2005, the first year that DISE data was collected, India created
about 70 new districts. While most of these districts were created by bifurcating an existing district in two,
some of the districts were created by taking sub-districts from two existing districts and forming a new
districts.
For districts that were bifurcated between 1991 and 2005, I use their original district and combine data
between the two older districts. For districts that were created out of tow or more existing districts, I assign
the new district to the old district they received most of their new blocks from. For example, Sahibzada
Ajit Singh Nagar district in Punjab was “formed by including two tehsils namely, Kharar and SAS Nagar
(Mohali) of Rupnagar district and one tehsil namely, Dera Bassi of Patiala disitrict,” (Census of India, 2011).
In this case, I have coded Sahibzada Ajit Singh Nagar district as being a part of Rupnagar district as two
tehsils were taken from the Rupnagar district.
170
B.7 District Primary Education Programme District Coding
I cross-referenced the districts included in DPEP from three different sources:
1. The World Bank. 1994. “Staff Appraisal Report: India District Primary Education Project.” 13072-
IN.
2. Aggrawal, Yash. 2001. “Progress Towards Universal Access and Retention: Analytical Report.” New
Delhi: National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration.
3. Mehta, Arun. 2016. “DPEP Coverage: States and Districts.” Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.
educationforallinindia.com/page82.html
State Name District Name DPEP I DPEP II
Andaman & Nicobar Islands Andamans 0 0
Andaman & Nicobar Islands Middle And North Andamans 0 0
Andaman & Nicobar Islands Nicobars 0 0
Andhra Pradesh Adilabad 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Chittoor 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Cuddapah 0 1
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari 0 0
Andhra Pradesh Guntur 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad 0 0
Andhra Pradesh Karimnagar 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Khammam 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Krishna 0 0
Andhra Pradesh Kurnool 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Mahbubnagar 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Medak 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Nalgonda 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Nellore 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Nizamabad 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Prakasam 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Rangareddy 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Srikakulam 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram 0 1
Andhra Pradesh Warangal 0 1
Andhra Pradesh West Godavari 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Anjaw 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Changlang 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Dibang Valley 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh East Kameng 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh East Siang 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Kurungkumey 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Lohit 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Lower Dibang Valley 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Lower Subansiri 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Papumpare 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Tawang 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Tirap 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh Upper Siang 0 0
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Arunachal Pradesh Upper Subansiri 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh West Kameng 0 0
Arunachal Pradesh West Siang 0 0
Assam Barpeta 0 1
Assam Bongaigaon 0 1
Assam Cachar 0 0
Assam Darrang 1 1
Assam Dhemaji 0 0
Assam Dhubri 1 1
Assam Dibrugarh 0 0
Assam Goalpara 0 1
Assam Golaghat 0 0
Assam Hailakandi 0 0
Assam Jorhat 0 0
Assam Kamrup 0 0
Assam Karbianglong 1 1
Assam Karimganj 0 0
Assam Kokrajhar 0 1
Assam Lakhimpur 0 0
Assam Marigaon 1 1
Assam Nagaon 0 0
Assam Nalbari 0 0
Assam North Cachar Hills 0 0
Assam Sibsagar 0 0
Assam Sonitpur 0 1
Assam Tinsukia 0 0
Bihar Araria 0 0
Bihar Aurangabad 0 0
Bihar Banka 0 1
Bihar Begusarai 0 0
Bihar Bhagalpur 0 1
Bihar Bhojpur 0 1
Bihar Buxar 0 1
Bihar Darbhanga 0 1
Bihar Gaya 0 1
Bihar Gopalganj 0 0
Bihar Jamui 0 1
Bihar Jehanabad 0 0
Bihar Kaimur(Bhabua) 0 1
Bihar Katihar 0 0
Bihar Khagaria 0 0
Bihar Kishanganj 0 0
Bihar Lakhisarai 0 1
Bihar Madhepura 0 0
Bihar Madhubani 0 0
Bihar Munger 0 1
Bihar Muzaffarpur 0 1
Bihar Nalanda 0 0
Bihar Nawada 0 0
Bihar Pashchim Champaran 0 1
Bihar Patna 0 0
Bihar Purba Champaran 0 0
Bihar Purnia 0 1
Bihar Rohtas 0 1
Bihar Saharsa 0 0
Bihar Samastipur 0 0
Bihar Saran 0 0
Bihar Sheikhpura 0 1
Bihar Shivhar 0 1
Bihar Sitamarhi 0 1
Bihar Siwan 0 0
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Bihar Supaul 0 0
Bihar Vaishali 0 1
Chandigarh Chandigarh 0 0
Chhattisgarh Balod 0 0
Chhattisgarh Balodabazar 0 1
Chhattisgarh Balrampur 1 1
Chhattisgarh Bastar 0 1
Chhattisgarh Bemetara 0 0
Chhattisgarh Bilaspur 1 1
Chhattisgarh Dantewada 0 1
Chhattisgarh Dhamtari 0 1
Chhattisgarh Durg 0 0
Chhattisgarh Gariaband 0 1
Chhattisgarh Janjgir-Champa 1 1
Chhattisgarh Jashpur 1 1
Chhattisgarh Kanker 0 1
Chhattisgarh Kondagaon 0 1
Chhattisgarh Korba 1 1
Chhattisgarh Koriya 1 1
Chhattisgarh Mahasamund 0 1
Chhattisgarh Mungeli 1 1
Chhattisgarh Narayanpur 0 1
Chhattisgarh Raigarh 1 1
Chhattisgarh Raipur 0 1
Chhattisgarh Rajnandgaon 1 1
Chhattisgarh Surajpur 1 1
Chhattisgarh Surguja 1 1
Dadra & Nagar Haveli Dadra & Nagarhaveli 0 0
Daman & Diu Daman 0 0
Daman & Diu Diu 0 0
Delhi Delhi 0 0
Goa North Goa 0 0
Goa South Goa 0 0
Gujarat Ahmadabad 0 0
Gujarat Amreli 0 0
Gujarat Anand 0 0
Gujarat Aravali 0 0
Gujarat Banaskantha 0 1
Gujarat Bharuch 0 0
Gujarat Bhavnagar 0 0
Gujarat Botad 0 0
Gujarat Devbhoomidwarka 0 0
Gujarat Dohad 0 1
Gujarat Gandhinagar 0 0
Gujarat Girsomnath 0 0
Gujarat Jamnagar 0 0
Gujarat Junagadh 0 0
Gujarat Kachchh 0 0
Gujarat Kheda 0 0
Gujarat Mahesana 0 0
Gujarat Mahisagar 0 0
Gujarat Morbi 0 0
Gujarat Narmada 0 0
Gujarat Navsari 0 0
Gujarat Panchmahals 0 1
Gujarat Patan 0 0
Gujarat Porbandar 0 0
Gujarat Rajkot 0 0
Gujarat Sabarkantha 0 0
Gujarat Surat 0 0
Gujarat Surendranagar 0 0
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Gujarat Tapi 0 0
Gujarat Thedangs 0 1
Gujarat Vadodara 0 0
Gujarat Valsad 0 0
Haryana Ambala 0 0
Haryana Bhiwani 0 1
Haryana Faridabad 0 0
Haryana Fatehabad 1 1
Haryana Gurgaon 0 1
Haryana Hisar 1 1
Haryana Jhajjar 0 0
Haryana Jind 1 1
Haryana Kaithal 1 1
Haryana Karnal 0 0
Haryana Kurukshetra 0 0
Haryana Mahendragarh 0 1
Haryana Mewat 0 1
Haryana Palwal 0 0
Haryana Panchkula 0 0
Haryana Panipat 0 0
Haryana Rewari 0 0
Haryana Rohtak 0 0
Haryana Sirsa 1 1
Haryana Sonipat 0 0
Haryana Yamunanagar 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Bilaspur 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Chamba 0 1
Himachal Pradesh Hamirpur 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Kangra 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Kinnaur 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Kullu 0 1
Himachal Pradesh Lahul & Spiti 0 1
Himachal Pradesh Mandi 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Shimla 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Sirmaur 0 1
Himachal Pradesh Solan 0 0
Himachal Pradesh Una 0 0
Jharkhand Chatra 0 1
Jharkhand Deoghar 0 0
Jharkhand Dhanbad 0 0
Jharkhand Dumka 0 1
Jharkhand Garhwa 0 0
Jharkhand Giridih 0 0
Jharkhand Godda 0 0
Jharkhand Gumla 0 0
Jharkhand Hazaribag 0 1
Jharkhand Kodarma 0 1
Jharkhand Lohardaga 0 0
Jharkhand Pakaur 0 0
Jharkhand Palamu 0 0
Jharkhand Pashchim Isinghbhum 0 1
Jharkhand Purbi Singhbhum 0 1
Jharkhand Ranchi 0 1
Jharkhand Sahibganj 0 0
Karnataka Bagalkot 0 1
Karnataka Bangalore 0 0
Karnataka Bangalorerural 0 1
Karnataka Belgaum 1 1
Karnataka Bellary 0 1
Karnataka Bidar 0 1
Karnataka Bijapur 0 1
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Karnataka Chamarajanagar 0 1
Karnataka Chikkaballapur 1 1
Karnataka Chikmagalur 0 0
Karnataka Chitradurga 0 0
Karnataka Dakshin Akannada 0 0
Karnataka Davanagere 0 0
Karnataka Dharwad 0 1
Karnataka Gadag 0 1
Karnataka Gulbarga 0 1
Karnataka Hassan 0 0
Karnataka Haveri 0 1
Karnataka Kodagu 0 0
Karnataka Kolar 1 1
Karnataka Koppal 1 1
Karnataka Mandya 1 1
Karnataka Mysore 0 1
Karnataka Raichur 1 1
Karnataka Ramnagara 0 1
Karnataka Shimoga 0 0
Karnataka Tumkur 0 0
Karnataka Udupi 0 0
Karnataka Uttarakannada 0 0
Karnataka Yadagiri 0 1
Kerala Alappuzha 0 0
Kerala Ernakulam 0 0
Kerala Idukki 0 1
Kerala Kannur 0 0
Kerala Kasaragod 1 1
Kerala Kollam 0 0
Kerala Kottayam 0 0
Kerala Kozhikode 0 0
Kerala Malappuram 1 1
Kerala Palakkad 0 1
Kerala Pathanamthitta 0 0
Kerala Thiruvananthapuram 0 1
Kerala Thrissur 0 0
Kerala Wayanad 1 1
Lakshadweep Lakshadweep 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Balaghat 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Barwani 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Betul 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Bhind 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Bhopal 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Chhatarpur 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Chhindwara 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Damoh 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Datia 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Dewas 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Dhar 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Dindori 0 1
Madhya Pradesh East Nimar 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Guna 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Gwalior 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Harda 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Hoshangabad 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Indore 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Jhabua 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Katni 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Mandla 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Mandsaur 1 1
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Madhya Pradesh Morena 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Narsimhapur 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Neemuch 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Panna 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Raisen 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Rajgarh 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Ratlam 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Rewa 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Sagar 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Satna 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Sehore 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Seoni 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Shahdol 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Shajapur 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Sheopur 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Shivpuri 0 1
Madhya Pradesh Sidhi 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Tikamgarh 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Ujjain 0 0
Madhya Pradesh Umaria 1 1
Madhya Pradesh Vidisha 0 1
Madhya Pradesh West Nimar 0 1
Maharashtra Ahmadnagar 0 0
Maharashtra Akola 0 0
Maharashtra Amravati 0 0
Maharashtra Aurangabad 1 1
Maharashtra Bhandara 0 0
Maharashtra Bid 0 1
Maharashtra Buldana 0 0
Maharashtra Chandrapur 0 0
Maharashtra Dhule 0 1
Maharashtra Gadchiroli 0 1
Maharashtra Jalgaon 0 0
Maharashtra Jalna 0 1
Maharashtra Kolhapur 0 0
Maharashtra Latur 1 1
Maharashtra Mumbai 0 0
Maharashtra Nagpur 0 0
Maharashtra Nanded 1 1
Maharashtra Nashik 0 0
Maharashtra Osmanabad 1 1
Maharashtra Palghar 0 0
Maharashtra Parbhani 1 1
Maharashtra Pune 0 0
Maharashtra Raigarh 0 0
Maharashtra Ratnagiri 0 0
Maharashtra Sangli 0 0
Maharashtra Satara 0 0
Maharashtra Sindhudurg 0 0
Maharashtra Solapur 0 0
Maharashtra Thane 0 0
Maharashtra Wardha 0 0
Maharashtra Yavatmal 0 0
Manipur Bishnupur 0 0
Manipur Chandel 0 0
Manipur Churachandpur 0 0
Manipur Imphal East 0 0
Manipur Imphal West 0 0
Manipur Senapati 0 0
Manipur Tamenglong 0 0
Manipur Thoubal 0 0
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Manipur Ukhrul 0 0
Meghalaya East Garo Hills 0 0
Meghalaya East Khasi Hills 0 0
Meghalaya Jaintia Hills 0 0
Meghalaya Ribhoi 0 0
Meghalaya South Garo Hills 0 0
Meghalaya West Garo Hills 0 0
Meghalaya West Khasi Hills 0 0
Mizoram Aizawl 0 0
Mizoram Chhimtuipui 0 0
Mizoram Lunglei 0 0
Nagaland Kohima 0 0
Nagaland Mokokchung 0 0
Nagaland Mon 0 0
Nagaland Phek 0 0
Nagaland Tuensang 0 0
Nagaland Wokha 0 0
Nagaland Zunheboto 0 0
Orissa Anugul 0 1
Orissa Balangir 0 1
Orissa Balasore 0 0
Orissa Bargarh 0 1
Orissa Baudh 0 0
Orissa Bhadrak 0 0
Orissa Cuttack 0 0
Orissa Debagarh 0 1
Orissa Dhenkanal 0 1
Orissa Gajapati 0 1
Orissa Ganjam 0 1
Orissa Jagatsinghapur 0 0
Orissa Jajapur 0 0
Orissa Jharsuguda 0 1
Orissa Kalahandi 0 1
Orissa Kendrapara 0 0
Orissa Kendujhar 0 1
Orissa Khordha 0 0
Orissa Koraput 0 1
Orissa Malkangiri 0 1
Orissa Mayurbhanj 0 0
Orissa Nabarangapur 0 1
Orissa Nayagarh 0 0
Orissa Nuapada 0 1
Orissa Phulabani 0 0
Orissa Puri 0 0
Orissa Rayagada 0 1
Orissa Sambalpur 0 1
Orissa Sonapur 0 1
Orissa Sundargarh 0 0
Pondicherry Karaikal 0 0
Pondicherry Mahe 0 0
Pondicherry Pondicherry 0 0
Pondicherry Yanam 0 0
Punjab Amritsar 0 0
Punjab Bathinda 0 0
Punjab Faridkot 0 0
Punjab Firozpur 0 0
Punjab Gurdaspur 0 0
Punjab Hoshiarpur 0 0
Punjab Jalandhar 0 0
Punjab Kapurthala 0 0
Punjab Ludhiana 0 0
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Punjab Mansa 0 0
Punjab Patiala 0 0
Punjab Rupnagar 0 0
Punjab Sangrur 0 0
Punjab Sas Nagar 0 0
Punjab Tarn Taran 0 0
Rajasthan Ajmer 0 0
Rajasthan Alwar 0 1
Rajasthan Banswara 0 0
Rajasthan Barmer 0 0
Rajasthan Bharatpur 0 0
Rajasthan Bhilwara 0 1
Rajasthan Bikaner 0 0
Rajasthan Bundi 0 0
Rajasthan Chittaurgarh 0 0
Rajasthan Churu 0 0
Rajasthan Dausa 0 1
Rajasthan Dhaulpur 0 0
Rajasthan Dungarpur 0 0
Rajasthan Ganganagar 0 1
Rajasthan Hanumangarh 0 1
Rajasthan Jaipur 0 0
Rajasthan Jaisalmer 0 0
Rajasthan Jalor 0 0
Rajasthan Jhalawar 0 1
Rajasthan Jhunjhunun 0 1
Rajasthan Jodhpur 0 0
Rajasthan Karauli 0 0
Rajasthan Kota 0 1
Rajasthan Nagaur 0 1
Rajasthan Pali 0 0
Rajasthan Rajsamand 0 0
Rajasthan Sawaimadhopur 0 0
Rajasthan Sikar 0 1
Rajasthan Sirohi 0 1
Rajasthan Tonk 0 1
Rajasthan Udaipur 0 0
Sikkim East 0 0
Sikkim North 0 0
Sikkim South 0 0
Sikkim West 0 0
Tamil Nadu Chennai 0 0
Tamil Nadu Coimbatore 0 0
Tamil Nadu Cuddalore 1 1
Tamil Nadu Dharmapuri 1 1
Tamil Nadu Dindigul 0 0
Tamil Nadu Erode 0 0
Tamil Nadu Kancheepuram 0 1
Tamil Nadu Kanniyakumari 0 0
Tamil Nadu Karur 0 1
Tamil Nadu Madurai 0 0
Tamil Nadu Nagapattinam 0 0
Tamil Nadu Namakkal 0 0
Tamil Nadu Perambalur 0 1
Tamil Nadu Pudukkottai 0 1
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram 0 1
Tamil Nadu Salem 0 0
Tamil Nadu Sivaganga 0 0
Tamil Nadu Thanjavur 0 0
Tamil Nadu Theni 0 0
Tamil Nadu Thenilgiris 0 0
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Tamil Nadu Thiruvallur 0 1
Tamil Nadu Thiruvarur 0 0
Tamil Nadu Thoothukkudi 0 0
Tamil Nadu Tiruchirappalli 0 1
Tamil Nadu Tirunelveli 0 0
Tamil Nadu Tiruvannamalai 1 1
Tamil Nadu Vellore 0 0
Tamil Nadu Viluppuram 1 1
Tamil Nadu Virudhunagar 0 0
Tripura Dhalai 0 0
Tripura North Tripura 0 0
Tripura South Tripura 0 0
Tripura West Tripura 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Agra 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Aligarh 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Allahabad 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Auraiya 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Azamgarh 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Baghpat 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Bahraich 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Ballia 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Balrampur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Banda 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Barabanki 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Bareilly 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Basti 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Bijnor 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Budaun 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Bulandshahr 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Chandauli 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Deoria 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Etah 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Etawah 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Faizabad 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Farrukhabad 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Fatehpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Firozabad 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Ghaziabad 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Ghazipur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Gonda 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Gorakhpur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Hamirpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Hardoi 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Jalaun 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Jaunpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Jhansi 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Jyotibaphulenagar 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Kannauj 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Kanpurdehat 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Kanpurnagar 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Kaushambi 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Kheri 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Kushinagar 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Lalitpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Lucknow 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Maharajganj 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Mahoba 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Mainpuri 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Mathura 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Mau 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Meerut 0 0
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Uttar Pradesh Mirzapur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Moradabad 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Muzaffarnagar 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Pilibhit 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Pratapgarh 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Raebareli 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Rampur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Saharanpur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Santravidasnagarbhadohi 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Shahjahanpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Shrawasti 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Siddharthnagar 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Sitapur 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Sonbhadra 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Sultanpur 0 1
Uttar Pradesh Unnao 0 0
Uttar Pradesh Varanasi 0 0
Uttarakhand Almora 0 0
Uttarakhand Bageshwar 0 0
Uttarakhand Chamoli 0 0
Uttarakhand Dehradun 0 0
Uttarakhand Garhwal 0 0
Uttarakhand Hardwar 0 0
Uttarakhand Nainital 0 0
Uttarakhand Pithoragarh 0 1
Uttarakhand Tehrigarhwal 0 1
Uttarakhand Udhamsinghnagar 0 0
Uttarakhand Uttarkashi 0 1
West Bengal Bankura 0 1
West Bengal Barddhaman 0 0
West Bengal Birbhum 0 1
West Bengal Dakshin Dinajpur 0 1
West Bengal Darjiling 0 0
West Bengal Haora 0 0
West Bengal Hugli 0 0
West Bengal Jalpaiguri 0 1
West Bengal Kochbihar 0 1
West Bengal Kolkata 0 0
West Bengal Maldah 0 1
West Bengal Murshidabad 0 1
West Bengal Nadia 0 0
West Bengal North Twenty Four Parganas 0 0
West Bengal Paschim Midnapor 0 0
West Bengal Puruliya 0 1
West Bengal South Twenty Four Parganas 0 1
West Bengal Uttardinajpur 0 1
Table B.12: DPEP District Coding
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APPENDIX C: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5
C.1 Variable Definitions
Household Income This variable takes the sum of two questions that asked respondents to report house-
hold income. The first question asked what the total daily wage income was of all wage laborers that lived
in the house and multiplied this answer by 30, and the second question asked what the total salary of all
salaried employees in the household.
Male A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent was male.
General Caste A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reported being classified as a
member of a General or Forward Caste.
Muslim A variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reported being Muslim.
Age Age of the respondent.
Salaried Employees The number of salaried employees in the household.
Education Years of education of the respondent.
Number of School Children in Household Number of school-aged children in the household (5-16).
Partisan Political Participation Index A summary index of 5 variables: Member of a Political Party,
Attended Political Meetings, Canvassed for a Political Party, Distributed Political Leaflets.
Member of a Political Party A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Are you a member of a political party?” and 0 otherwise.
Attended Political Meetings A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Have you participated in a political meeting or gathering such as an election meeting, procession, or rally
over the past year?” and 0 otherwise.
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Canvassed for a Political Party A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the ques-
tion “Have you participated in door to door canvassing in the past year?” and 0 otherwise.
Distributed Political Leaflets A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Have you distributed election leafless or put up posters in the past year?” and 0 otherwise.
Associational Index A summary index of seven variables: Member of Caste Association, Member of Coop-
erative, Member of SHG.
Member of Caste Association A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Are you a member of any religious/caste organisation or association?” and 0 otherwise.
Member of Cooperative or Labor Union A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to
the question “Do you belong to any other associations and organisation like cooperatives, farmer’s associ-
ations, trade unions, welfare organisations, school management committees, or cultural and sports organi-
sations?” and 0 otherwise.
Member of SHG A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question “Are you a
member of a local Self Help Group?” and 0 otherwise.
Voting Index A summary index of three variables: Intend to Vote: Lok Sabha, Intend to Vote: Vidhan
Sabha, and Voted: Panchayat.
Intend to Vote: Lok Sabha A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Do you plan on voting in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections?” and 0 otherwise.
Intend to Vote: Vidhan Sabha A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question
“Do you plan on voting in the 2014 Legislative Assembly elections?” and 0 otherwise.
Voted: Panchayat A variable that was coded 1 if a respondent answered “Yes” to the question “Did you
vote in the 2013 panchayat elections?” and 0 otherwise.
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Private Sector Index A summary index of three variables: Private Job, Private Services, and Private Fi-
nancing.
Private Job A variable that takes the value 1 if a respondent answers “Private Job” to the question, “If
you were looking for a job today, would you prefer a government job, a private sector job, or to be self-
employed?” and 0 otherwise.
Private Services A variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent answers “Private Body” to the ques-
tion, “If you were seeking health services or education for a family member today, would you prefer the
service from a government body or from a private body?” and 0 otherwise.
Private Financing A variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent answers “Private actors should both
finance and administer these services,” to the question, “Which statement about the provision of health care
and education do you agree with more?” and 0 otherwise.
Voucher Child in Private School A variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent reports enrolling
their voucher lottery child in a private school after the voucher lottery period finished.
Children in Private Schools A sum of the number of school-aged children in the household enrolled in
private schools.
Use Private Health Services A variable that takes a value of 1 if a respondent mentions a private health
service in answer to the question, “If a family member falls sick, where would you take them?”
Willingness to Pay Index A summary index of two variables: Voucher Willingness to Pay and PDS Will-
ingness to Pay.
Voucher Willingness to Pay A variable that took the value the respondent stopped at to the question
“If you were given a choice between receiving an annual education scholarship from the government of
Rs. X per year or Rs. X/12 per month that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish
(including private school fees, books, uniform, transport, and private tuition), or being able to send your
child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer?” The question began
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by setting X at Rs. 3,000 per year (or Rs. 250 per month) and progressed in Rs. 500 per year increments to
Rs. 10,000 per year (or Rs. 833 per month). If the respondent rejected the offer at Rs. 10,000 per year, the
respondent was asked at what value of scholarship would they be indifferent between government provision
or receiving a scholarship, and the variable takes this value.
PDS Willingness to Pay A variable that took the value the respondent stopped at to the question “Would
you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. X INSTEAD of your current monthly
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop?” The question began by setting X at Rs. 200 per month and
progressed in Rs. 50 increments to Rs. 1,000 per month. If the respondent rejected the offer at Rs. 1,000
per month, the respondent was asked at what value of cash transfer would they be indifferent between
government provision of rations or receiving a cash transfer and the variable takes this value.
Teachers in this Village Work as Election Monitors A variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent
reports knowing that government school teachers work as election monitors.
Teachers in this Village Work as Census Enumerators A variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent
reports knowing that government school teachers work as census enumerators.
Care about well-being of students Answer to the question “Do you think that government teachers care
about the well-being of their students?” from “Very much care”, “Somewhat care”, “Somewhat don’t care”,
“Very much don’t care”.
Treat all students equally Coded as 1 if respondents answer “Yes” to question “Do you think that gov-
ernment school teachers treat all students equally?”
State Intermediaries For each variable that composes the index, the variable was coded as 1 if respondents
claimed to go to one of the following: A local government (panchayat) member, a block or district level
government bureaucrat, a state or local politician, a member of an official political party. If respondents
said they did not use anyone, the variable was coded as 0.
Non-State Intermediaries For each variable that composes the index, the variable was coded as 1 if re-
spondents claimed to go to one of the following: Community associations, Caste groups, local informal
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“fixers”, an NGO, a private school teacher, or family. If respondents said they did not use anyone, the
variable was coded as 0.
185
C.2 Selection & Compliance
Despite the school voucher lottery relying on randomized assignment, there exist two prior avenues for
selection into treatment. First, participants had to choose to enter their name into the voucher lottery. As
we can see from Table C.3, this led to participants that were of lower socioeconomic status than the average
household in the same villages and districts. Second, vouchers winners, upon winning the lottery, had to
choose whether to take up the lottery or not, and could drop out at any point, while those that did not win
the lottery could choose to send their children to privates schools out of pocket. As the treatment was over
five years, there was a long time for participants to violate assignment status. Tables 5.3 and C.1 present
compliance in the full sample and in my smaller downstream sample. Compliance was slightly higher in
my downstream sample, likely due to respondent out-migration from the full sample and the subsequent
inability of surveyors to locate them.
Compliance Rate of Downstream Sample
Offered Voucher
No Yes
Total 405 797
Took-up Admission NA 606(76%)
In Private School After Five Years 93 457(23%) (57%)
Table C.1: Compliance Rate: Downstream Sample
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C.3 First-Stage Estimator for Instrumental Variable Regression
As we can see from Tables 5.3 and C.1, there was about 43 percent non-compliance in the downstream
sample. The third coefficient plot in every coefficient plot represents an instrumental variable regression
where the an indicator of whether households kept their children in private school for five years is instru-
mented original assignment into treatment and control. In Table C.2 I report the first stage of this regression
for interested readers and note that the F-Statistic passes all conventional measures for the strength of an
instrument.
Private School at Endline Private School at Endline Private School at Endline
Voucher Winner 0.347∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Observations 1161 1161 1095
F-Stat 139.582 141.609 18.273
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.2: First-Stage Regression
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C.4 The Andhra Pradesh School Choice Experiment
Improving on existing voucher experiments, the Andhra Pradesh School Choice Experiment (APSC) exper-
iment employed a two-stage randomization design. Villages selected for the project were first randomized
into “treatment” villages that would receive vouchers and “control” villages that would receive no vouch-
ers. Once treatment villages were selected, there was a second round of randomization where households
within treatment villages were then entered into a voucher lottery. This created both a child and village
level counterfactual where some children within villages received vouchers and others did not, and then
some villages had no voucher winning children at all.
The original experiment operated across five districts of Andhra Pradesh - Nizamabad, Medak, Kedapa,
East Godavari, and Visakhapatnam - specifically chosen to account for Andhra Pradesh’s cultural and so-
cioeconomic diversity.93 The APSC project was conducted over 180 villages that had at least one recognized
private school.94 The initial village level randomization randomized 90 villages into treatment villages, and
90 control villages. Due to the small size of the program relative to the size of villages, I hold no theoreti-
cal expectations for effects at the village, as opposed to household, level. As a result, I only sampled from
treatment villages in which the second stage randomization selected voucher children.
A household could only enter a child into the lottery if they were in Upper Kindergarten or Standard 1
at the time of the lottery, ensuring that the child would benefit from five years of private education if they
received a voucher. The voucher provided for fees, books, and school uniforms, but not school lunches
or transportation to a local private school.95 The emphasis on local private schools restricted households
to sending children to schools within their village, although villages were purposefully selected to have at
least one government recognized private school. Within treatment villages, 3,097 households applied for a
voucher, of which 1,980 (64 percent) were selected by lottery to receive a voucher. 1,210 of the 1,980 (61
percent) households accepted the voucher and enrolled in a private school at the beginning of the project.
93In the recent division of Andhra Pradesh into the two states of Andhra Pradesh and Telengana, Nizamabad and Medak became
part of the newly formed Telengana state, while Kedapa, East Godavari, and Visakhapatnam remained in Andhra Pradesh.
94Recognized private schools are those that have been registered and recognized by the state government. To receive government
recognition, they must meet criteria specified in the Right to Education Act, including a certain pupil-to-teacher ratio, separate boys
and girls toilets, a boundary wall to separate the school from other buildings, and a playground for children among other requirements.
These requirements ensure that the quality of the school as measured by physical infrastructure is higher than many unrecognized
schools that also operate in the area.
95Government schools in India provide one hot cooked meal a day to students through a Central Government scheme known
as the Midday Meal Scheme. The scheme is often credited with increasing enrollment in government schools (Drèze and Kingdon,
2001), although no interviewed households cited the lack of free meals as a barrier to sending their children to private schools if they
received a voucher.
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At the end of five years 980 households (83 percent) remained in private schools. Table 5.3 provides the full
details of compliers and non-compliers.
For a more detailed treatment of the original Andhra Pradesh School Choice Experiment, see Muralid-
haran and Sundararaman (2015). The original experiment found that test scores in math and Telugu (the
vernacular language of Andhra Pradesh) between students in private schools and government schools were
not significantly different. Two important caveats should be added, however. While government schools
teach an average of three subjects (math, Telugu, and a joint subject of science and social studies called “en-
vironmental studies” (EVS)) students in private schools study a far greater number of subjects including
English, Hindi, separate classes for social studies and science, and computer use. Accounting for time use
within schools, private schools achieve greater “bang for their buck,” by achieving the same test scores using
less instructional time on the subjects that both types of schools share in common, while attaining higher
test scores in subjects, such as Hindi, that government schools do not focus on as much. Moreover, private
schools in the sample spend an average of Rs. 3,000 per student per year, while government schools in the
sample spend an average of Rs. 8,000 per student per year (approximately $50 and $130 per student per
year respectively). The second caveat is that there is considerable disruption for students that join private
schools not in their vernacular language.96 For students that join Telugu medium private schools, their test
scores across all subjects are far better than students in Telugu medium government schools.
96Private schools in Andhra Pradesh generally fall into two categories, “Telugu medium” and “English medium” schools. Telugu
medium schools conduct instruction for all classes in Telugu apart from second and third language classes, while English medium
schools conduct all instruction in English.
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C.5 Downstream Sampling
Downstream Sample Census: Survey Villages Census: Survey Districts Census: All India
1 Literate (%) 25.79 51.96 60.67 57.91
2 Agricultural Labor (%) 50.33 54.01 62.08 32.94
3 Unemployed (%) 0.50 207.52 164.23 197.30
4 Scheduled Caste (%) 24.29 5.83 20.47 18.46
5 Scheduled Tribe (%) 2.41 0.72 5.17 11.26
Table C.3: Comparison of Sample Socieconomic Indicators
As we can see from Table 5.1, there was covariate balance between treatment and control households in
both the full APSC sample and my reduced downstream sub-sample. As we can see from C.3, households
in my sample were less literate and more households work as agricultural laborers than the district wide
averages for the five districts I surveyed in, suggesting my respondents were slightly poorer than district
averages. Households reported far lower rates of unemployement than the district wide average, but this
might be a result of different measures of employment between the two surveys, and I surveyed slightly
more scheduled caste households and slightly fewer scheduled tribe households.
Surveyors were instructed to survey the chief decision maker in the household or the person in charge of
schooling decisions for children in the household and to return at a later date if either of those two people
were not present. I sampled households from the original APSC sample list, stratifying by district and
ensuring a similar balance between treatment and control households as the original intervention. Surveys
lasted between 50 minutes and one and a half hours. Semi-structured interviews lasted between 30 minutes
and two hours. Simultaneous translation was provided by three of the 11 surveyors who were fluent in
English and Telugu.
190
C.6 Full Results Tables
In this section, I present the full regression results, including the coefficients on all control variables (Col-
umn 2 in all tables). I also include a series of additional robustness checks in this analysis: using treatment
status as an instrument for whether households accepted the voucher (Column 3), whether households en-
rolled in a private school (Column 4), whether children remained in a private school for the entire voucher
experiment (this estimator is the one presented in the results of the main body of the paper) (Column 5),
and whether households enrolled their children in English medium schools (Column 6).
We can also view these tables as results that are robust to alternative measures of school choice (e.g.
voucher use and years in private school). Moreover, comparing these measures reveals that the treatment
effects are stronger along the intensive margin (i.e. how much does each household use private schools,
conditional on any attendance) rather than the extensive margin (i.e. any attendance at a private school).
These results add support to one of my primary mechanisms, the idea of private sector permanence, as
households that spent more time in private schools are more likely to hold stronger market-oriented beliefs.
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C.6.1 Political Participation
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.070 0.066
(0.047) (0.048)
Accepted Voucher 0.094
(0.068)
Enrolled in 0.114
Private School (0.082)
Attended Private 0.161
School (0.140)
English Medium 0.415
(0.310)
Household Income 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Male 0.120∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.140∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.058)
General Caste -0.152∗∗ -0.154∗∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.079)
Muslim -0.080 -0.078 -0.077 -0.081 -0.054
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.095)
Age 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006∗ 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Salaried -0.068 -0.068 -0.076 -0.115 -0.172∗
Employees (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.072) (0.098)
Education 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
No. School -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 -0.001
Children in HH (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038)
Constant -0.272∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.205) (0.194)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.4: Political Participation Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
Accepted Voucher 0.013
(0.016)
Enrolled in 0.016
Private School (0.020)
Attended Private 0.020
School (0.034)
English Medium 0.053
(0.074)
Household Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
General Caste -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Muslim 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.021 -0.028
Employees (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023)
Education 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. School 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Children in HH (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.005 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 -0.025 -0.026
(0.015) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.047)
Observations 1198 1131 1131 1131 1092 1050
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.5: Member of a Political Party
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.005 0.006
(0.027) (0.028)
Accepted Voucher 0.008
(0.039)
Enrolled in 0.010
Private School (0.048)
Attended Private 0.026
School (0.081)
English Medium 0.077
(0.178)
Household Income 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Male 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.039 0.042
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
General Caste -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019 -0.041
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045)
Muslim -0.059 -0.058 -0.058 -0.053 -0.047
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.059 -0.059 -0.060 -0.067 -0.082
Employees (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055)
Education 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School -0.037∗ -0.037∗ -0.037∗ -0.030 -0.030
Children in HH (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant 0.290∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.166 0.153
(0.037) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.118) (0.110)
Observations 1195 1128 1128 1128 1089 1047
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.6: Attended a Political Meeting
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.026 0.020
(0.021) (0.021)
Accepted Voucher 0.028
(0.030)
Enrolled in 0.034
Private School (0.036)
Attended Private 0.043
School (0.062)
English Medium 0.118
(0.134)
Household Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.032
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
General Caste -0.067∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035)
Muslim -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.014
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.014 -0.036
Employees (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.043)
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
No. School 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.013
Children in HH (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 0.009 -0.098 -0.099 -0.101 -0.127 -0.127
(0.028) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.090) (0.086)
Observations 1197 1129 1129 1129 1090 1048
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.7: Canvassed for a Political Party
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.029∗ 0.029∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Accepted Voucher 0.042∗
(0.025)
Enrolled in 0.051∗
Private School (0.030)
Attended Private 0.070
School (0.050)
English Medium 0.175
(0.114)
Household Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
General Caste -0.054∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029)
Muslim -0.030 -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 -0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
Age 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.025 -0.025 -0.029 -0.045∗ -0.065∗
Employees (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037)
Education 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.000
Children in HH (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant -0.003 -0.107 -0.109 -0.112∗ -0.138∗ -0.119∗
(0.023) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.075) (0.072)
Observations 1189 1121 1121 1121 1082 1040
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.8: Distributed Leaflets for a Political Party
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C.6.2 Associational Membership
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.071∗ 0.069∗
(0.037) (0.038)
Accepted Voucher 0.097∗
(0.053)
Enrolled in 0.119∗
Private School (0.065)
Attended Private 0.178
School (0.110)
English Medium 0.351
(0.242)
Household Income 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.196∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045)
General Caste -0.154∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.143∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.062)
Muslim -0.081 -0.079 -0.078 -0.087 -0.078
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.066 -0.066 -0.074 -0.108∗ -0.174∗∗
Employees (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.076)
Education 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. School -0.039 -0.037 -0.035 -0.028 -0.042
Children in HH (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.239∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.257∗ 0.248∗ 0.126 0.279∗
(0.050) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.161) (0.151)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.9: Associational Membership Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.007 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017)
Accepted Voucher -0.005
(0.025)
Enrolled in -0.006
Private School (0.030)
Attended Private -0.005
School (0.051)
English Medium 0.001
(0.112)
Household Income 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
General Caste -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.005
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Muslim -0.067∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Age -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.021 -0.025
Employees (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035)
Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.008
Children in HH (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.196∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.074) (0.070)
Observations 1194 1127 1127 1127 1089 1047
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.10: Member of a Caste Association
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.014 0.016
(0.019) (0.019)
Accepted Voucher 0.022
(0.027)
Enrolled in 0.027
Private School (0.033)
Attended Private 0.029
School (0.056)
English Medium 0.058
(0.122)
Household Income 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Male 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
General Caste -0.047∗ -0.047∗ -0.048∗ -0.042 -0.046
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032)
Muslim 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.047∗ -0.048∗ -0.049∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.066∗
Employees (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.039)
Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019
Children in HH (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 0.098∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.030 -0.031 -0.045 -0.027
(0.015) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.083) (0.078)
Observations 1189 1122 1122 1122 1084 1042
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.11: Member of a Cooperative or Labor Union
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.051∗ 0.046∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Accepted Voucher 0.066∗
(0.037)
Enrolled in 0.080∗
Private School (0.045)
Attended Private 0.127∗
School (0.075)
English Medium 0.249
(0.167)
Household Income 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.209∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
General Caste -0.086∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.078∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043)
Muslim -0.060 -0.059 -0.058 -0.065 -0.057
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.033 -0.081
Employees (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.053)
Education -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. School -0.055∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
Children in HH (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 0.703∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.099) (0.100) (0.101) (0.112) (0.105)
Observations 1194 1127 1127 1127 1089 1047
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.12: Member of a Self-Help Group
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C.6.3 Intention to Vote
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.034 0.027
(0.039) (0.039)
Accepted Voucher 0.038
(0.055)
Enrolled in 0.047
Private School (0.067)
Attended Private 0.048
School (0.111)
English Medium 0.051
(0.243)
Household Income -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.044 -0.044 -0.043 -0.033 -0.037
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046)
General Caste 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.062 0.054
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062)
Muslim 0.120∗ 0.121∗ 0.121∗ 0.107 0.095
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074)
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗
Employees (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.077)
Education 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
No. School -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 -0.015 -0.008
Children in HH (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant -0.022 -0.123 -0.036 -0.040 -0.029 0.000
(0.032) (0.149) (0.150) (0.151) (0.163) (0.152)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.13: Electoral Participation Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.004 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015)
Accepted Voucher -0.003
(0.021)
Enrolled in -0.004
Private School (0.026)
Attended Private -0.006
School (0.043)
English Medium -0.017
(0.091)
Household Income -0.007∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.016
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
General Caste 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.019 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Muslim 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.012
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Age -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.055∗
Employees (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.029)
Education 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. School 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015
Children in HH (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.921∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.064) (0.059)
Observations 1188 1122 1122 1122 1083 1041
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.14: Intend to Vote: Lok Sabha
202
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.010 -0.011
(0.015) (0.015)
Accepted Voucher -0.015
(0.021)
Enrolled in -0.019
Private School (0.026)
Attended Private -0.025
School (0.043)
English Medium -0.056
(0.090)
Household Income 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.025 0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
General Caste 0.042∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.035 0.042∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Muslim 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.004
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Age -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.074∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗
Employees (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.029)
Education 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. School 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015
Children in HH (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant 0.920∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.060)
Observations 1183 1117 1117 1117 1078 1037
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.15: Intend to Vote: Vidhan Sabha
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.019 0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
Accepted Voucher 0.025
(0.017)
Enrolled in 0.030
Private School (0.021)
Attended Private 0.036
School (0.034)
English Medium 0.057
(0.076)
Household Income 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.032∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
General Caste 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Muslim 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.040∗ 0.032 0.033
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.023
Employees (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024)
Education 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. School -0.020∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.015
Children in HH (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.945∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.048)
Observations 1187 1121 1121 1121 1082 1040
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.16: Voted: Panchayat
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C.6.4 Comfort with Private Services
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.086∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.034) (0.033)
Accepted Voucher 0.114∗∗
(0.047)
Enrolled in 0.139∗∗
Private School (0.057)
Attended Private 0.244∗∗∗
School (0.093)
English Medium 0.495∗∗
(0.207)
Household Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Male -0.053 -0.051 -0.051 -0.064∗ -0.042
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
General Caste 0.088∗ 0.086∗ 0.081∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.037
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.053)
Muslim -0.050 -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 -0.041
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.063)
Age -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried 0.228∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗
Employees (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.065)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. School 0.049∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.037
Children in HH (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Constant -0.002 -0.018 -0.024 -0.034 -0.135 0.049
(0.045) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.136) (0.130)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.17: Private Services Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.003 -0.007
(0.017) (0.017)
Accepted Voucher -0.010
(0.024)
Enrolled in -0.012
Private School (0.029)
Attended Private -0.010
School (0.049)
English Medium -0.017
(0.106)
Household Income 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
General Caste 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
Muslim 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.001
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.006 0.001
Employees (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034)
Education -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
No. School 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.012
Children in HH (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 0.002 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.011 -0.039
(0.023) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) (0.067)
Observations 1199 1131 1131 1131 1092 1050
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.18: Preference for Private Sector Job
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.022 0.028
(0.024) (0.024)
Accepted Voucher 0.040
(0.034)
Enrolled in 0.049
Private School (0.041)
Attended Private 0.110
School (0.070)
English Medium 0.256∗
(0.155)
Household Income 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Male -0.049∗ -0.049∗ -0.049∗ -0.050∗ -0.036
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
General Caste 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.045 0.012
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039)
Muslim -0.090∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.092∗∗ -0.100∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
Age -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.018 -0.013
Employees (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.049)
Education 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
No. School -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 -0.022 -0.026
Children in HH (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.080∗∗ 0.125 0.123 0.119 0.094 0.152
(0.032) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.103) (0.097)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.19: Basic Services should be Provided Privately
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.018 0.023
(0.017) (0.017)
Accepted Voucher 0.032
(0.024)
Enrolled in 0.039
Private School (0.030)
Attended Private 0.075
School (0.051)
English Medium 0.175
(0.112)
Household Income 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
General Caste 0.040∗ 0.040∗ 0.038 0.048∗ 0.024
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029)
Muslim -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.047 -0.051
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Age -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.017 -0.008
Employees (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035)
Education 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.019
Children in HH (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.138∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.075) (0.071)
Observations 1200 1132 1132 1132 1093 1051
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.20: Basic Services should be Financed Privately
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.072∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Accepted Voucher 0.085∗∗
(0.037)
Enrolled in 0.103∗∗
Private School (0.044)
Attended Private 0.169∗∗
School (0.072)
English Medium 0.314∗∗
(0.159)
Household Income -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.049∗ -0.048∗ -0.048∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.050∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
General Caste 0.033 0.031 0.027 0.029 -0.022
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041)
Muslim 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.062
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.065
Employees (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.050)
Education 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. School 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.005
Children in HH (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 0.183∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.137 0.277∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.105) (0.099)
Observations 1198 1130 1130 1130 1091 1049
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.21: Voucher Child Continued in Private School
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.103∗∗ 0.078∗
(0.042) (0.041)
Accepted Voucher 0.110∗
(0.058)
Enrolled in 0.134∗
Private School (0.070)
Attended Private 0.210∗
School (0.116)
English Medium 0.315
(0.249)
Household Income -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.108∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047)
General Caste 0.054 0.051 0.046 0.047 -0.013
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.064)
Muslim 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.051
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried 0.221∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗
Employees (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.079)
Education 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
No. School 0.199∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
Children in HH (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 0.319∗∗∗ 0.023 0.017 0.008 -0.079 0.105
(0.056) (0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.169) (0.156)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.22: No. Children in HH in Private Schools
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.001 0.009
(0.029) (0.029)
Accepted Voucher 0.013
(0.041)
Enrolled in 0.016
Private School (0.050)
Attended Private 0.049
School (0.085)
English Medium 0.175
(0.183)
Household Income 0.011∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗ 0.011 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.054∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
General Caste 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.054 0.062
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.047)
Muslim -0.108∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.124∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056)
Age -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004 -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.077
Employees (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.058)
Education 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.029
Children in HH (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Constant 0.683∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.124) (0.115)
Observations 1201 1133 1133 1133 1094 1052
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.23: Choice of Private Health Facility
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C.6.5 Willingness to Pay
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.095∗∗ -0.065∗
(0.041) (0.039)
Accepted Voucher -0.093∗
(0.056)
Enrolled in -0.113∗
Private School (0.068)
Attended Private -0.238∗∗
School (0.118)
English Medium -0.464∗
(0.262)
Household Income 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Male 0.084∗ 0.083∗ 0.083∗ 0.084∗ 0.060
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049)
General Caste 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.073
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.067)
Muslim -0.081 -0.083 -0.084 -0.092 -0.099
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080)
Age 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried 0.052 0.052 0.059 0.086 0.131
Employees (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.083)
Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
No. School 0.036 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.029
Children in HH (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Constant 0.123∗∗ -0.299∗∗ -0.294∗ -0.286∗ -0.208 -0.328∗∗
(0.056) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) (0.173) (0.164)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.24: Willingness to Pay Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.032 -0.033
(0.058) (0.060)
Accepted Voucher -0.046
(0.084)
Enrolled in -0.057
Private School (0.103)
Attended Private -0.132
School (0.178)
English Medium -0.284
(0.374)
Household Income 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Male 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.037 0.012
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071)
General Caste -0.122 -0.121 -0.118 -0.118 -0.085
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.096)
Muslim -0.059 -0.061 -0.063 -0.063 -0.068
(0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.118) (0.122)
Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Salaried -0.022 -0.021 -0.018 -0.005 0.005
Employees (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.090) (0.120)
Education 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
No. School 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.030
Children in HH (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048)
Constant -0.113 -0.485∗∗ -0.480∗∗ -0.477∗∗ -0.456∗ -0.533∗∗
(0.083) (0.236) (0.236) (0.237) (0.263) (0.247)
Observations 1078 1015 1015 1015 979 941
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.25: Willingness to Pay: School Voucher
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.142∗∗ -0.094
(0.063) (0.058)
Accepted Voucher -0.134
(0.082)
Enrolled in -0.164
Private School (0.101)
Attended Private -0.313∗
School (0.170)
English Medium -0.534
(0.363)
Household Income 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.021
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Male 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.028
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.074)
General Caste 0.097 0.100 0.106 0.120 0.182∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.081) (0.094)
Muslim -0.039 -0.044 -0.050 -0.061 -0.081
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.118) (0.125)
Age 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Salaried 0.068 0.069 0.080 0.112 0.177
Employees (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.088) (0.121)
Education -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
No. School 0.080∗ 0.080∗ 0.076∗ 0.071 0.058
Children in HH (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049)
Constant 0.374∗∗∗ -0.294 -0.291 -0.280 -0.124 -0.316
(0.103) (0.238) (0.237) (0.238) (0.265) (0.256)
Observations 994 930 930 930 903 865
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.26: Willingness to Pay: PDS
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C.6.6 State Claim Making Networks
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.068∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Accepted Voucher -0.087∗∗
(0.043)
Enrolled in -0.106∗∗
Private School (0.053)
Attended Private -0.170∗
School (0.090)
English Medium -0.328∗
(0.194)
Household Income -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.099∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
General Caste 0.014 0.016 0.020 -0.003 0.041
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.050)
Muslim -0.038 -0.040 -0.041 -0.010 -0.027
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Age -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.005∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.093∗∗ -0.093∗∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.059 -0.022
Employees (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.061)
Education 0.008∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.014 0.016
Children in HH (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 0.045∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) (0.131) (0.122)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.27: State Claim Making Networks Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.037∗ -0.033
(0.020) (0.020)
Accepted Voucher -0.047
(0.029)
Enrolled in -0.057
Private School (0.035)
Attended Private -0.103∗
School (0.060)
English Medium -0.173
(0.125)
Household Income -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.039∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.043∗ 0.036
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
General Caste -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.033 -0.028
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033)
Muslim -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.006
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 0.017 0.040
Employees (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.041)
Education 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School 0.037∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.035∗∗
Children in HH (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 0.168∗∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.027 0.031 0.079 0.041
(0.016) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.088) (0.082)
Observations 1173 1107 1107 1107 1068 1029
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.28: State Channel: Access to Government School
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.007 0.003
(0.035) (0.035)
Accepted Voucher 0.005
(0.051)
Enrolled in 0.006
Private School (0.065)
Attended Private -0.002
School (0.118)
English Medium 0.057
(0.186)
Household Income -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.014∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.083∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
General Caste 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.028 0.046
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.051)
Muslim 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.001
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064)
Age -0.005 -0.005∗ -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.010 -0.028
Employees (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.057) (0.062)
Education 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. School 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.045∗
Children in HH (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.762∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.132) (0.141) (0.141) (0.157) (0.146)
Observations 631 594 594 594 568 551
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.29: State Channel: Access to BPL Card
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.084∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.033) (0.034)
Accepted Voucher -0.103∗∗
(0.047)
Enrolled in -0.129∗∗
Private School (0.059)
Attended Private -0.217∗∗
School (0.100)
English Medium -0.361∗
(0.184)
Household Income -0.013∗ -0.014∗ -0.014∗ -0.015∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Male 0.084∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040)
General Caste 0.066 0.066 0.076 0.060 0.115∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.064)
Muslim -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.013 0.000
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.071)
Age -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.130∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.087 -0.055
Employees (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.055) (0.070)
Education 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. School 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.007
Children in HH (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.337∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.135) (0.143) (0.143) (0.165) (0.156)
Observations 748 713 713 713 684 662
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.30: State Channel: Access to Government Hospital
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.071∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Accepted Voucher -0.087∗∗
(0.038)
Enrolled in -0.107∗∗
Private School (0.047)
Attended Private -0.170∗∗
School (0.079)
English Medium -0.311∗∗
(0.149)
Household Income -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.035 0.021
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)
General Caste -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.030
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.047)
Muslim 0.046 0.040 0.041 0.071 0.063
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062)
Age -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.006 -0.003 0.004 0.029 0.086
Employees (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.058)
Education 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.016
Children in HH (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.841∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112) (0.128) (0.119)
Observations 836 789 789 789 758 737
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.31: State Channel: NREGA Employment
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.014 -0.010
(0.031) (0.032)
Accepted Voucher -0.015
(0.047)
Enrolled in -0.018
Private School (0.057)
Attended Private -0.003
School (0.097)
English Medium 0.018
(0.233)
Household Income -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Male 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.062
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
General Caste -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 -0.043 -0.020
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.060)
Muslim -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 -0.023 -0.048
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.084∗ -0.084∗ -0.082∗ -0.085 -0.093
Employees (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) (0.082)
Education -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
No. School 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.003
Children in HH (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 0.726∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.143) (0.132)
Observations 860 815 815 815 777 752
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.32: State Channel: Dealing with Police or Land Administration
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C.6.7 Non-State Claim Making Networks
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.086∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
Accepted Voucher 0.118∗∗∗
(0.042)
Enrolled in 0.144∗∗∗
Private School (0.052)
Attended Private 0.222∗∗
School (0.089)
English Medium 0.451∗∗
(0.200)
Household Income 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 -0.038 -0.020
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037)
General Caste -0.067 -0.070∗ -0.075∗ -0.051 -0.093∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.051)
Muslim 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.009 0.013
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.061)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Salaried -0.019 -0.019 -0.028 -0.065 -0.125∗∗
Employees (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.063)
Education -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School -0.027 -0.025 -0.022 -0.018 -0.024
Children in HH (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant -0.057∗∗ -0.251∗∗ -0.150 -0.160 -0.252∗ -0.153
(0.024) (0.113) (0.115) (0.116) (0.130) (0.125)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.33: Non-State Claim Making Networks Index
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.102∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Accepted Voucher 0.140∗∗∗
(0.033)
Enrolled in 0.171∗∗∗
Private School (0.040)
Attended Private 0.294∗∗∗
School (0.073)
English Medium 0.600∗∗∗
(0.168)
Household Income 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Male -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.028 -0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032)
General Caste -0.056∗ -0.058∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.053 -0.106∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.045)
Muslim 0.075∗ 0.076∗ 0.078∗ 0.079∗ 0.077
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.053)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.045 -0.119∗∗
Employees (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.055)
Education -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School -0.030∗ -0.028∗ -0.025 -0.020 -0.034
Children in HH (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Constant 0.136∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.039 -0.051 -0.149 -0.005
(0.018) (0.088) (0.089) (0.091) (0.107) (0.110)
Observations 1173 1107 1107 1107 1068 1029
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.34: Non-State Channel: Access to Government School
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.012 0.000
(0.037) (0.038)
Accepted Voucher 0.000
(0.055)
Enrolled in 0.001
Private School (0.069)
Attended Private 0.018
School (0.124)
English Medium -0.036
(0.202)
Household Income 0.014 0.014∗ 0.014∗ 0.011 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.074∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
General Caste -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.042 -0.060
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.055)
Muslim 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.023
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068)
Age 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 -0.006
Employees (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.066)
Education -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009∗ -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. School -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.046 -0.040
Children in HH (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.263∗∗∗ 0.092 0.109 0.109 0.101 0.062
(0.030) (0.141) (0.150) (0.150) (0.165) (0.157)
Observations 627 590 590 590 565 548
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.35: Non-State Channel: Access to BPL Card
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.091∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Accepted Voucher 0.114∗∗∗
(0.042)
Enrolled in 0.142∗∗∗
Private School (0.052)
Attended Private 0.240∗∗∗
School (0.090)
English Medium 0.414∗∗
(0.169)
Household Income 0.012∗ 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.065∗∗ -0.062∗ -0.062∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037)
General Caste -0.089∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.083∗ -0.139∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.058)
Muslim -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.027 -0.016
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.065)
Age 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried 0.079∗ 0.079∗ 0.070 0.033 -0.010
Employees (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.064)
Education -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School -0.021 -0.019 -0.015 -0.010 -0.013
Children in HH (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
Constant 0.730∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.119) (0.125) (0.126) (0.147) (0.141)
Observations 750 715 715 715 686 664
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.36: Non-State Channel: Access to Government Hospital
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.058∗ 0.045
(0.033) (0.034)
Accepted Voucher 0.064
(0.048)
Enrolled in 0.079
Private School (0.059)
Attended Private 0.106
School (0.098)
English Medium 0.185
(0.184)
Household Income 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.003 0.005 0.007 -0.006 0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
General Caste -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 -0.013 -0.025
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.058)
Muslim -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.023 -0.014
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076)
Age 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.111∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.179∗∗
Employees (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.072)
Education -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. School -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005
Children in HH (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Constant 0.277∗∗∗ -0.112 -0.197 -0.204 -0.254 -0.175
(0.027) (0.137) (0.140) (0.141) (0.159) (0.146)
Observations 833 786 786 786 755 734
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.37: Non-State Channel: NREGA Employment
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.036 0.047
(0.034) (0.035)
Accepted Voucher 0.070
(0.052)
Enrolled in 0.085
Private School (0.064)
Attended Private 0.103
School (0.108)
English Medium 0.257
(0.269)
Household Income 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Male 0.006 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.004
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
General Caste -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.009 -0.058
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.069)
Muslim 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.015 0.032
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.069)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Salaried -0.009 -0.011 -0.018 -0.041 -0.089
Employees (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.094)
Education 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. School -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.020
Children in HH (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
Constant 0.491∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.160) (0.152)
Observations 859 814 814 814 776 751
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.38: Non-State Channel: Dealing with Police or Land Administration
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C.6.8 Teachers Non-Teaching Duties
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.011 -0.012
(0.021) (0.021)
Accepted Voucher -0.017
(0.029)
Enrolled in -0.021
Private School (0.036)
Attended Private -0.013
School (0.060)
English Medium 0.001
(0.132)
Household Income 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
General Caste 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034)
Muslim -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.016
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.036 0.031
Employees (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.042)
Education 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004
Children in HH (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 0.773∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.088) (0.082)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.39: Government Teachers Serve as Election Monitors
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.014 0.013
(0.020) (0.020)
Accepted Voucher 0.018
(0.029)
Enrolled in 0.022
Private School (0.035)
Attended Private 0.060
School (0.059)
English Medium 0.103
(0.129)
Household Income 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
General Caste -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.014 -0.023
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033)
Muslim -0.055 -0.055 -0.054 -0.059 -0.069∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
Age -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried 0.006 0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.008
Employees (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.041)
Education 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. School -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.022 -0.028∗
Children in HH (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 0.651∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) (0.081)
Observations 1202 1134 1134 1134 1095 1053
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.40: Government Teachers Serve as Census Enumerators
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C.6.9 Teacher Perceptions
ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner -0.031 -0.029
(0.030) (0.031)
Accepted Voucher -0.041
(0.044)
Enrolled in -0.050
Private School (0.053)
Attended Private -0.076
School (0.089)
English Medium -0.166
(0.190)
Household Income -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.062∗ 0.063∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
General Caste -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.011 0.032
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049)
Muslim -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.020 -0.016
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Salaried -0.029 -0.029 -0.025 -0.022 -0.028
Employees (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.061)
Education -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. School 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006
Children in HH (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 3.523∗∗∗ 3.589∗∗∗ 3.695∗∗∗ 3.699∗∗∗ 3.690∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.131) (0.122)
Observations 1185 1119 1119 1119 1081 1039
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.41: Government Teachers Care about the Well-Being of Their Students
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ITT ITT IV: Accepted Voucher IV: Enrolled IV: Five Years IV: English School
Voucher Winner 0.005 0.009
(0.010) (0.011)
Accepted Voucher 0.013
(0.015)
Enrolled in 0.015
Private School (0.019)
Attended Private 0.026
School (0.031)
English Medium 0.024
(0.066)
Household Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Male -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
General Caste -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.003 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Muslim -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Age -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salaried -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.027∗ -0.034
Employees (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. School -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
Children in HH (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.967∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042)
Observations 1183 1116 1116 1116 1079 1037
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.42: Government Teachers Treat All Students Equally
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C.7 First-Stage Regressions
I present the first-stage regressions for all instrumented variables. I present the first-stage for having accepted
a voucher in Table C.43, for having enrolled in private school in Table C.44, and for enrolling in an English
medium school in Table C.45.
Accepted Voucher Accepted Voucher Accepted Voucher
Voucher Winner 0.700∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 1202 1202 1134
F-Stat 943.992 946.919 98.982
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.43: First-Stage Regression for Accepted Voucher
Enrolled in Private School Enrolled in Private School Enrolled in Private School
Voucher Winner 0.573∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 1202 1202 1134
F-Stat 543.462 555.668 59.298
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.44: First-Stage Regression for Enrolled in Private School
English Medium English Medium English Medium
Voucher Winner 0.160∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 1116 1116 1053
F-Stat 35.874 37.587 12.476
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.45: First-Stage Regression for English Medium
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR CHAPTER 5
This Appendix presents the survey instrument used for the survey reported in Chapter 5.
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Andhra Pradesh School Choice Political Change Survey 
University of Pennsylvania and Poverty Action Lab 
 
To be filled out BEFORE the interview 
District Name:      District Code: 
PU Name:      PU Code: 
APF Student Name:     APF Student Code: 
Name of Respondent:     Interviewer: 
Date of Interview: 
Household identifier (e.g. house number, landmark, or name): 
Time of Interview Start: 
 
Interview the head of the household.  If the head of the household is not present, interview the adult most 
responsible for making household decisions.  If that person is not available, end interview and find a time to 
return when the head of the household will be present. 
 
Introduction 
 
“My name is [surveyor name], and I am from the Poverty Action Lab in Chennai.  I am conducting a survey on 
behalf of a PhD student at the University of Pennsylvania, a university in the United States of America.  We are 
surveying participants from the voucher lottery experiment you participated in about your opinions on village life 
and politics. 
 
We do not represent any government body.  The information gathered in the survey is for the purposes of an 
academic study only; it is not connected to any program or scheme and will not in any way affect the benefits that 
you or your family receives.  All of your answers will be confidential, meaning that we will not share your name 
or any details identifying this survey with anybody. 
 
Your opinions are important and we hope to learn from you.  While there is no immediate benefit to you from this 
research, we intend to share the general conclusions with others so that they can understand this area and its 
people better, and hopefully improve conditions over the long term.  If you have any questions about the research, 
you should feel free to ask me while I’m here or write to my supervisor at this address, or call him at this phone 
number. Emmerich Davies, Plot #286, Ayyappa Society, Madhapur, Hyderabad, 500081 or 09910685950. 
 
Participation in this survey is completely voluntary.  You are free to refuse to participate without causing any 
problem to me or anyone else.  You can stop the survey at any time and can skip any questions that you do not 
wish to answer.  If you do participate, we will not use your name in any reports.  The survey should take about 45 
minutes to one hour.   
 
Do you have any questions that you would like to ask? 
 
Would you be willing to participate in the survey? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
233
APF Student Code: 
2 
 
Section 1: Background Household Information 
 
Q1.1 What is your relationship to [Azim Premji Scholarship Program Child Name]: 
1. Father 
2. Mother 
3. Grandmother/Father 
4. Uncle/Aunt 
5. Older Brother/Sister 
6. Other (Please specify) _______________ 
 
Q1.2 Respondent’s Gender 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
Q1.3 What is your age?  ________________ 
 
Q1.4 What is your Caste Category? 
1. General 
2. OBC 
3. SC 
4. ST 
 
Q1.5 What is your religion? 
1. Hindu 
2. Muslim 
3. Christian 
4. Buddhist 
5. Sikh 
6. Jain 
7. Parsi 
8. Other (Please Specify) __________________ 
 
Q1.6 What is your occupation? (Multicoding allowed). 
1. Agriculture 
2. Agricultural labour (other’s land) 
3. Laborer (Non-Agricultural) 
4. Non-Farm Enterprise (e.g. Shopkeeper) 
5. Salaried Employee 
6. Housewife 
7. Student 
8. Retired 
9. Other (Please Specify) _____________________ 
10. Unemployed 
 
Q1.7 What was your highest level of schooling? ___________ 
 
Q1.8 How many people live in your household? ___________ 
 
Q1.9 How many school age children are there in this household? ___________ 
 
234
APF Student Code: 
3 
 
Q1.10 How many members of your household live outside of the village for more than one month in a year for 
work? ___________ 
 
Q1.11 How many members of your household live outside of the village for more than one month in a year for 
education? ___________ 
 
Q1.12 Are any of your household members daily wage labourers? How many? 
1. Yes. _____ 
2. No. -> Skip to Q1.14 
3. Refuse to answer -> Skip to Q1.14 
4. Not applicable -> Skip to Q1.14 
 
Q1.13 What is the average daily wage they earn total? 
 
Q1.14 Are any of your household members salaried employees? How many? 
1. Yes. ______ 
2. No. -> Skip to Q1.16  
3. Refuse to answer -> Skip to Q1.16  
4. Not applicable -> Skip to Q1.16 
 
Q1.15 What is their total salary? ___________ 
 
Q1.16 How much land does your household own? (in cents and acres) 
____________cents ______________ acres 
 
Q1.17 Does your household own any livestock such as cows, buffalo, goats, horses, chickens? How many? 
(Allow multi-coding) 
1. Cows?  _____ 
2. Buffalo? ______ 
3. Goats? _____ 
4. Horses? _____ 
5. Chickens? ______ 
6. None of these things 
 
Q1.18 Do you own any of these things? How many? (Allow multi-coding) 
1. Bicycle ____ 
2. Motorcycle ____ 
3. Three-wheeler ____ 
4. Car _____ 
5. TV ____ 
6. Radio _____ 
7. Refrigerator ____ 
8. Gas stove _____ 
9. Phone/Mobile _____ 
10. None of these things 
Q1.19 Do you own or rent your house? 
1. Own 
2. Rent 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refuse to answer 
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Q1.20 In the last year, have you paid any of the following? (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. House tax 
2. Water tax 
3. Other taxes or fees paid to the Gram Panchayat 
4. Contributions to festivals 
5. Contributions to community projects (like the school) 
6. Contributions to the temple, mosque or church 
7. Income tax 
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The following questions apply only to the APSC scholarship child and the school you sent them to for the past five 
years. 
 
Q2.14 During school hours was your scholarship child’s teacher: 
1. Always present? 
2. Mostly present? 
3. Sometimes present? 
4. Never present? 
5. Don’t know 
6. Can’t Remember 
 
Q2.15 Did you have the mobile number of your scholarship child’s teacher? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. Can’t Remember 
 
Q2.16 Were you ever invited for a meeting with a teacher or headmaster regarding your scholarship child’s 
performance in school? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. Can’t Remember 
 
Q2.17 Did you ever attend a meeting with a teacher or headmaster regarding your scholarship child’s performance in 
school? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. Can’t Remember 
 
Q2.18 If you wanted to hold a same day meeting with your scholarship child’s teacher or headmaster, was this 
possible? 
1. Yes, always possible 
2. Yes, sometimes possible 
3. No, never possible 
4. Don’t know 
5. Can’t Remember 
 
Q2.19 How effective was your scholarship child’s school at solving problems such as discipline, learning levels, or 
lack of homework with your scholarship’s child’s education? 
1. Very effective 
2. Somewhat effective 
3. Not at all effective 
4. Never had any problems with scholarship child’s education 
5. Don’t know 
6. Can’t remember 
 
Q2.20 How many days per month should teachers be in the school teaching? 
1. _____________ 
2. Don’t know 
3. Refuse to answer 
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Q2.21 How many hours per day should teachers be in school teaching? 
1. _____________ 
2. Don’t know 
3. Refuse to answer 
 
Q2.22 How do you think that the building grounds and teaching aids in your scholarship child’s school compared 
with those in other schools in the neighbouring villages? 
1. Much better 
2. Better 
3. The same 
4. Worse 
5. Much worse 
6. Don’t know 
7. Refused to answer 
 
Q2.23 How do you think that the quality of the teachers in your scholarship child’s school compared with those in 
the other schools in the neighbouring villages? 
1. Much better 
2. Better 
3. The same 
4. Worse 
5. Much worse 
6. Don’t know 
7. Refused to answer 
 
Q2.24 Looking at all the factors, how you think your scholarship child’s school compared with the schools in 
neighbouring villages? 
1. Much better 
2. Better 
3. The same 
4. Worse 
5. Much worse 
6. Don’t know 
7. Refused to answer 
 
Q2.25 In what school have you admitted [Name of APSC Child]? 
1. Government high school 
2. Private Telugu Medium School 
3. Private English Medium School 
4. Government Residential School 
5. Private Residential School 
6. Welfare hostel 
7. Madrassa or other Muslim religious school 
8. Hindu school 
9. Still in 5th class or below and receiving scholarship -> Skip to Q 2.30 
10. Still in 5th class or below and not receiving scholarship -> Skip to Q2.30 
 
Q2.26 Did you have to make an informal payment to have [Name of APSC Child] admitted to secondary school? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to answer 
4. Don’t know 
5. Not applicable 
Q2.27 If so, how much? ___________ 
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Q2.28 Did you have to make an informal payment to receive a transfer certificate for [Name of APSC Child]? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to answer 
4. Don’t know 
 
Q2.29 If so, how much? ___________ 
 
Q.2.30 What school would you have preferred to have your [Name of APSC Child] admitted? 
1. Government high school 
2. Private Telugu Medium School 
3. Private English Medium School 
4. Government Residential School 
5. Private Residential School 
6. Welfare Hostel 
7. Madrassa or other Muslim religious school 
8. Hindu school 
9. Same school as child was admitted. -> Skip to Q 2.32 
 
Q2.31 Why did you not have your [Name of APSC Child] admitted in that school? [Multiple coding allowed] 
1. The school was too expensive 
2. The school was too far away 
3. The child did not like the school 
4. Other (Please Specify) ___________ 
 
I now want to ask some questions about other government services other than education. 
 
Q2.32 If a family member falls sick, where would you take them? 
1. Government Doctor or Nurse 
2. Government Dr. or Nurse in Private facility 
3. Private Doctor or Nurse 
4. Non-Government organisation clinic/hospital 
5. Mobile services van or health camp 
6. Pharmacy 
7. Traditional Healer such as ayurveda 
8. Other (please specify) _____________ 
9. Nowhere 
 
Q2.33 How much would you pay to access this facility? 
1. _______ 
2. No payment 
3. Don’t know 
 
Q2.34 Where is the closest government health centre? 
1. In the village 
2. Outside the village 
Q2.35 What sources of drinking water do you use? (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Household government water connection (tap) 
2. Private water source (own), such as private boring or well 
3. Common government source (public), such as handpump or tank 
4. Private water source (other’s), such as private tanker or neighbour’s water supply 
5. River or lake 
6. Other 
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Q2.36 How long does it take to reach your closest water source? 
1. Less than 15 mins 
2. 15-30 mins 
3. More than 30 mins 
 
Q2.37 Do you have a government water connection in your home? 
1. Yes 
2. No -> skip to Q2.42 
 
Q2.38 How often does water flow in the connection? 
1. Daily 
2. Every 2-3 days 
3. Weekly 
4. Never 
5. Not applicable (No government water connection) 
 
Q2.39 How long have you had a government water connection? 
1. _____ 
2. Not applicable (No government water connection) 
3. Don’t know 
 
Q2.40 How much did you pay to establish the connection? 
1. _____ 
2. No payment 
3. Not applicable (No government water connection) 
4. Don’t know 
 
Q2.41 How satisfied are you with your government water connection? 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied 
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 
5. Very dissatisfied 
6. Not applicable (do not have a government water connection) 
 
Q2.42 Do you have electricity in your home? 
1. Yes 
2. No -> skip to Q2.46 
 
Q2.43 How long have you had a connection? 
1. _____ 
2. Not applicable (No government water connection) 
3. Don’t know 
 
Q2.44 How much did you pay to establish the connection? 
1. ______ 
2. No payment 
3. Not applicable (No government water connection) 
4. Don’t know 
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Q2.45 How satisfied are you with your electricity connection? 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied 
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 
5. Very dissatisfied 
6. Not applicable (do not have a government electricity connection) 
 
Q2.46 Does your household qualify for a Below Poverty Line or “white” ration card? 
1. No, don’t qualify -> skip to Section 3 
2. Yes, qualify but don’t have a card -> skip to Section 3 
3. Yes, have Below Poverty Line card 
 
Q2.47 How long have you had a Below Poverty Line card? (Years) 
1. _______ 
2. Not applicable (Do not have a Below Poverty Line card) 
 
Q2.48 How much did it cost to get the Below Poverty Line card? 
1. _______ 
2. No payment 
3. Not applicable (Do not have a Below Poverty Line card) 
4. Don’t know 
 
Q2.49 How satisfied are you with the quality of government rations? 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied 
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 
5. Very dissatisfied 
6. Not applicable (do not have a Below Poverty Line card) 
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Section 3: Associational Activities 
 
Moving from welfare schemes, I want to ask you some questions about organisations you might belong to and 
activities you might participate in in the village. 
 
Q3.1 Other than political parties, are you a member of any religious/caste organisation or association? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Don’t Know 
 4. Refuse to Answer 
 
Q3.2 Aside from caste and religious organisation, do you belong to any other associations and organisations like co-
operatives, farmers’ associations, trade unions, welfare organisations, school management committees, or cultural and 
sports organisations? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Don’t Know  
 4. Refuse to Answer 
 
Q3.3 Are you a member of your village’s School Management Committee? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No committee exists in this village -> skip to Q3.5 
4. Don’t know 
5. Refused to answer 
 
Q3.4 Have you attended your village’s School Management Committee Meeting in the last year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. No SMC active 
5. Refuse to Answer 
 
Q3.5 Are you a member of your village’s Academic Monitoring Committee? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. No AMC exists in this village -> skip to Q3.7 
 4. Refuse to answer 
 
Q3.6 Have you attended your village’s Academic Monitoring Committee Meeting in the last year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. No AMC active 
5. Refuse to answer 
 
Q3.7 Are you a member of a local Self-Help Group (SHG)? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refuse to Answer 
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Section 4: Voting and Participation 
 
I would now like to ask you some questions about your voting and political participation over the last 4 years.  Some 
of these questions are sensitive and I would like to re-emphasize that you have the right to not answer or stop the 
interview at any point if you do not feel comfortable answering any question.  In all these questions, we want to know 
whether you participated or not, but not who you supported.  Please do not tell us who you voted for or what 
politicians you support at any point. 
 
Q4.1 While talking to people about the 2009 elections to the Lok Sabha, we find that some people were not able to 
vote.  How about you? Were you able to vote or not? 
1. Not able to vote 
2. Able to vote - > Skip to Q4.3 
3. Don’t know - > Skip to Q4.3 
4. Refuse to Answer - > Skip to Q4.3 
 
Q4.2 (If not voted) What was the main reason due to which you could not vote in this election? 
 1. Out of station 
 2. Not well 
 3. No interest/did not feel like voting 
 4. Prevented/Fear of violence 
 5. No identity card/identity proof 
 6. No good choice 
 7. Someone had voted in place of me before I went to vote 
 8. Other (Specify) ___________ 
 9. Don’t Know/Can’t Remember 
 10. Refused to answer 
 
Q4.3 Do you plan on voting in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections? 
1. Yes 
2. No -> Skip to Q4.5  
3. Don’t Know -> Skip to Q4.5 
4. Refuse to answer -> Skip to Q4.5 
 
Q4.4 Do you plan on voting for the same party or candidate in 2014 than you did in 2009? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Undecided 
5. Don’t intend to vote 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q4.5 And what about the assembly elections – did you vote in the 2009 Legislative Assembly Elections? 
1. Not able to vote  
2. Able to vote 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refuse to Answer 
 
Q4.6 Do you plan on voting in the 2014 Legislative Assembly elections? 
1. Yes 
2. No -> skip to Q4.8 
3. Don’t Know -> skip to Q4.8 
4. Refuse to answer -> skip to Q4.8 
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Q4.7 Do you plan on voting for the same party or candidate in 2014 than you did in 2009? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Undecided 
5. Don’t intend to vote 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q4.8 And what about the panchayat (corporate) elections – did you vote in the 2013 panchayat (2009 corporate) 
elections? 
1. Not able to vote 
2. Able to vote -> skip to Q4.10 
3. Don’t know  
4. Refuse to Answer  
 
Q4.9 (If not voted) What was the main reason due to which you could not vote in this election? 
 1. Out of station 
 2. Not well 
 3. No interest/did not feel like voting 
 4. Prevented/Fear of violence 
 5. No identity card/identity proof 
 6. No good choice 
 7. Someone had voted in place of me before I went to vote 
 8. Other (Specify) 
 9. Don’t Know 
 10. Refused to answer 
 
Q4.10 Did you vote for the same candidate or party in the 2013 panchayat (2009 corporate) election that you did in 
the 2006 panchayat (corporate) elections? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Same candidate did not run 
4. Can’t Remember 
5. Refuse to answer 
 
Q4.11 Are you a member of a political party? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to answer 
4. Don’t Know 
 
Q4.12 Did you attend your village’s last gram sabha meeting? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to Answer 
4. Don’t Know 
 
Q4.13 Have you participated in a political meeting or gathering such as an election meeting, procession, or rally over 
the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to Answer 
4. Don’t Know 
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Q4.14 Have you participated in door to door canvassing in the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to Answer 
4. Don’t Know 
 
Q4.15 Have you distributed election leaflets or put up posters in the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to Answer 
4. Don’t Know 
 
Q4.16 Has any candidate, party worker, or canvasser come to your house to ask for your vote over the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Refuse to Answer 
4. Don’t Know 
 
Q4.17 Has any candidate, party worker, or canvasser asked for your vote in exchange for a material gift, money, or 
job over the past year? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Refuse to Answer 
 4. Don’t know 
 
Q4.18 While voting, what is the most important consideration for you?  The candidate, your caste or community’s 
interest or something else? 
1. Candidate 
2. Party 
3. Caste/Community 
4. I/members of my family have benefitted, or expect to benefit from the candidate 
5. I am impressed by the candidate’s personality 
6. The candidate is accessible 
7. This village will benefit broadly from the candidate 
8. Something else (Please specify) ___________ 
9. Don’t Know 
10. Refuse to Answer 
 
Q4.19 For you, in this upcoming Lok Sabha and Legislative election, what are the biggest/most important issues? 
(Record exactly in the order mentioned and probe for 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 responses.  If respondent struggles, prompt with the 
following issues “For example household issues such as health and education, or jobs, village infrastructure issues 
such as roads, electricity, or water, community issues such as the uplift of your caste, state issues such as the division 
of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and Andhra Pradesh or International issues such as relations with Pakistan and 
the U.S?”). 
 1. ___________ 
 2. ___________ 
 3. ___________ 
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Q4.20 Do government school teachers in this village engage in any of the following non-teaching activities? (Code 
all that respondent mentions) (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Serving as election monitors? 
2. Serving as census enumerators? 
3. Work as private tutors? 
4. Campaigning for a political party or candidate? 
5. Other (Please specify)? ___________ 
6. Don’t know? 
 
Q4.21 Do private school teachers in this village engage in any of the following non-teaching activities? (Code all that 
respondent mentions). (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Serving as election monitors? 
2. Serving as census enumerators? 
3. Work as private tutors? 
4. Campaigning for a political party or candidate? 
5. Other (Please specify)? ___________ 
6. Don’t know? 
 
Q4.22 Do government health care workers engage in any of the following non-health related activities? (Code all 
that respondent mentions): (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Serving as election monitors? 
2. Serving as census enumerators? 
3. Private health-care activities such as a working as a nurse or a doctor for a fee? 
4. Campaigning for a political party or candidate? 
5. Other (Please specify)? ___________ 
6. Don’t know 
 
Q4.23 Do private health care workers engage in any of the following non-health related activities? (Code all that 
respondent mentions): (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Serving as election monitors? 
2. Serving as census enumerators? 
3. Campaigning for a political party or candidate? 
4. Other (Please specify)? ___________ 
5. Don’t know 
248
APF Student Code: 
17 
 
Section 5: Perception and Trust in Government 
 
I would now like to ask you some questions about your thoughts about government employees, politicians, and other 
service workers 
 
Q5.1 Do you think that government teachers care about the well-being of their students? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.2 Do you think that private teachers care about the well-being of their students? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.3 Do you think that the Gram Panchayat officials care about the well-being of villagers? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.4 Do you think that Block and District officials care about the well-being of villagers? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.5 Do you think that politicians, like the MLA or MP care about the well-being of villagers? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.6 Do you think that the Central Government (Government of India) cares about the well-being of villagers? 
1. Very much care 
2. Somewhat care 
3. Somewhat don’t care 
4. Very much don’t care 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
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Q5.7 Do you think that government school teachers treat all students equally? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.8 Do you think that private school teachers treat all students equally? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.9 Do you think that Gram Panchayat officials treat all villagers equally? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.10 Do you think that Mandal and District officials treat all villagers equally? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Refused to answer 
 
Q5.11 If the Central Government decided to give each villager 1,000 Rupees cash assistance following a drought or a 
bad harvest, how much do you think you would get after it passed through various levels of government? 
1. _______________ 
2. No amount 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Refused to Answer 
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Section 6: Claim Making 
 
I would now like to ask you some questions about how you get things done in your village.  Sometimes there are 
people who are well connected, meaning they know how to get things done both inside and outside the village. These 
people can help others with their problems, helping them to make contact with government agencies and to access 
government schemes and benefits. 
  
Q6.1 Are there any such people in your village or ward? 
1. Yes 
2. No -> skip to Q6.3 
3. Don’t know -> skip to Q6.3 
4. Refused to answer -> skip to Q6.3 
 
Q6.2 How would you describe such people? (Multi-coding allowed) 
1. Elders 
2. Caste or religious leaders 
3. “Effective” people like leaders, landowners, “big men” 
4. Educated people 
5. Youth 
6. Political party members 
7. Other (please specify) _________________ 
 
Q6.3 Who helps in replacing a non-performing government teacher? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Headmaster 
9. Other (please specify) ____________________ 
10. No one has helped 
11. Don’t Know 
 
Q6.4 Who helps in replacing a non-performing private school teacher? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Headmaster 
9. Other (please specify) ____________________ 
10. No one has helped 
11. Don’t Know 
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Q6.5 Who helps in having one’s child admitted to a preferred government school? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Other (please specify) _____________ 
9. No one has helped 
10. Don’t know 
 
Q6.6 Did anyone help your family acquire a white Below Poverty Line card? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Other (please specify)_________ 
9. No one has helped 
10. Don’t know 
 
Q6.7 Thinking back to the last time you had to take a relative to the hospital.  Did anyone help have your sick 
relative admitted to the hospital? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Other (please specify) __________ 
9. No one has helped 
10. Don’t know 
 
Q6.8 Who helps in getting wage employment through NREGA or other government schemes? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Other (please specify) _______________ 
9. No one has helped 
10. Don’t know 
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Q6.9 Who helps gain access to dealing with the land administration agency or the police? 
1. Gram Panchayat Officials 
2. Other Government Officials 
3. Politicians/Political Parties 
4. Village or Neighbourhood Groups/Organisations 
5. Caste/Religious Groups/Leaders 
6. Effective People/Fixers 
7. NGO 
8. Other (please specify) _______________ 
9. No one has helped 
10. Don’t know 
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Section 7: Privatization, Market-Beliefs, and Effectiveness of Government 
 
PDS Transfers 
 
There have recently been debates on whether government rations should be provided through government ration 
shops, or if households should be given money to buy whatever food they choose.  The amount of the cash transfer 
will be based on the difference in the price of an item between a kirana store and the ration store, multiplied by your 
monthly entitlement of that item.  For example, if your household is eligible to purchase 10kgs of rice from the ration 
store at Rs. 5/kg, and the price of rice at the kirana store is Rs. 20/kg, then the government is currently providing you a 
subsidy of Rs. 15/kg (Rs. 20/kg – Rs. 5/kg) and a total of Rs. 150 (Rs. 15/kg *10 kgs).  Under a cash transfer program, 
the same cash transfer of Rs. 150 would be provided to you as cash every month.  The amount of the cash transfer 
will be adjusted every year to account for inflation.  All the questions in this section refer to monthly cash transfers 
for the next month. 
 
Q7.1 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 200 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.2 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 250 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.3 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 300 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.4 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 350 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.5 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 400 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.6 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 450 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
Q7.7 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 500 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.8 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 550 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
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Q7.9 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 600 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.10 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 650 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.11 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 700 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.12 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 750 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.13 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 800 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.14 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 850 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.15 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 900 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
 
Q7.16 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 950 INSTEAD of your current monthly 
grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19 
2. No 
Q7.17 Would you prefer a monthly cash transfer from the government of Rs. 1000 INSTEAD of your current 
monthly grain/fuel entitlements at the Ration Shop? 
1. Yes -> skip to Q7.19  
2. No 
Q7.18 What is the minimum amount of cash you would prefer to have in place of discounted commodities at your 
ration shop? 
 
Q7.19 How much do you think the Government of India spends on government rations per household per month? 
1. _________ 
2. Don’t know 
Q7.20 The Government of India spends approximately Rs. 750 per month per household on food through fair price 
shops.  Would you prefer for rations to be distributed through government ration shops at subsidised prices, or would 
you prefer to be given this money to buy food as you please? 
 1. Rations to be distributed through government ration shops 
 2. Given money to buy rations as you please. 
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School Voucher Transfers 
 
There have recently been debates on whether education should be provided by the government or if households should 
be given money to send their children to whatever schools they please.  All the questions in this section refer to yearly 
cash transfers for the next year. 
 
Q7.21 If you were given a choice between receiving an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 
3,000 per year or Rs. 250 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish (including 
private school fees, books, uniform, transport, and private tuition), or of being able to send your child to the 
government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.22 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 3,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 290 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.23 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 4,000 per year or 
approximately Rs. 330 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.24 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 4,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 375per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.25 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 5,000 per year or 
approximately Rs. 417 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.26 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 5,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 458 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.27 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 6,000 per year or 
approximately Rs. 500  per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.28 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 6,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 542 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
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Q7.29 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 7,000  per year or 
approximately Rs. 583 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.30 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 7,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 625 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.31 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 8,000 per year or 
approximately Rs. 667 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.32 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 8,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 708 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.33 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 9,000 per year or 
approximately Rs. 750 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.34 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 9,500 per year or 
approximately Rs. 792 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37 
2. Government school 
 
Q7.35 Would you prefer an annual education scholarship from the government of Rs. 10,000  per year or 
approximately Rs. 833 per month, that you can spend on your child’s education in any way you wish, or of being able 
to send your child to the government school for free (as it currently is), what would you prefer? 
1. Cash transfer -> skip to Q7.37  
2. Government school 
 
Q7.36 What is the minimum amount of cash you would prefer to have instead of government provision of primary 
education per year? 
 
Q7.37 How much do you think the Government of India spends on providing primary education per child per year? 
1. ________ 
2. Don’t know 
Q7.38 The Government of India spends approximately Rs. 8,400 per year per child (or Rs. 700 per month per child) 
in providing primary education.  Would you prefer to receive this money as an education scholarship and be able to 
choose whatever school you please, or would you prefer to send your child to the government school for free (as it 
currently is)? 
1. Government should provide education 
2. Receive the money as cash and choose schools as they please 
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Q7.39 If you were looking for a job today, would you prefer a government job, a private sector job, or to be self-
employed? 
1. Government job 
2. Private job 
3. I would prefer to be self-employed. 
 
Q7.40 If you were seeking health services or education for a family member today, would you prefer the service 
from a government body or from a private body? 
1. Government body 
2. Private body 
 
Q7.41 Which statement about the provision of health care and education do you agree with more? 
1. The Government of India should both finance and administer the provision of these services 
2. The Government of India should finance these services, but private actors should administer these 
services 
3. Private actors should both finance and administer these services. 
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Thank you very much for participating in this survey, your responses are very valuable for us and will hopefully 
contribute to debates on how to improve this area in the future.  As mentioned previously, your responses will not be 
shared with anyone but the principal researchers on this project. 
 
To be completed AFTER interview, but BEFORE leaving respondent’s house 
 
Time of Finish: 
 
Interviewer, please note the house material (on average): 
1. “Kaccha” (mud, wood, other “rough materials) 
2. Tin/metal 
3. Concrete/pucca 
4. Other 
 
Please note the house roof material: 
1. “Kaccha” (mud, wood, other “rough” materials) 
2. Tin/metal 
3. Concrete/pucca 
4. Other 
 
Interview Quality: (Multiple coding allowed) 
1. No major problems, respondent cooperative. 
2. Respondent at first reluctant, but satisfactory interview and all responses obtained. 
3. Respondent reluctant, all responses obtained but reason to be skeptical about validity. 
4. Respondent reluctant and several responses not obtained. 
5. Respondent encountered difficulty with questions to personal physical problems or problems of recall. 
6. Interviewer failed to ask two or more questions. 
7. Order of questions altered to facilitate interview. 
8. Interview marred by interruptions or presence of other persons (Note who was present.) 
 
Note any other impressions of interview: 
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